Exhibit (a)(5)(iii)
| STEPHEN R. BASSER (121590) | ||||
| 1 | SAMUEL M. WARD (216562) | |||
| BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE | ||||
| 2 | One America Plaza | |||
| 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 | ||||
| 3 | San Diego, CA 92101 | |||
| Telephone: (619) 230-0800 | ||||
| 4 | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 | |||
| 5 | Counsel For Plaintiffs Ryan Ridgeway and | |||
| 6 | David Thompson | |||
| 7 | ||||
| 8 | ||||
| 9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |||
| 10 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |||
| 11 | ||||
| 12 | RYAN RIDGEWAY AND DAVID THOMPSON, | CASE NO. 109CV157437 | ||
| 13 | Plaintiffs, | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR | ||
| 14 | INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RE: BREACH OF | |||
| v. |
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND AIDING AND | |||
| 15 | ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY | |||
| BING YEH, YAH WEN HU, RONALD | DUTY | |||
| 16 | CHWANG, TERRY NICKERSON, EDWARD | |||
| 17 | Y.W. YANG, SILICON STORAGE | |||
| TECHNOLOGY, INC. and PROPHET EQUITY | ||||
| 18 | LP, | |||
| JURY TRIAL DEMANDED | ||||
| 19 | Defendants. | |||
| 20 | ||||
| 21 | ||||
| 22 | ||||
| 23 | ||||
| 24 | ||||
| 25 | ||||
| 26 | ||||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
| VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT | ||
| 1 | Plaintiffs, Ryan Ridgeway and David Thompson, by their attorneys, allege on | |
| 2 | information and belief except as to paragraph 7, which plaintiff Ryan Ridgeway alleges on | |
| 3 | personal knowledge and paragraph 8, which plaintiff David Thompson alleges on personal | |
| 4 | knowledge: | |
| 5 | SUMMARY OF THE ACTION | |
| 6 | 1. This is a shareholder class action on behalf of the public shareholders of Silicon | |
| 7 | Storage Technology, Inc. (“Silicon Storage” or the “Company”) against the Company and its | |
| 8 | Board of Directors (the “Board” or the “Individual Defendants”), to enjoin the proposed | |
| 9 | acquisition of Silicon Storage by Prophet Equity LP (“Prophet”), and alleging that the Board | |
| 10 | breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the proposed sale of the Company to Prophet | |
| 11 | and members of the Company’s management for $2.10 per share in cash, or approximately | |
| 12 | $201 million in the aggregate (the “Proposed Transaction”). | |
| 13 | 2. The Proposed Transaction is unfair and fails to maximize shareholder value and | |
| 14 | otherwise undervalues the Company’s shares. The consideration offered to public shareholders | |
| 15 | is only a 13% premium over the close of $1.86 per share on the day before the Proposed | |
| 16 | Transaction was announced publicly. Indeed, the Company’s shares traded at or above the | |
| 17 | offering price as recently as two weeks before the Proposed Transaction was announced and | |
| 18 | since the announcement of the Proposed Transaction shares have traded over the inadequate | |
| offer price. | ||
| 19 | 3. Accordingly, this action seeks, inter alia, equitable relief seeking to enjoin the | |
| 20 | Proposed Transaction and compelling the Board to properly exercise its fiduciary duties to | |
| 21 | maximize shareholder value in connection with the Proposed Transaction or any alternate | |
| 22 | transaction. | |
| 23 | JURISDICTION AND VENUE | |
| 24 | 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the cause of action asserted herein pursuant to | |
| 25 | the California Constitution, Article VI, § 10, because this case is a cause not given by statute to | |
| 26 | other trial courts. | |
| 27 | 5. This Court has jurisdiction over defendant Silicon Storage because it conducts | |
| 28 | business in California and maintains its principal place of business at 1171 Sonora Court, | |
1
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Sunnyvale, California. This action is not removable. | |
| 2 | 6. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and had an | |
| effect in this County. | ||
| 3 | PARTIES | |
| 4 | 7. Plaintiff Ryan Ridgeway is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder of | |
| 5 | Silicon Storage. | |
| 6 | 8. Plaintiff David Thompson is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder | |
| 7 | of Silicon Storage. | |
| 8 | 9. Defendant Silicon Storage supplies NOR flash memory semiconductor devices | |
| 9 | for digital consumers, networking, wireless communications, and the Internet computing | |
| 10 | markets. The Company produces and sells semiconductor products, including NAND flash | |
| 11 | controllers and NAND controller-based modules, smart card integrated circuits (“ICs”) and | |
| 12 | modules, flash microcontrollers, and radio frequency ICs and modules. It also produces and | |
| 13 | sells various products based on its proprietary SuperFlash design and manufacturing process | |
| 14 | technology, as well as licenses the SuperFlash technology for applications in semiconductor | |
| 15 | devices that integrate flash memory with other functions on a monolithic chip. Silicon Storage | |
| 16 | sells its products in Asia, North America and Europe. The Company’s common stock publicly | |
| 17 | trades on the NASDAQ Stock Market (“NASDAQ”) under the trading symbol “SSTI.” As of | |
| October 31, 2009, Silicon Storage had over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding. | ||
| 18 | 10. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yen”), one of the co-founders of Silicon Storage, has | |
| 19 | served as the President and Chief Executive Officer and has been a member of the Company’s | |
| 20 | Board of Directors since its inception in 1989. In April 2004, he was appointed Chairman of | |
| 21 | the Board of Directors. | |
| 22 | 11. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has been a member of the Board of Directors of | |
| 23 | Silicon Storage since 1995. He joined the Company in 1993 as Vice President of Technology | |
| 24 | Development. Currently, defendant Hu is the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating | |
| 25 | Officer of Silicon Storage. | |
| 26 | 12. Defendant Ronald Chwang has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 27 | Directors since June 1997. He is also a member of the Audit Committee and the Compensation | |
| 28 | Committee and the Chairman of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. | |
2
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | 13. Defendant Terry Nickerson has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 2 | Directors since April 2005. He is the Chairman of the Audit Committee and a member of the | |
| Compensation Committee and the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. | ||
| 3 | 14. Defendant Edward Y.W. Yang has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 4 | Directors since October 2007. | |
| 5 | 15. Defendant Prophet, a private equity firm, is located at 181 Grand Avenue, | |
| 6 | Southlake, Texas. | |
| 7 | 16. The defendants identified in ¶¶ 10 - 14 are collectively referred to herein as the | |
| 8 | “Individual Defendants.” By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the | |
| 9 | Company, the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs and the other | |
| 10 | public shareholders of Silicon Storage, and owe Plaintiffs and Silicon Storage’s other | |
| 11 | shareholders the highest obligations of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, due care, and full and | |
| fair disclosure. | ||
| 12 | 17. Each of the Individual Defendants at all times had the power to control and direct | |
| 13 | Silicon Storage to engage in the misconduct alleged herein. The Individual Defendants’ | |
| 14 | fiduciary obligations required them to act in the best interest of Plaintiffs and all other Silicon | |
| 15 | Storage shareholders. | |
| 16 | 18. Each of the Individual Defendants owes fiduciary duties of good faith, fair | |
| 17 | dealing, loyalty, candor, and due care to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class. They are | |
| 18 | acting in concert with one another in violating their fiduciary duties as alleged herein, and, | |
| specifically, in connection with the Proposed Transaction. | ||
| 19 | 19. As directors and/or officers of a publicly traded corporation, the Individual | |
| 20 | Defendants have an affirmative fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably | |
| 21 | available for the Company’s shareholders and to avoid taking action that: | |
| 22 | (a) discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase Silicon Storage; | |
| 23 | (b) adversely affects the value provided to the Company’s shareholders; | |
| 24 | (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; | |
| 25 | (d) adversely affects their ability to secure the best value reasonably | |
| 26 | available under the circumstances for the corporation’s shareholders; and/or | |
| 27 | (e) provides Silicon Storage insiders with preferential treatment at the | |
| 28 | expense of, or separate from, its public shareholders. | |
3
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | 7. In accordance with his/her duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual | |
| 2 | Defendants are also obligated to refrain from: | |
| 3 | (a) participating in any transaction in which their loyalties are divided; | |
| 4 | (b) participating in any transaction in which they will receive a personal | |
| financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the corporation; and/or | ||
| 5 | (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the | |
| 6 | public shareholders. | |
| SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS | ||
| 7 | 20. Silicon Storage, which was founded in 1989, designs, manufactures and markets | |
| 8 | a diversified range of memory and non-memory products for high volume applications in the | |
| 9 | digital consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet computing markets. With | |
| 10 | its proprietary, patented SuperFlash technology, the Company is a leading provider of | |
| 11 | nonvolatile memory solutions for products with various densities of high functionality flash | |
| 12 | memory components and flash mass storage products. The Company has a broad network of | |
| 13 | world-class manufacturing partners and technology licensees, including TSMC, which offers it | |
| 14 | under its trademark Emb-FLASH. Additionally, Silicon Storage offers non-memory products | |
| 15 | include NAND controller-based products, smart card ICs and modules, flash microcontrollers | |
| and radio frequency ICs and modules. | ||
| 16 | 21. The Company’s products have been very successful. On November 2, 2009, just | |
| 17 | days before the announcement of the Proposed Transaction, Silicon Storage unveiled the | |
| 18 | industry’s first 1.8V, high-speed quad-bit serial flash memory. It features an 80 MHz operating | |
| 19 | frequency and a specialized instruction set and allows programs to be stored and executed | |
| 20 | directly from the flash memory without the need for code shadowing. Its technology is ideal for | |
| 21 | mobile handsets, Bluetooth headsets, GPS devices and other small form factor, portable | |
| 22 | electronics. This new product follows after the Company won an Innovation of the Year Award | |
| from EDN Magazine in April of 2009 for another flash product. | ||
| 23 | 22. The Company’s positive prospects suggest that the Proposed Transaction | |
| 24 | undervalues its shares. Silicon Storage has seen bright prospects in recent months as a result of | |
| 25 | stronger product and licensing revenue and cost cuts to help the bottom line. Indeed, in | |
| 26 | September 2009, the Company raised its guidance for the second quarter ending September 30, | |
| 27 | 2009. The Company said it now sees revenue of $69 million to $71 million, up from a | |
| 28 | previously expected $61 million to $68 million and now expects net income of zero to 3 cents a | |
4
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | share, up from a previously forecast loss of 3-7 cents a share. Silicon Storage further said that | |
| 2 | the better forecast reflects “stronger than anticipated product and licensing revenues in the | |
| 3 | quarter as well as increased dividends on investments and lower operating expenses.” Despite | |
| 4 | its recent strong performance and its potential for continued growth and success, Silicon | |
| 5 | Storage, via its Board of Directors has willingly accepted inadequate consideration and entered | |
| into the Proposed Transaction to the detriment of its public shareholders. | ||
| 6 | 23. On November 13, 2009, Silicon Storage announced publicly that it agreed to be | |
| 7 | acquired by management and equity firm Prophet and members of the Company’s management, | |
| 8 | pursuant to which Silicon Storage’s public shareholders will receive $2.10 in cash for each | |
| 9 | share of common stock in the Company that they own. The aggregate value of the deal is | |
| $201 million. The Proposed Transaction is expected to close during the second quarter of 2010. | ||
| 10 | 24. Under the terms of the Proposed Transaction, shares of Silicon Storage will no | |
| 11 | longer trade on a stock exchange and shareholders will not receive a continuing interest in the | |
| 12 | Company. While the public shareholders’ investment in Silicon Storage will be terminated if | |
| 13 | the Proposed Transaction is consummated, defendant Yeh, the Company’s Chairman and Chief | |
| 14 | Executive Officer, and defendant Hu, the Company’s Executive Vice President and Chief | |
| 15 | Operating Officer, who together hold or control 12.7 percent of outstanding shares of Silicon | |
| 16 | Storage, will continue having an equity interest in the Company as they have agreed to | |
| 17 | exchange all of their shares of Silicon Storage for shares of capital stock of the resulting | |
| 18 | privately held company. Accordingly, Prophet and defendant Yeh and Hu stand to benefit from | |
| 19 | the Company’s promising growth and operational results. In contrast, Silicon Storage | |
| 20 | shareholders do not. Defendants Yeh and Hu have also entered into voting agreements pursuant | |
| 21 | to which they have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against | |
| any other acquisition proposals. | ||
| 22 | 25. The consideration to public shareholders is only a 13 percent premium over the | |
| 23 | $1.86 closing price on November 12, 2009, the last day of trading before the Proposed | |
| 24 | Transaction was announced. Shares traded at this level as recently as two weeks ago on | |
| 25 | October 29, 2009. Aside from the fact that the Proposed Transaction appears to favor two of | |
| 26 | Silicon Storage’s insider shareholders, the trading price of the Company’s common stock in the | |
| 27 | wake of the Proposed Transaction’s announcement suggests that the market believes that the | |
| 28 | shares should fetch a higher price. Indeed, since the Proposed Transaction was announced, the | |
5
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | stock has traded above the $2.10 offering price. Market reaction to the announcement of the | |
| 2 | Proposed Transaction has been swift, as investors sent Silicon Graphic’s stock price up | |
| 3 | approximately 20% to close at $2.24 on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. As a | |
| 4 | result, the price Prophet is offering in the Proposed Transaction, and the Company has | |
| unanimously accepted, already represents a discount to Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. | ||
| 5 | 26. A Strategic Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, consisting of all | |
| 6 | four of the so-called “independent” members of the Board, was formed to evaluate the Proposed | |
| 7 | Transaction. The Strategic Committee approved the Merger Agreement and resolved to | |
| 8 | recommend that the Company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. However, | |
| 9 | Bryant R. Riley, one of the independent directors since 2008 and a major holder in the | |
| 10 | Company, voted against the approval of the Merger Agreement and subsequently resigned from | |
| the Board of Directors on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. | ||
| 11 | 27. Moreover, Lloyd I. Miller, III, Silicon Storage’s second largest shareholder, filed | |
| 12 | a Schedule 13D-A with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on November | |
| 13 | 13, 2009. In it, Mr. Miller revealed that he “strongly opposes the price terms of the recently | |
| 14 | announced merger” and that “it would be in his best interest, and those of other stockholders, to | |
| 15 | attempt to influence the governance and business strategies of the Company.” Mr. Miller | |
| 16 | expressed concern about the appearance of opposition to the Proposed Transaction on the Board | |
| 17 | of Directors and about the appearance of conflicts of interest in the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 18 | Specifically, Mr. Miller notes (1) the resignation of Bryant R. Riley and his vote against the | |
| 19 | Proposed Transaction, and (2) the special treatment of the shares of two insiders, defendants | |
| 20 | Yeh and Hu, who will receive equity in the acquiring company while public shareholders will | |
| 21 | be cashed out at $2.10, a price that Mr. Miller believes is deficient. Mr. Miller is examining all | |
| 22 | of the options that he believes will enhance stockholder value, including encouraging, | |
| 23 | participating in or leading efforts to appoint individuals to the Company’s Board of Directors | |
| 24 | who would be independent of management and would represent the Company and the holders | |
| of the shares. | ||
| 25 | 28. No doubt recognizing that the deal is unfair to existing shareholders, the | |
| 26 | individual defendants, aided and abetted by Prophet, have attempted to camouflage their | |
| 27 | breaches of fiduciary duty to Silicon Storage shareholders by the inclusion of a cosmetic “go | |
| 28 | shop” provision in the Merger Agreement. This provision is insufficient to protect the interests | |
6
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | of Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. Any potential suitor for the Company’s shares must | |
| 2 | complete its due diligence within the short, 45 day time permitted by the “go shop” provision, | |
| 3 | which is expected to expire on December 28, 2009. Under the circumstances, the provision is | |
| 4 | cosmetic and merely intended to camouflage the fact that the Board violated its fiduciary duties | |
| 5 | and engaged in an unfair process that lead to an inadequate and unfair price. Now, any third | |
| 6 | party that would have paid a fair price for the Company is advantaged by the knowledge that the | |
| 7 | Board has already made it clear that it would be willing to agree, and indeed has agreed, to a | |
| wholly unfair and inadequate price and is not focused upon maximizing shareholder value. | ||
| 8 | 29. Moreover, if a potential acquiror were to propose a transaction more favorable to | |
| 9 | Silicon Storage’s public shareholders, pursuant to Section 8.3(b) of the Merger Agreement, the | |
| 10 | Company would be required to pay the sum of $7.05 million or approximately 3.5 percent of the | |
| 11 | deal value to Prophet as a termination fee, thus hindering the prospect of a more favorable | |
| transaction from being proposed. | ||
| 12 | 30. Accordingly, the Proposed Transaction undervalues the Company’s shares when | |
| 13 | giving due consideration to the Company’s anticipated operating results and prospects. The | |
| 14 | Proposed Transaction will deny class members their right to share proportionately and equitably | |
| 15 | in the true value of the Company’s valuable and profitable business, and future growth in profits | |
| 16 | and earnings, at a time when the Company is poised to increase its profitability. Unless the | |
| 17 | Individual Defendants are enjoined from breaching their fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs and the | |
| other public shareholders of Silicon Storage will continue to suffer irreparable harm. | ||
| 18 | 31. Plaintiffs allege herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in | |
| 19 | connection with the Proposed Transaction, violated the fiduciary duties owed to plaintiffs and | |
| 20 | the other public shareholders of Silicon Storage, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, | |
| 21 | candor, due care and independence, insofar as they stood on both sides of the transaction and | |
| 22 | engaged in self-dealing and obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal | |
| 23 | financial benefits, not shared equally by plaintiffs or the Class. As a result of the Individual | |
| 24 | Defendants’ self-dealing and divided loyalties, neither Plaintiffs nor the Class will receive | |
| 25 | adequate or fair value for their Silicon Storage investment in the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 26 | 32. Because the Individual Defendants have breached their duties of due care, | |
| 27 | loyalty and good faith in connection with the Proposed Transaction, the burden of proving the | |
| 28 | inherent or entire fairness of the Proposed Transaction, including all aspects of its negotiation, | |
7
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | structure, price and terms, is placed upon the Individual Defendants as a matter of law. | |
| CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | ||
| 2 | 33. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to §382 of the California Code of Civil | |
| 3 | Procedure on their own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all common stockholders of | |
| 4 | Silicon Storage who are being and will be harmed by defendants’ actions described below (the | |
| 5 | “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, | |
| 6 | corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendants, or their principals or | |
| 7 | affiliates. | |
| 8 | 34. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. | |
| 9 | 35. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of | |
| 10 | October 31, 2009, the Company had over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding held | |
| by scores, if not hundreds of individuals and entities scattered throughout America. | ||
| 11 | 36. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and | |
| 12 | predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions | |
| 13 | include, inter alia, the following: | |
| 14 | (a) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty of | |
| 15 | undivided loyalty, independence, due care and/or candor with respect to plaintiffs and the other | |
| 16 | members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 17 | (b) whether the Individual Defendants are engaging in self-dealing in | |
| 18 | connection with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 19 | (c) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to | |
| 20 | secure and obtain the best price reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiffs | |
| 21 | and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 22 | (d) whether defendants have breached any of their other fiduciary duties to | |
| 23 | Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction, | |
| 24 | including the duties of good faith, diligence, candor and fair dealing; | |
| 25 | (e) whether the defendants have impeded or erected barriers to discourage | |
| 26 | other offers for the Company or its assets; whether the consideration payable to Plaintiffs and | |
| 27 | the Class is unfair and inadequate; and | |
| 28 | (f) whether Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class would be | |
8
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | irreparably harmed if the transactions complained of herein are consummated. | |
| 2 | 37. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and | |
| plaintiffs do not have any interests adverse to the Class. | ||
| 3 | 38. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class, have retained competent | |
| 4 | counsel experienced in litigation of this nature and will fairly and adequately protect the | |
| 5 | interests of the Class. | |
| 6 | 39. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would | |
| 7 | create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the | |
| 8 | Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. | |
| 9 | 40. Plaintiffs anticipate that there will be no difficulty in the management of this | |
| 10 | litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient | |
| adjudication of this controversy. | ||
| 11 | 41. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect | |
| 12 | to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with | |
| 13 | respect to the Class as a whole. | |
| 14 | CAUSES OF ACTION | |
| 15 | COUNT I | |
| (For Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the Individual Defendants) | ||
| 16 | 42. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation set forth herein. | |
| 17 | 43. The defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor and | |
| 18 | independence owed to the public shareholders of Silicon Storage. | |
| 19 | 44. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, defendants, | |
| 20 | individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiffs | |
| 21 | and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in Silicon Storage. | |
| 22 | Moreover, they have violated their fiduciary duties by entering into the Proposed Transaction | |
| 23 | without regard to its fairness. | |
| 24 | 45. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to | |
| 25 | exercise the care required and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith and candor owed to | |
| 26 | the shareholders of Silicon Storage. | |
| 27 | 46. As a result of the actions of defendants, Plaintiffs and the Class have been and | |
| 28 | will be irreparably harmed in that they have not and will not be provided complete and candid | |
9
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | information concerning the Proposed Transaction, which information is in the possession of | |
| 2 | defendants. | |
| 3 | 47. Unless enjoined by this Court, the defendants will continue to breach their | |
| 4 | fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed | |
| 5 | Transaction that will result in irreparable harm to the Class. | |
| 6 | 48. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only | |
| 7 | through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiffs and the Class be fully | |
| 8 | protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which defendants’ actions threaten to | |
| 9 | inflict. | |
| 10 | COUNT II (For Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Silicon Storage and Prophet) | |
| 11 | 49. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation set forth herein. | |
| 12 | 50. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet are sued herein as aiders and | |
| 13 | abettors of the breaches of fiduciary duties outlined above by the Individual Defendants, | |
| 14 | as members of the Board and/or executives of Silicon Storage. | |
| 15 | 51. The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of due care, | |
| 16 | good faith, loyalty, and candor to the Silicon Storage stockholders by the actions alleged | |
| 17 | supra. | |
| 18 | 52. Such breaches of fiduciary duties could not and would not have occurred | |
| 19 | but for the conduct of Defendant Silicon Storage, which, therefore, aided and abetted | |
| 20 | such breaches via entering into the Proposed Transaction with Prophet. | |
| 21 | 53. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet directly breached or aided and/or abetted | |
| 22 | the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and the other holders of | |
| 23 | Silicon Storage stock. In connection with discussions regarding the Proposed Transaction, | |
| 24 | Silicon Storage provided, and Prophet obtained, sensitive non-public information concerning | |
| 25 | Silicon Storage’s operations and thus had unfair advantages which enabled it to acquire the | |
| 26 | Company at an unfair and inadequate price. | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
10
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | 54. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet had knowledge that it was aiding and | |
| 2 | abetting the Individual Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage | |
| 3 | stockholders. | |
| 4 | 55. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet rendered substantial assistance to the | |
| 5 | Individual Defendants in their breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage | |
| 6 | stockholders. | |
| 7 | 56. As a result of Silicon Storage’s and Prophet’s conduct of aiding and abetting the | |
| 8 | Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs and the other members of the | |
| 9 | Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from | |
| obtaining a fair price for their shares. | ||
| 10 | 57. As a result of the unlawful actions of Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet, | |
| 11 | Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not | |
| 12 | receive fair value for Silicon Storage’s assets and business and will be prevented from | |
| 13 | obtaining the real value of their equity ownership in the Company. Unless the actions of | |
| 14 | Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet are enjoined by the Court, it will continue to aid and | |
| 15 | abet the Individual Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs and the | |
| 16 | members of the Class, and will aid and abet a process that inhibits the maximization of | |
| 17 | stockholder value. | |
| 18 | 58. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at | |
| 19 | law. | |
| 20 | PRAYER FOR RELIEF | |
| 21 | WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment and preliminary and permanent relief, | |
| 22 | including injunctive relief, in their favor and in favor of the Class and against defendants as | |
| 23 | follows: | |
| 24 | A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action; | |
| 25 | B. Declaring and decreeing that the Merger Agreement was entered into in breach | |
| 26 | of the fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants and is therefore unlawful and | |
| 27 | unenforceable; | |
| 28 | C. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Proposed Transaction or any | |
| of the terms thereof, | ||
11
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | D. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining defendants, their agents, counsel, | |||
| 2 | employees and all persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed | |||
| 3 | Transaction, unless and until the defendants provide Silicon Storage shareholders with an offer | |||
| 4 | that is fair, equitable, maximizes shareholder value; | |||
| 5 | E. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a | |||
| 6 | transaction which is in the best interests of Silicon Storage’s shareholders and implement a | |||
| 7 | process for the sale of the Company designed to ensure that the highest possible price is | |||
| 8 | obtained; | |||
| 9 | F. Awarding Plaintiffs the costs and disbursements of this action, including | |||
| 10 | reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and | |||
| 11 | G. Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. | |||
| 12 | DATED: November 16, 2009 | Respectfully Submitted, | ||
| 13 | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE | |||
| 14 | STEPHEN R. BASSER | |||
| 15 | SAMUEL M. WARD | |||
| 16 | /s/ Stephen R. Basser | |||
| 17 | STEPHEN R. BASSER | |||
| 18 | 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 | |||
| 19 | San Diego, CA 92101 | |||
| 20 | Telephone: (619) 230-0800 | |||
| 21 | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 | |||
| 22 | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE | |||
| 23 | DANIEL E. BACINE | |||
| 24 | JULIE PALLEY | |||
| 25 | 3300 Two Commerce Square | |||
| 26 | 2001 Market Street | |||
| 27 | Philadelphia, PA 19130 | |||
| 28 | (215) 963-0600 | |||
| Attorneys for Plaintiff David Thompson | ||||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT