Exhibit (a)(5)(iv)
| 1 | JEFF S. WESTERMAN (SBN 94559) | |||
| 2 | jwesterman@milberg.com | |||
| 3 | MILBERG LLP | |||
| 4 | One California Plaza | |||
| 5 | 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3900 | |||
| 6 | Los Angeles, California 90071 | |||
| 7 | Telephone: (213) 617-1200 | |||
| 8 | Facsimile: (213) 617-1975 | |||
| 9 | MILBERG LLP | |||
| 10 | ANDREI V. RADO | |||
| 11 | arado@milberg.com | |||
| 12 | ANNE MARIE VU (SBN 238771) | |||
| 13 | avu@milberg.com | |||
| 14 | One Pennsylvania Plaza, 49th Floor | |||
| 15 | New York, NY 10119 | |||
| 16 | Telephone: (212) 594-5300 | |||
| 17 | Facsimile: (212) 868-1229 | |||
| 18 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | |||
| 19 | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |||
| 20 | FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |||
| 21 | LAWRENCE FISHER, on Behalf of | ) Case No: 109CV157444 | ||
| 22 | Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, | ) | ||
| 23 | ) CLASS ACTION | |||
| 24 | Plaintiff, | ) | ||
| 25 | v. |
) COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF | ||
| 26 | ) FIDUCIARY DUTIES | |||
| 27 | SILICON STORAGE TECHNOLOGY, | ) | ||
| 28 | INC, | ) | ||
| BING YEH, | ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED | |||
| YAW WEN HU, | ) | |||
| RONALD CHWANG, | ) | |||
| TERRY NICKERSON, | ) | |||
| EDWARD Y.W. YANG, | ) | |||
| PROPHET EQUITY LLC, | ) | |||
| and | ) | |||
| TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE | ) | |||
| HOLDINGS, INC., | ) | |||
| Defendants. | ) | |||
| ) | ||||
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | TABLE OF CONTENTS | |||
| 2 | Page | |||
| 3 | NATURE OF THE ACTION | 1 | ||
| 4 | JURISDICTION AND VENUE | 1 | ||
| 5 | THE PARTIES | 2 | ||
| 6 | THE DEFENDANTS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES | 4 | ||
| 7 | CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | 5 | ||
| 8 | COMPANY BACKGROUND | 7 | ||
| 9 | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS | 13 | ||
| 10 | Conflicts of Interests Relating to the Proposed Transaction |
13 | ||
| 11 | Defendants Yeh and Hu Will Continue To Have An Equity Stake In SST’s Business |
14 | ||
| 12 | The Process is Unfair |
14 | ||
| 13 | TRH’s Offer to Acquire the Outstanding Shares of SST At An Inadequate Price |
16 | ||
| 14 | FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants and the TRH Defendants |
17 | ||
| 15 | SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against Defendants SST and the TRH Defendants |
19 | ||
| 16 | PRAYER | 21 | ||
| 17 | DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL | 21 | ||
| 18 | ||||
| 19 | ||||
| 20 | ||||
| 21 | ||||
| 22 | ||||
| 23 | ||||
| 24 | ||||
| 25 | ||||
| 26 | ||||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
- i -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | Plaintiff Lawrence Fisher, (“Plaintiff”) by his attorneys, for his complaint against | |
| 2 | Defendants, alleges upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and upon | |
| 3 | information and belief derived from, inter alia, a review of documents filed with the Securities | |
| 4 | and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and publicly available news sources, such as press releases | |
| 5 | and newspaper articles, as to all other matters, as follows: | |
| 6 | NATURE OF THE ACTION | |
| 7 | 1. This is a shareholder class action on behalf of Plaintiff and other public | |
| 8 | shareholders of Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. (“SST” or the “Company”) common stock | |
| 9 | against SST and its directors to enjoin Defendants from causing the Company to be acquired by | |
| 10 | Technology Resource Holdings, Inc. (“TRH”), a Prophet Equity LLC entity, for inadequate | |
| 11 | consideration and under circumstances unfair to public SST shareholders (the “Proposed | |
| 12 | Transaction”), pursuant to the Company’s announcement that SST had entered into an | |
| 13 | Agreement and Plan of Merger (the “Merger Agreement”) with TRH on November 13, 2009, in | |
| 14 | a deal worth approximately $201.285 million (based on the number of outstanding shares as of | |
| 15 | November 13, 2009). | |
| 16 | JURISDICTION AND VENUE | |
| 17 | 2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to the | |
| 18 | California Constitution, Article VI, Section 10, because this case is an action not given by statute | |
| 19 | to other trial courts. | |
| 20 | 3. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants in this action because SST is | |
| 21 | headquartered in this State, it is organized under the laws of this State, and because the improper | |
| 22 | conduct alleged in this Complaint occurred in and/or was directed at this State. Furthermore, this | |
| 23 | Court has jurisdiction over each of the Defendants because their wrongful conduct challenged in | |
| 24 | this Complaint was directed at, and intended to have its primary effect in, this State. Finally, | |
| 25 | many of the individual Defendants reside in California. | |
| 26 | 4. Venue lies in this Court because SST’s principal place of business is located in | |
| 27 | Sunnyvale, California within Santa Clara County, and Defendants’ wrongful acts occurred in | |
| 28 | ||
- 1 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | substantial part in, or were directed toward, Santa Clara County. Venue is also proper in this | |
| 2 | Court because many of those affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct reside in this County, | |
| 3 | and many of the potential witnesses reside or work in this County. | |
| 4 | 5. This action challenges the internal affairs or governance of SST and hence is not | |
| 5 | removable to Federal Court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 or the Securities | |
| 6 | Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f). | |
| 7 | THE PARTIES | |
| 8 | 6. Plaintiff is the owner of 20,650 shares of SST common stock and has been the | |
| 9 | owner of such shares at all relevant times, including prior to the announcement of the Proposed | |
| 10 | Transaction. | |
| 11 | 7. Defendant SST is a publicly traded corporation with its headquarters located at | |
| 12 | 1171 Sonora Court, Sunnyvale, California 94086. SST is traded on NASDAQ under the symbol | |
| 13 | “SSTI,” and has approximately 614 employees working at its facilities throughout the world | |
| 14 | including in Sunnyvale, California and Los Angeles, California. SST produces and sells | |
| 15 | semiconductor products, and various products based on its “SuperFlash” design and | |
| 16 | manufacturing process technology. The Company also licenses the SuperFlash technology to | |
| 17 | third parties for applications in semiconductor devices. SST sells its products in Asia, North | |
| 18 | America and Europe, and in 2008, the Company reported revenues of approximately $315.5 | |
| 19 | million. As of November 13, 2009, the Company had 95,850,000 shares of SST common stock | |
| 20 | outstanding. | |
| 21 | 8. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yeh”) has served as a President, Chief Executive Officer | |
| 22 | (“CEO”), and member of the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) since 1989. Yeh | |
| 23 | is a co-founder of SST and in April 2004, he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors | |
| 24 | (a position he continues to hold). Yeh is a significant holder of the Company’s common stock, | |
| 25 | beneficially owning 11.3% of the Company’s common stock. Defendant Yeh, along with | |
| 26 | Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (described in ¶ 9), and certain of their affiliates, reportedly hold | |
| 27 | approximately 12.7% of the Company’s outstanding common stock (directly or indirectly). This | |
| 28 | ||
- 2 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | Court has jurisdiction over Yeh because SST is headquartered in California and many of Yeh’s | |
| 2 | actions challenged in this Complaint occurred in this State. | |
| 3 | 9. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has served as a member of the Company’s Board | |
| 4 | since September 1995. Hu has worked as an officer of the Company since July 1993, and has | |
| 5 | served in various positions including Vice President, Technology Development; Vice President, | |
| 6 | Operations and Process Development; Senior Vice President, Operations and Process | |
| 7 | Development; and Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. Hu is a significant | |
| 8 | holder of the Company’s common stock, beneficially owning 1.4% of the Company’s common | |
| 9 | stock. Defendant Hu, along with Defendant Yeh (described in ¶ 8), and certain of their affiliates, | |
| 10 | reportedly hold approximately 12.7% of the Company’s outstanding common stock (directly or | |
| 11 | indirectly). This Court has jurisdiction over Hu because SST is headquartered in California and | |
| 12 | many of Hu’s actions challenged in this Complaint occurred in this State. | |
| 13 | 10. Defendant Ronald Chwang (“Chwang”) has served as a member of the | |
| 14 | Company’s Board since June 1997. Chwang is the chairman of the Board’s Strategic | |
| 15 | Committee that reviewed and recommended the Proposed Transaction. This Court has | |
| 16 | jurisdiction over Chwang because SST is headquartered in California and many of Chwang’s | |
| 17 | actions challenged in this Complaint occurred in this State. | |
| 18 | 11. Defendant Terry Nickerson (“Nickerson”) has served as a member of the | |
| 19 | Company’s Board since April 2005. Nickerson is a member of the Board’s Strategic Committee | |
| 20 | that reviewed and recommended the Proposed Transaction. This Court has jurisdiction over | |
| 21 | Nickerson because SST is headquartered in California and many of Nickerson’s actions | |
| 22 | challenged in this Complaint occurred in this State. | |
| 23 | 12. Defendant Edward Y.W. Yang (“Yang”) has served as a member of the | |
| 24 | Company’s Board since October 2007. Yang is a member of the Board’s Strategic Committee | |
| 25 | that reviewed and recommended the Proposed Transaction. This Court has jurisdiction over | |
| 26 | Yang because SST is headquartered in California and many of Yang’s actions challenged in this | |
| 27 | Complaint occurred in this State. | |
| 28 | ||
- 3 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 13. Defendant Prophet Equity LLC (“Prophet”), is a private equity firm duly | |
| 2 | organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of | |
| 3 | business at 181 Grand Avenue, Suite 201, Southlake, Texas 76092. Prophet is the parent | |
| 4 | company of TRH. This Court has jurisdiction over Prophet because many of Prophet’s actions | |
| 5 | challenged in this Complaint were directed at this State. | |
| 6 | 14. Defendant TRH is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the | |
| 7 | State of Delaware. It is wholly-owned by Prophet Equity LLC. This Court has jurisdiction over | |
| 8 | TRH because many of TRH’s actions challenged in this Complaint were directed at this State. | |
| 9 | 15. Unless otherwise noted, the Defendants identified in paragraphs 7 through 14 are | |
| 10 | hereinafter referred to collectively as “Defendants.” | |
| 11 | 16. The Defendants identified in paragraphs 8 through 12 collectively constitute the | |
| 12 | existing members of the Company’s Board of Directors.1 These five individuals are hereinafter | |
| 13 | referred to collectively as the “Individual Defendants” or the “Director Defendants.” As | |
| 14 | members of the Board these Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and all other | |
| 15 | public shareholders of SST and owe them the highest obligations of due care, loyalty, good faith | |
| 16 | and candor. | |
| 17 | 17. The Defendants identified in paragraphs 13 and 14 are hereinafter referred to | |
| 18 | collectively as the “TRH Defendants.” | |
| 19 | THE DEFENDANTS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES | |
| 20 | 18. Under applicable law, the directors and majority shareholders of a publicly held | |
| 21 | company such as SST have fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, disclosure, good faith and fair | |
| 22 | dealing and are liable to shareholders for breaches thereof. They are required to exercise good | |
| 23 | faith and subordinate their own selfish interests to those of the corporation where their interests | |
| 24 |
| |
| 25 | 1 Former director Bryant R. Riley opposed the Proposed Transaction and is not named as a | |
| 26 | defendant in this action at this time. Mr. Riley served as a member of the Company’s Board | |
| 27 | from June 2008 until his resignation on November 12, 2009. He also served as a member of the | |
| 28 | Board’s Strategic Committee that reviewed the Proposed Transaction. As a member of both the | |
| Board of Directors and Strategic Committee, Mr. Riley voted against the approval of the Merger | ||
| Agreement. | ||
- 4 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | conflict. Where it appears that a director and/or majority shareholder has obtained any personal | |
| 2 | profit from dealing with the corporation, and the transaction is drawn into question as between | |
| 3 | him/her/it and the stockholders of the corporation, the burden is upon the director or majority | |
| 4 | shareholder to show that the transaction has been fair, open and handled in the utmost good faith. | |
| 5 | 19. As alleged in detail below, Defendants have breached, and/or aided other | |
| 6 | Defendants’ breaches of, their fiduciary duties to SST’s public shareholders by acting to cause or | |
| 7 | facilitate the Proposed Transaction because it is not in the best interests of those shareholders. | |
| 8 | Specifically, the Proposed Transaction is in the best interests of the Director Defendants, and | |
| 9 | particularly Defendants Yeh and Hu, who have entered into a contribution agreement with the | |
| 10 | TRH Defendants in which they agreed to exchange all of their shares of SST common stock for | |
| 11 | shares of capital stock of the resulting privately held company, and without adequate | |
| 12 | compensation to SST’s public shareholders, as well as a voting agreement in which they have | |
| 13 | agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against any other acquisition | |
| 14 | proposals, and further agreed to certain restrictions on the transfer of those shares. | |
| 15 | 20. Because Defendants have knowingly or recklessly breached their fiduciary duties | |
| 16 | in connection with the Proposed Transaction, and/or are personally profiting from the same, the | |
| 17 | burden of proving the inherent or entire fairness of the Proposed Transaction, including all | |
| 18 | aspects of its negotiation, structure, and terms, is borne by Defendants as a matter of law. | |
| 19 | CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | |
| 20 | 21. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to California Code of Civil | |
| 21 | Procedure § 382 on behalf of himself and all other shareholders of the Company except the | |
| 22 | Defendants herein and any person(s), firm(s), trust(s), corporation(s), or other entit(ies) related to | |
| 23 | or affiliated with them, who are or will be threatened with injury arising from Defendants’ | |
| 24 | actions, as more fully described herein (the “Class”). | |
| 25 | 22. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them would be | |
| 26 | impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff, and can be | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 5 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are many hundreds, if not | |
| 2 | thousands, of Class members. SST had approximately 95.85 million shares of SST common | |
| 3 | stock outstanding as of November 13, 2009. | |
| 4 | 23. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, since Plaintiff and the | |
| 5 | other members of the Class have and will sustain harm arising out of Defendants’ breaches of | |
| 6 | their fiduciary duties. Plaintiff does not have any interests that are adverse or antagonistic to | |
| 7 | those of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff | |
| 8 | is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained counsel competent and | |
| 9 | experienced in this type of litigation. | |
| 10 | 24. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that | |
| 11 | predominate over any questions which, if they exist, may affect individual Class members. The | |
| 12 | predominant questions of law and fact include, among others, whether: | |
| 13 | (a) Defendants have and are breaching their fiduciary duties to the detriment | |
| 14 | of SST shareholders; | |
| 15 | (b) with respect to Defendants Yeh and Hu, whether they have engaged, and | |
| 16 | are continuing to engage, in a plan and scheme to benefit themselves at the expense of the Class | |
| 17 | members; | |
| 18 | (c) the consideration provided in the Proposed Transaction prevents the Class | |
| 19 | from receiving full value for their shares; | |
| 20 | (d) the Proposed Transaction is entirely fair to the members of the Class; | |
| 21 | (e) Defendants have disclosed all material facts in connection with the | |
| 22 | Proposed Transaction; | |
| 23 | (f) Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an injunction and other equitable | |
| 24 | relief; | |
| 25 | (g) Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed if Defendants are not | |
| 26 | enjoined from effectuating the conduct described herein; and | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 6 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | (h) the extent to which Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages, and | |
| 2 | the proper measure of those damages. | |
| 3 | 25. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient | |
| 4 | adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Further, as | |
| 5 | individual damages may be relatively small for most members of the Class, the burden and | |
| 6 | expense of prosecuting litigation of this nature makes it unlikely that members of the Class | |
| 7 | would prosecute individual actions. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this | |
| 8 | action as a class action. Further, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of | |
| 9 | the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying results, which may establish incompatible | |
| 10 | standards of conduct for Defendants. | |
| 11 | COMPANY BACKGROUND | |
| 12 | 26. Founded in 1989 by Defendant Yeh and a team of engineers, SST is reportedly | |
| 13 | the fifth largest NOR flash supplier in the world, and is a major supplier of integrated circuits | |
| 14 | addressing the requirements of high-volume applications in the internet computing, digital | |
| 15 | consumer, networking, and wireless communications markets. SST developed a non-volatile | |
| 16 | memory technology the company called “SuperFlash” for code or data storage in electronic | |
| 17 | systems and embedded memory for integrated logic circuits. Non-volatile memory devices | |
| 18 | retain data without a continuous supply of power. Virtually every microprocessor or | |
| 19 | microcontroller-based electronic system requires non-volatile memory to store a basic instruction | |
| 20 | set critical to the operation of the system. | |
| 21 | 27. SST also produces and sells other semiconductor products, including NAND flash | |
| 22 | controllers and NAND Controller-based modules; smart card integrated circuits (ICs), and | |
| 23 | modules; flash microcontrollers; and radio frequency ICs and modules. The Company produces | |
| 24 | and sells many products based on its SuperFlash design and manufacturing process technology. | |
| 25 | SST products are incorporated into products sold by many Fortune 500 companies, including | |
| 26 | Apple, Cisco, Dell, Freescale Semiconductor, Intel, IBM, Quanta, and Texas Instruments; as | |
| 27 | well as products sold by industry leaders such as LG Electronics, Legend Lenovo, NEC, | |
| 28 | ||
- 7 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | Nintendo, Panasonic, Philips, Samsung, Sanyo, Seagate, Sony, Sony Ericsson, Toshiba, Asustek, | |
| 2 | BenQ, First International Computer, or FIC, Gigabyte, Haier, Huawei, Infineon, Inventec, VTech | |
| 3 | and ZTE. | |
| 4 | 28. SST is known for creating innovative products which have a high demand in the | |
| 5 | market. In the Fall of 1992, SST introduced the world’s first single-board 30 MB 2.5" solid-state | |
| 6 | drive with standard hard-disk ATA interface and a 5 MB PC Card memory card with built-in | |
| 7 | controller and firmware at an industry show. In 1993, SST introduced its first SuperFlash | |
| 8 | technology products, with lower costs and faster write speeds. By the end of 1995, more than | |
| 9 | 90% of the PC motherboards produced in Taiwan had adopted SST’s 1 Mbit SuperFlash | |
| 10 | EEPROM product for the BIOS storage. | |
| 11 | 29. In November 1995, SST went public on the NASDAQ market and during the next | |
| 12 | 10 years the Company continued its expansion, introducing low to medium density memory | |
| 13 | products and expanded their applications beyond PCs. In 2004, SST began an initiative to | |
| 14 | diversify beyond flash memory products, targeting consumer and industrial products with | |
| 15 | embedded solid-state data storage and RF wireless communication. By the end of 2006, SST | |
| 16 | and its licensees had shipped more than seven billion integrated circuits based on SuperFlash | |
| 17 | technology. SST products are now used by almost every major electronic system manufacturer | |
| 18 | and can be found in virtually every type of IT and consumer product. | |
| 19 | 30. During the past few years SST stock has performed well and has consistently | |
| 20 | traded well above the offer price. In 2004, the stock hit a historic high closing at $16.77 per | |
| 21 | share on April 14, 2004. | |
| 22 | 31. Demand for SST products remained robust from 2006 through the first half of | |
| 23 | 2008. However, in the fourth quarter of 2008, in conjunction with the rapid slowdown in the | |
| 24 | global economy, SST experienced a significant weakening in demand for its products. | |
| 25 | 32. When SST common stock traded down to $2.10 in December 2008 in the depth of | |
| 26 | the economic crisis, it was the first time the stock had been that low for years. Even as recently | |
| 27 | as October 28, 2009, the stock closed at $2.13 per share, above the $2.10 offer price. | |
| 28 | ||
- 8 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 33. As the economy has improved the Company has experienced increased demand | |
| 2 | which has had a positive impact on earnings and earnings forecasts. | |
| 3 | 34. On September 29, 2009, the Company issued a press release entitled, “SST | |
| 4 | Updates Estimates For Third Quarter 2009,” raising revenue estimates, stating in relevant part: | |
| 5 | SST expects its third quarter revenues to be between $69 and $71 million, up | |
| 6 | from the previous estimates of between $61 million and $68 million, given on | |
| 7 | July 28, 2009. Net income per share is now expected to be between $0.00 and | |
| 8 | $0.03, up from the previous estimate of a net loss per share of between $0.07 and | |
| $0.03. This improvement in expected results is due to stronger than anticipated | ||
| product and licensing revenues in the quarter as well as increased dividends on | ||
| investments and lower operating expenses. | ||
| 9 | 35. On September 29, 2009, SST shares traded as high as $2.75. | |
| 10 | 36. On October 27, 2009, the Company issued a press release announcing earning | |
| 11 | results for the third quarter ended September 30, 2009, that was filed with the SEC on Form 8-K. | |
| 12 | The press release provided positive earnings compared to second quarter, and stated in relevant | |
| 13 | part: | |
| 14 | Net revenues for the third quarter were $71.3 million compared with $58.1 | |
| 15 | million in the second quarter of 2009 and with $92.4 million in the third quarter of | |
| 16 | 2008. Product revenues for the third quarter of 2009 were $61.8 million, | |
| 17 | compared with $51.8 million in the second quarter of 2009 and with $79.8 million | |
| 18 | in the third quarter of 2008. Revenues from technology licensing for the third | |
| quarter of 2009 were $9.5 million, compared with $6.3 million in the second | ||
| quarter of 2009 and with $12.6 million in the third quarter of 2008. | ||
| 19 | Income from operations for the third quarter of 2009 was $1.5 million compared | |
| 20 | with a loss from operations of $7.5 million in the second quarter of 2009 and with | |
| income from operations of $4.1 million in the third quarter of 2008. | ||
| 21 | Net income for the third quarter of 2009 was $3.1 million, or $0.03 per share, | |
| 22 | based on approximately 95.9 million diluted shares. By comparison, the company | |
| 23 | recorded a net loss of $6.4 million, or $0.07 per share, based on approximately | |
| 24 | 95.7 million diluted shares in the second quarter of 2009. For the third quarter of | |
| 2008, SST reported net income of $4.9 million, or $0.05 per share based on | ||
| approximately 99.7 million diluted shares. | ||
| 25 | SST finished the third quarter of 2009 with $143.8 million in cash, cash | |
| 26 | equivalents, short-term investments, and long-term marketable debt securities, up | |
| 27 | approximately $8.5 million from $135.3 million at June 30, 2009. | |
| 28 | ||
- 9 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 37. On November 2, 2009, the Company announced the introduction of an innovative | |
| 2 | product that is expected to revolutionize the industry. The press release provided in relevant | |
| 3 | part: | |
| 4 | SST (Silicon Storage Technology, Inc.) (Nasdaq: SSTI), a leader in flash memory | |
| 5 | technology, today announced the industry’s first 1.8V, high-speed quad-bit serial | |
| 6 | flash memory. Featuring an 80 MHz operating frequency and a specialized | |
| 7 | instruction set, the new 26WF Series Serial Quad I/O (SQI) family of 4-bit | |
| 8 | multiplexed I/O serial interface devices enables execute-in-place (XIP) capability, | |
| 9 | allowing programs to be stored and executed directly from the flash memory | |
| 10 | without the need for code shadowing on an SRAM. The 26WF Series, the first | |
| high-performance 1.8V quad I/O serial flash product, marries the performance | ||
| typically associated with parallel flash memory, with the low pin count and space | ||
| savings of serial flash memory, plus reduced power. This combination of high | ||
| performance and low power consumption is ideal for mobile handsets, Bluetooth | ||
| headsets, GPS devices and other small form factor, portable electronics. | ||
| 11 | Today’s announcement builds on the success of SST’s 3.0V SQI flash products, | |
| 12 | the 26VF Series, which in April of this year won an Innovation of the Year | |
| 13 | Award from EDN Magazine. Both 26 Series devices from SST feature a novel | |
| 14 | read memory indexing feature that enables the devices to achieve the industry’s | |
| 15 | fastest random access performance of any quad-bit serial memory. Read memory | |
| indexing allows the system to jump from one address to another within a | ||
| 256-Byte page, within a 64-KByte block or from one block to another using indirect | ||
| addressing. This results in a significant reduction in the number of clock cycles | ||
| and dramatically accelerates data access. | ||
| 16 | With sustained burst data rates of up to 320 Mbit/sec., the 26WF Series devices | |
| 17 | provide serial flash performance exceeding that of typical parallel flash memory. | |
| 18 | To provide additional system speed and performance while reducing access time, | |
| 19 | the 26WF devices support 8-, 16-, 32- and 64-Byte burst mode operation with | |
| wrap around. This feature allows designers to execute code in burst snippets for | ||
| RAM-less applications or fill cache line buffers for applications where the system | ||
| architecture uses pipelining to maximize bus bandwidth. | ||
| 20 | The 26WF Series SQI devices offer memory write performance enhancements to | |
| 21 | improve overall device performance, including flexible erase capability to erase | |
| 22 | small block sectors on the chip in as little as 25 ms or the entire flash memory | |
| chip in 50 ms. The devices also support write suspend and resume operation so a | ||
| program can suspend a write operation to access another block of memory within | ||
| the same clock cycle. | ||
| 23 | “The mobile phone industry, in particular, has been yearning for a serial | |
| 24 | memory solution with high performance and extremely low power consumption | |
| 25 | and we are proud to be the first in the industry to achieve this highly | |
| 26 | challenging accomplishment,” said Douglas Lee, vice president, Memory | |
| 27 | Products, SST. “In addition to performance and power consumption | |
| 28 | advantages, our new 26 WF Series offers designers of ultra low-cost mobile | |
| handsets with a low pin count, quad I/O protocol serial flash memory that is | ||
| straightforward and easy to integrate, enabling continued system cost reduction. | ||
| Today’s announcement solidifies our leadership in low-voltage, high-speed | ||
- 10 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | serial flash memory and underscores our commitment to providing customers | |
| 2 | with the solutions they need to achieve their design goals.” | |
| 3 | The 26WF Series SQI devices are built upon SST’s native 1.8V SuperFlash | |
| 4 | memory cell, providing inherently higher performance when compared to | |
| 5 | alternative quad-bit devices that would require power-hungry charge pump | |
| 6 | circuitry for 1.8V operation, resulting in performance limitations. The 26WF | |
| 7 | Series products offer superior reliability of 100,000 cycles endurance (typical) | |
| 8 | and greater than 100 years data retention. The active read current of the devices is | |
| 9 | only 15 milliamperes (typical at 80 MHz) and standby current is a mere 10 | |
| 10 | microamperes (typical). | |
| 11 | * * * * | |
| 12 | Pricing and Availability | |
| 13 | The first product in the 26WF Series SQI family is the 32 Mbit SST26WF032. | |
| 14 | Samples of the product are available now to select customers, with volume | |
| 15 | production scheduled for Q1 2010. Pricing for the SST26WF032 device is $3.20 | |
| 16 | each in 10K unit quantities. Additional products in the series will be announced at | |
| 17 | a later date. | |
| 18 | [Emphasis added.] | |
| 19 | 38. On November 9, 2009, the Company issued its quarterly report for the third | |
| 20 | quarter ended September 30, 2009, that was filed with the SEC on Form 10-Q. The press release | |
| 21 | confirmed positive earnings compared to second quarter, and provided in relevant part: | |
| 22 | Operations Overview | |
| 23 | In response to the challenging market conditions of the past year, we began taking | |
| 24 | a fresh look at every aspect of our business; focusing our resources on areas that | |
| 25 | we believe will yield the most impact over time, while creating additional | |
| 26 | opportunities without incurring significant additional research and development | |
| 27 | expense in the near term. These efforts include a targeted approach to product | |
| 28 | development that emphasizes non-commodity applications through differentiated | |
| features, as well as new programs to enhance our licensing business. We have | ||
| made good progress, and strong execution of these objectives, combined with an | ||
| improved demand environment, resulted in solid financial performance for the | ||
| third quarter of 2009, as well as yielding several key achievements in product | ||
| development and technology licensing which we believe will help drive future | ||
| growth. | ||
| [Emphasis added.] | ||
| 39. As evidenced above, SST has been doing extraordinarily well despite difficult | ||
| market conditions and the value of the Company stock is poised to continue its climb as | ||
| economic conditions improve. However, by approving the Proposed Transaction the Director | ||
- 11 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | Defendants and SST have acted for their own benefit and for the benefit of the TRH Defendants, | |
| 2 | to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Company’s other public shareholders. | |
| 3 | 40. According to an article from Dow Jones Newswire published on November 13, | |
| 4 | 2009, “Silicon Storage has seen its prospects brighten in recent months along with many in the | |
| 5 | computer space. It has seen stronger product and licensing revenue and cost cuts help the bottom | |
| 6 | line.” | |
| 7 | 41. On November 13, 2009, the Company announced the Proposed Transaction by | |
| 8 | TRH, which is expected to close in the second quarter of 2010. | |
| 9 | 42. Shortly after the publication of the third quarter earnings report for 2009, the | |
| 10 | Company announced that it had received a proposal from the TRH Defendants to acquire all of | |
| 11 | the outstanding shares of SST stock at a price of $2.10 in cash per share, except for the shares | |
| 12 | held by Defendants Yeh and Hu, which would be exchanged for shares of capital stock of the | |
| 13 | resulting privately held company. The $2.10 offer price per share represented a meager one-day | |
| 14 | price premium of 13% to SST’s closing price of $1.86 on November 12, 2009. | |
| 15 | 43. Upon news of the Proposed Transaction, SST stock has risen over 20% to close at | |
| 16 | $2.24 per share on November 13, 2009, on heavy trading volume of 5,538,800 (compared to | |
| 17 | average trading volume of 350,194). | |
| 18 | 44. Market insiders analyzing the Proposed Transaction have stated that the deal is a | |
| 19 | “low-premium buyout and at a price that is under its tangible book value and under its stated | |
| 20 | book value.” On November 13, 2009, in an article published by MarketWatch, Inc. entitled, | |
| 21 | “Are Silicon Storage Holders Getting Enough? (SSTI),” Jon C. Ogg of 24/7 Wall St. wrote: | |
| 22 | Five years ago may not matter to most but this was a $5.00 back in 2004 and was | |
| 23 | significantly higher back in 2000 and 2001 above $20 and $30 during the tech | |
| 24 | bubble (split-adjusted). You never know if something is brewing that would be a | |
| 25 | game-changer in these management-led buyouts. But what is easy to see is that | |
| 26 | this is a low-premium buyout and at a price that is under its tangible book value | |
| 27 | and under its stated book value. | |
| 28 | ||
-12 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS | |
| 2 | Conflicts of Interests Relating to the Proposed Transaction | |
| 3 | 45. The Proposed Transaction suffers from significant conflicts of interests by the | |
| 4 | Individual Defendants. The Merger Agreement provides for the continuation of SST’s current | |
| 5 | management and directorship (section 2.5) with the post-merger entity, enabling certain | |
| 6 | members of Company senior management, as well as the Company directors, to maintain | |
| 7 | effective control over the resultant entity’s board of directors, and allowing these directors to | |
| 8 | maintain their lucrative positions and to continue to have a stake in the business of the surviving | |
| 9 | entity, unlike public shareholders. Section 2.5 of the Merger Agreement provides as follows: | |
| 10 | Directors and Officers of the Surviving Corporation. The directors of Merger | |
| 11 | Sub, as of immediately prior to the Effective Time shall, from and after the | |
| 12 | Effective Time, be the directors of the Surviving Corporation until their | |
| 13 | successors shall have been duly elected or appointed or qualified or until their | |
| 14 | earlier death, resignation or removal in accordance with the Surviving | |
| 15 | Corporation’s Organizational Documents. The officers of the Company at the | |
| 16 | Effective Time shall, from and after the Effective Time, be the initial officers of | |
| 17 | the Surviving Corporation until their successors shall have been duly elected or | |
| 18 | appointed or qualified or until their earlier death, resignation or removal in | |
| 19 | accordance with the Surviving Corporation’s Organizational Documents. | |
| 20 | 46. The Individual Defendants are therefore conflicted, due to personal financial | |
| 21 | incentives they receive from the Company and which they will continue to receive from the | |
| 22 | surviving corporation. | |
| 23 | 47. According to the Company’s Proxy dated April 30, 2009, (“April Proxy”): | |
| 24 | (a) In 2008, Director and CEO Defendant Yeh received total compensation of | |
| 25 | approximately $731,309, including a salary of $475,000, approximately $251,237 in option | |
| 26 | awards, and “Other Compensation” worth $4,822; | |
| 27 | (b) Defendant Hu received 2008 compensation totaling $517,677, including a | |
| 28 | salary of $330,000, approximately $181,850 in option awards, and “Other Compensation” worth | |
| $5,411; | ||
| (c) Defendant Yang received 2008 compensation totaling $84,339, including | ||
| $28,470 in cash and $55,896 in option awards; | ||
- 13 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | (d) Defendant Nickerson received 2008 compensation totaling $70,684, | |
| 2 | including $32,400 in cash and $38,284 in option awards; and | |
| 3 | (e) Defendant Chwang received 2008 compensation totaling $68,334, | |
| 4 | including $30,050 in cash and $38,284 in option awards. | |
| 5 | 48. The Merger Agreement also calls for the conversion of capital stock of SST into | |
| 6 | the capital stock of the surviving company (Section 2.6(d)), which will only benefit holders of | |
| 7 | capital stock. | |
| 8 | Defendants Yeh and Hu Will Continue To Have An Equity Stake In SST’s Business | |
| 9 | 49. Defendants Yeh and Hu, who hold approximately 12.7% of the Company’s | |
| 10 | outstanding common stock (directly or indirectly through certain of their affiliates), have entered | |
| 11 | into a contribution agreement with TRH in which they agreed to exchange all of their shares of | |
| 12 | SST common stock for shares of capital stock of the resulting privately held company. They | |
| 13 | have also entered into a voting agreement in which they have agreed to vote their shares in favor | |
| 14 | of the Merger and against any other acquisition proposals, and further agreed to certain | |
| 15 | restrictions on the transfer of their shares. | |
| 16 | 50. Defendants Yeh and Hu’s attempt to privatize the Company to maximize their | |
| 17 | own financial interests at an inadequate price is a blatant attempt by them to unfairly enrich | |
| 18 | themselves at the expense of the Company’s public shareholders to which they owe fiduciary | |
| 19 | duties. | |
| 20 | 51. Unlike the public shareholders of SST, Defendants Yeh and Hu will continue to | |
| 21 | have an equity stake in the business of SST. Public shareholders who have borne the risk of | |
| 22 | holding SST’s common stock will, unlike Defendants Yeh and Hu, be unable to reap the benefits | |
| 23 | of SST’s dramatically improving business and prospects. | |
| 24 | The Process is Unfair | |
| 25 | 52. The Proposed Transaction is being advanced through unfair processes and | |
| 26 | procedures. | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 14 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 53. The terms of the Merger Agreement deter competing bids and prevent the | |
| 2 | Director Defendants from exercising their fiduciary duties to obtain the best reasonably available | |
| 3 | price for SST’s shareholders. The defensive provisions erect barriers to competing offers and | |
| 4 | function to substantially increase the likelihood that the Proposed Transaction will be | |
| 5 | consummated, leaving SST’s public shareholders with an unfair deal. | |
| 6 | 54. When viewed collectively, these provisions, which are detailed below, further the | |
| 7 | personal interests of Yeh, Hu and the TRH Defendants, and cannot be justified as an appropriate | |
| 8 | and proportionate response to the costs and expenses associated with the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 9 | 55. Section 6.4 of the Merger Agreement contains a go-shop provision under which | |
| 10 | the Strategic Committee, with the assistance of its independent advisors, has the right to solicit | |
| 11 | proposals or offers with respect to, or that would reasonably be expected to lead to, an | |
| 12 | acquisition proposal from a third party for a 45 day period beginning on November 13, 2009. | |
| 13 | However, according to the New York Times, SST has indicated that it does not intend to disclose | |
| 14 | any developments with respect to this solicitation process unless or until the Strategic Committee | |
| 15 | has made a decision with respect to any proposals or offers it may receive. | |
| 16 | 56. The inclusion of the above-mentioned go-shop provision has been erected to give | |
| 17 | the appearance that the Defendants are seeking to conduct a “market check” to maximize | |
| 18 | shareholder value, however, given the current depressed market conditions, a market check | |
| 19 | cannot adequately value the Company’s future prospects. Accordingly, the 45 day period | |
| 20 | allowed in Section 6.4 does not cure the unfair process and procedures that have been initiated | |
| 21 | by Defendants in the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 22 | 57. Section 8.3 of the Merger Agreement imposes a “Termination Fee” of $7,045,281 | |
| 23 | from SST to the TRH Defendants, or as high as 3.5% of the total deal value. Even if the | |
| 24 | agreement is terminated as a result of the Director Defendants’ recommendation in favor of a | |
| 25 | superior offer for SST shares, SST will be required to pay $4,025,875, or a minimum 2% of the | |
| 26 | total deal value. | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 15 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 58. The Merger Agreement entered into by SST and TRH allows the TRH Defendants | |
| 2 | an opportunity to benefit from the Company’s growth to the detriment of the Company’s | |
| 3 | shareholders who are provided inadequate consideration without the benefit of a full and fair | |
| 4 | transaction process. | |
| 5 | TRH’s Offer to Acquire the Outstanding Shares of SST At An Inadequate Price | |
| 6 | 59. The consideration offered is unfair and inadequate and does not constitute a | |
| 7 | maximization of stockholder value for Plaintiff and other SST public stockholders. Recognizing | |
| 8 | SST’s potential for greater growth, on November 13, 2009, TRH announced that it has proposed | |
| 9 | to acquire the outstanding publicly held interest in SST for $2.10 per share in cash, or a total | |
| 10 | payment of a little over $201 million to equity holders of SST other than TRH. The offer | |
| 11 | represents a one-day premium of 13% to SST’s closing price of $1.86 on September 12, 2009. | |
| 12 | This price is highly inadequate due to the Company’s “bright” prospects, especially since SST | |
| 13 | products are in high demand by many successful companies, such as Apple, Asustek, BenQ, | |
| 14 | Cisco, Dell, First International Computer, or FIC, Gigabyte, Haier, Huawei, Infineon, Intel, IBM, | |
| 15 | Inventec, Legend Lenovo, LG Electronics, Freescale Semiconductor, NEC, Nintendo, Panasonic, | |
| 16 | Philips, Quanta, Samsung, Sanyo, Seagate, Sony, Sony Ericsson, Toshiba, Texas Instruments, | |
| 17 | VTech and ZTE. Indeed, the offer price is considerably lower than the one-year target estimate | |
| 18 | of $2.50. | |
| 19 | 60. The Company has virtually no debt. The September 30, 2009, balance sheet lists | |
| 20 | all liabilities as a mere $61.02 million and listed the following cash and liquid assets: $75.25 | |
| 21 | million cash, $40.6 million short-term investments, and $95.74 million in long-term investments. | |
| 22 | The value of the Company’s tangible assets according to the Company’s reports is valued at | |
| 23 | approximately, $238.76 million, which is greater than the total proposed consideration of $201 | |
| 24 | million for the deal. In other words, the going-private deal does not even pay for the Company’s | |
| 25 | hard assets, to say anything of the growth potential the Company has demonstrated. | |
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 16 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION | |
| 2 | Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties | |
| 3 | Against the Individual Defendants and the TRH Defendants | |
| 4 | 61. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth | |
| 5 | herein. | |
| 6 | 62. As set forth herein, the Company and the Individual Defendants and the TRH | |
| 7 | Defendants have violated their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor and independence owed | |
| 8 | to the public shareholders of SST and have put their personal interests and the interests of the | |
| 9 | TRH Defendants ahead of the interests of SST shareholders and without regard to the | |
| 10 | maximization of shareholder value. | |
| 11 | 63. Recognizing the Company’s potential for growth, Defendants have determined to | |
| 12 | deny the Company’s public shareholders the opportunity to obtain fair value for their equity | |
| 13 | interest by proposing a transaction at an inadequate premium. | |
| 14 | 64. The consideration of $2.10 per share to be paid to Class members is unfair and | |
| 15 | inadequate consideration because, among other things: (a) the intrinsic value of the Company’s | |
| 16 | stock is materially in excess of the $2.10 per share that the TRH Defendants have proposed, | |
| 17 | giving due consideration to the Company’s assets, prospects for growth and profitability in light | |
| 18 | of its business, earnings power, present and future; and (b) the $2.10 per share price is not the | |
| 19 | result of arm’s length negotiations but was fixed arbitrarily by Defendants to “cap” the market | |
| 20 | price of the Company and obtain its assets and businesses at the lowest possible price. | |
| 21 | 65. The Proposed Transaction is an attempt by Defendants to enrich themselves at the | |
| 22 | expense of the Company’s public stockholders. The Proposed Transaction will, for inadequate | |
| 23 | consideration, deny Plaintiff and the other members of the Class the opportunity to share | |
| 24 | proportionately in the future success of the Company and its valuable assets, while permitting | |
| 25 | Defendants to benefit wrongfully from the transaction. | |
| 26 | 66. Given Defendants Yeh and Hu’s stock ownership of the Company and their | |
| 27 | representation on the Board of Directors, they are able to dominate and control the other | |
| 28 | directors. Under the circumstances, none of the directors can be expected to protect the | |
- 17 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | Company’s public shareholders in a transaction which benefits the Director Defendants and the | |
| 2 | TRH Defendants at the expense of the Company’s public shareholders. | |
| 3 | 67. SST’s Board of Directors, acting upon the recommendation of a Strategic | |
| 4 | Committee composed of supposed SST’s independent directors, approved the agreement and | |
| 5 | resolved to recommend that the company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. | |
| 6 | However, as a practical matter, these directors are unable to render an unbiased judgment on the | |
| 7 | Proposed Transaction given that they have already agreed to support the deal in Section 6.4(c), | |
| 8 | which provides: | |
| 9 | Except as expressly permitted by this Section 6.4(c), neither the Company Board, | |
| 10 | nor any committee thereof (including the Strategic Committee) shall (i) | |
| 11 | withdraw or modify in a manner adverse to Parent, the Company | |
| 12 | Recommendation (a “Change of Recommendation”), (ii) approve or recommend | |
| 13 | any Acquisition Proposal, or (iii) cause or permit the Company to enter into (or | |
| 14 | publicly propose that the Company enter into) any letter of intent, memorandum | |
| 15 | of understanding, agreement in principle, acquisition agreement, merger | |
| 16 | agreement or other similar agreement (an “Alternative Acquisition Agreement”) | |
| 17 | with respect to any Acquisition Proposal or authorize, approve or publicly | |
| 18 | recommend or propose to approve or recommend any Acquisition Proposal or any | |
| agreement, understanding or arrangement relating to any Acquisition Proposal (or | ||
| resolve or authorize or propose to agree to do any of the foregoing actions), | ||
| except for a confidentiality agreement referred to in Section 6.4(a) or Section | ||
| 6.4(b) entered into in the circumstances referred to in Section 6.4(a) or Section | ||
| 6.4(b). | ||
| 19 | [Emphasis added.] | |
| 20 | 68. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, Defendants, | |
| 21 | acting individually and as part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and | |
| 22 | other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in SST. | |
| 23 | 69. The Individual Defendants have violated their fiduciary duties by inducing the | |
| 24 | TRH Defendants to attempt to deprive SST’s shareholders of their Company shares without | |
| 25 | regard to the fairness of the transaction to SST’s shareholders. | |
| 26 | 70. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants have failed | |
| 27 | to exercise due care, and breached their duties of loyalties, good faith, candor and independence | |
| 28 | owed to SST shareholders because, among other reasons, the Individual Defendants dominate | |
- 18 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | and control the business and corporate affairs of SST, and are privy to and in possession of | |
| 2 | confidential corporate information concerning SST’s assets, business and future prospects, and | |
| 3 | as such an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and economic power exists between them and | |
| 4 | the public shareholders of SST which makes it inherently unfair for them to pursue any | |
| 5 | transaction wherein they or any third party, such as TRH and Prophet, will reap disproportionate | |
| 6 | benefits to the exclusion of maximizing shareholder value. | |
| 7 | 71. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the Defendants | |
| 8 | have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations | |
| 9 | toward Plaintiff and other Class members. | |
| 10 | 72. As a result of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer | |
| 11 | irreparable injury in that they will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their common | |
| 12 | stock. | |
| 13 | 73. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Company, the Individual Defendants, and the | |
| 14 | TRH Defendants will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members | |
| 15 | of the Class, will not engage in arm’s length negotiations, will continue to conceal material | |
| 16 | information possessed by Defendants from SST’s public shareholders, and will in all likelihood | |
| 17 | consummate the Proposed Transaction to the irreparable harm of Plaintiff and the other members | |
| 18 | of the Class. | |
| 19 | 74. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will suffer irreparable injury unless | |
| 20 | Defendants are enjoined from breaching their fiduciary duties to the Company’s public | |
| 21 | shareholders in a proposed transaction which will benefit the Individual Defendants and TRH at | |
| 22 | the expense of the public shareholders. | |
| 23 | 75. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |
| 24 | SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION | |
| Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duties | ||
| 25 | Against Defendants SST and the TRH Defendants | |
| 26 | 76. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth | |
| 27 | herein. | |
| 28 | ||
- 19 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | 77. As set forth herein, Defendants SST and the TRH Defendants are sued as aiders | |
| 2 | and abettors of the breaches of fiduciary duties outlined above by the Individual Defendants, as | |
| 3 | members of the Board, and TRH and Prophet, as the private equity buyers. | |
| 4 | 78. The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care | |
| 5 | to SST shareholders by failing to: | |
| 6 | (a) act in the best interests of SST public shareholders; | |
| 7 | (b) maximize shareholder value; and | |
| 8 | (c) act in accordance with their fundamental duties of due care and loyalty. | |
| 9 | 79. Such breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the public shareholders of SST could | |
| 10 | not and would not have occurred but for the conduct of Defendants SST and the TRH | |
| 11 | Defendants, who aided and abetted such breaches with respect to the imminent sale of SST to the | |
| 12 | TRH Defendants. | |
| 13 | 80. Defendants SST, TRH, and Prophet had knowledge that they were aiding and | |
| 14 | abetting the Individual Defendants’ and the TRH Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties to | |
| 15 | SST shareholders. | |
| 16 | 81. Defendants SST, TRH, and Prophet rendered substantial assistance to the | |
| 17 | Individual Defendants’ and breached their fiduciary duties to SST shareholders. | |
| 18 | 82. As a result of the unlawful actions by Defendants SST, TRH, and Prophet, | |
| 19 | Plaintiff and other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not receive | |
| 20 | fair value for their investments in SST’s assets and business and will be prevented from | |
| 21 | obtaining the true economic value of their equity ownership in the Company. | |
| 22 | 83. Unless their actions are enjoined by this Court, Defendants SST, TRH, and | |
| 23 | Prophet will continue to aid and abet the Individual Defendants’ and the TRH Defendants’ | |
| 24 | breach of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, to the irreparable harm of Plaintiff and | |
| 25 | the other members of the Class. | |
| 26 | 84. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
- 20 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| 1 | PRAYER | |||
| 2 | WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as follows: | |||
| 3 | A. Determining that this action is a proper class action, and that Plaintiff is a proper | |||
| 4 | class representative; | |||
| 5 | B. Declaring that Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the | |||
| 6 | Class and/or aided and abetted such breaches; | |||
| 7 | C. Enjoining the Proposed Transaction unless and until the Company adopts and | |||
| 8 | implements an independent procedure or process to obtain the highest possible price for | |||
| 9 | shareholders and/or providing such other equitable relief as may be appropriate; | |||
| 10 | D. Directing the Individual Defendants and the TRH Defendants to exercise their | |||
| 11 | fiduciary duties to obtain a transaction which is in the best interests of SST’s public shareholders | |||
| 12 | until the process for the sale or auction of the Company is completed and the highest possible | |||
| 13 | price is obtained; | |||
| 14 | E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class compensatory and/or rescissory damages as | |||
| 15 | allowed by law; | |||
| 16 | F. Awarding interest, attorney’s fees, expert fees and other costs, in an amount to be | |||
| 17 | determined; and | |||
| 18 | G. Granting such other relief as the Court may find just and proper. | |||
| 19 | DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL | |||
| 20 | Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury. |
|||
| 21 | Respectfully submitted, | |||
| 22 | DATED: November 16, 2009 | MILBERG LLP | ||
| 23 | JEFF S. WESTERMAN | |||
| 24 | /s/ Jeff S. Westerman | |||
| 25 | JEFF S. WESTERMAN | |||
| 26 | ||||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
- 21 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
| One California Plaza | ||||
| 1 | 300 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 3900 | |||
| Los Angeles, CA 90071 | ||||
| 2 | Telephone: (213) 617-1200 | |||
| Facsimile: (213) 617-1975 | ||||
| 3 | E-mail: jwesterman@milberg.com | |||
| 4 | MILBERG LLP | |||
| ANDREI V. RADO | ||||
| 5 | ANNE MARIE VU | |||
| One Pennsylvania Plaza, 49th Floor | ||||
| 6 | New York, NY 10119 | |||
| Telephone: (212) 594-5300 | ||||
| 7 | Facsimile: (212) 868-1229 | |||
| E-mail: arado@milberg.com | ||||
| 8 | avu@milberg.com | |||
| 9 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | |||
| 10 | ||||
| 11 | ||||
| 12 | ||||
| 13 | ||||
| 14 | ||||
| 15 | ||||
| 16 | ||||
| 17 | ||||
| 18 | ||||
| 19 | ||||
| 20 | ||||
| 21 | ||||
| 22 | ||||
| 23 | ||||
| 24 | ||||
| 25 | ||||
| 26 | ||||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
- 22 -
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES