Exhibit (a)(5)(v)
| STEPHEN R. BASSER (121590) | ||||
| 1 | SAMUEL M. WARD (216562) | |||
| BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE | ||||
| 2 | One America Plaza | |||
| 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 | ||||
| 3 | San Diego, CA 92101 | |||
| Telephone: (619) 230-0800 | ||||
| 4 | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 | |||
| 5 | ||||
| Counsel For Plaintiff Anis Shaikh | ||||
| 6 | ||||
| 7 | ||||
| 8 | ||||
| 9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |||
| 10 | COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | |||
| 11 | ||||
| 12 | ||||
| ANIS SHAIKH, | CASE NO. 109CV157542 | |||
| 13 | ||||
| Plaintiff, |
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR | |||
| 14 | INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RE: BREACH OF | |||
| v. |
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND AIDING AND | |||
| 15 | ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY | |||
| BING YEH, YAH WEN HU, RONALD | DUTY | |||
| 16 | CHWANG, TERRY NICKERSON, EDWARD | |||
| Y.W. YANG, SILICON STORAGE | ||||
| 17 | TECHNOLOGY, INC., PROPHET EQUITY LP, | |||
| and TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE HOLDINGS, | ||||
| 18 | INC. | |||
| 19 | JURY TRIAL DEMANDED | |||
| 20 | ||||
| Defendants |
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| 21 | ||||
| 22 | ||||
| 23 | ||||
| 24 | ||||
| 25 | ||||
| 26 | ||||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT | |
| 2 | Plaintiff, Anis Shaikh, by his attorneys, alleges on information and belief except as to | |
| 3 | paragraph 7, which he alleges on personal knowledge, as follows: | |
| 4 | SUMMARY OF THE ACTION | |
| 5 | 1. This is a shareholder class action on behalf of the public shareholders of Silicon | |
| 6 | Storage Technology, Inc. (“Silicon Storage” or the “Company”) against the Company and its Board | |
| 7 | of Directors (the “Board” or the “Individual Defendants”), to enjoin the proposed acquisition of | |
| 8 | Silicon Storage by Technology Resource Holdings, Inc. (“TRH”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of | |
| 9 | Prophet Equity LP (“Prophet”), and alleging that the Board breached its fiduciary duties in | |
| 10 | connection with the proposed sale of the Company to Prophet and members of the Company’s | |
| 11 | management for $2.10 per share in cash, or approximately $201 million in the aggregate (the | |
| 12 | “Proposed Transaction”). | |
| 13 | 2. The Proposed Transaction is unfair and fails to maximize shareholder value and | |
| 14 | otherwise undervalues the Company’s shares. The consideration offered to public shareholders | |
| 15 | is only a 13% premium over the close of $1.86 per share on the day before the Proposed | |
| 16 | Transaction was announced publicly. Indeed, the Company’s shares traded at or above the | |
| 17 | offering price as recently as two weeks before the Proposed Transaction was announced and | |
| 18 | since the announcement of the Proposed Transaction shares have traded over the inadequate | |
| 19 | offer price. | |
| 20 | 3. Accordingly, this action seeks, inter alia, equitable relief seeking to enjoin the | |
| 21 | Proposed Transaction and compelling the Board to properly exercise its fiduciary duties to | |
| 22 | maximize shareholder value in connection with the Proposed Transaction or any alternate | |
| 23 | transaction. | |
| 24 | JURISDICTION AND VENUE | |
| 25 | 4. This Court has jurisdiction over the cause of action asserted herein pursuant to | |
| 26 | the California Constitution, Article VI, § 10, because this case is a cause not given by statute to | |
| 27 | other trial courts. | |
| 28 | 5. This Court has jurisdiction over defendant Silicon Storage because it conducts | |
| business in California and maintains its principal place of business at 1171 Sonora Court, | ||
1
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Sunnyvale, California. This action is not removable. | |
| 2 | 6. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and had an effect | |
| 3 | in this County. | |
| PARTIES | ||
| 4 | 7. Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder of Silicon Storage. | |
| 5 | 8. Defendant Silicon Storage supplies NOR flash memory semiconductor devices for | |
| 6 | digital consumers, networking, wireless communications, and the Internet computing markets. The | |
| 7 | Company produces and sells semiconductor products, including NAND flash controllers and NAND | |
| 8 | controller-based modules, smart card integrated circuits (“ICs”) and modules, flash microcontrollers, | |
| 9 | and radio frequency ICs and modules. It also produces and sells various products based on its | |
| 10 | proprietary SuperFlash design and manufacturing process technology, as well as licenses the | |
| 11 | SuperFlash technology for applications in semiconductor devices that integrate flash memory with | |
| 12 | other functions on a monolithic chip. Silicon Storage sells its products in Asia, North America and | |
| Europe. The Company’s common stock publicly trades on the NASDAQ Stock Market | ||
| 13 | (“NASDAQ”) under the trading symbol “SSTI.” As of October 31, 2009, Silicon Storage had | |
| 14 | over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding. | |
| 15 | 9. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yeh”), one of the co-founders of Silicon Storage, has served | |
| 16 | as the President and Chief Executive Officer and has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 17 | Directors since its inception in 1989. In April 2004, he was appointed Chairman of the Board of | |
| 18 | Directors. | |
| 19 | 10. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has been a member of the Board of Directors of | |
| Silicon Storage since 1995. He joined the Company in 1993 as Vice President of Technology | ||
| 20 | Development. Currently, defendant Hu is the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating | |
| 21 | Officer of Silicon Storage. | |
| 22 | 11. Defendant Ronald Chwang has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 23 | Directors since June 1997. He is also a member of the Audit Committee and the Compensation | |
| 24 | Committee and the Chairman of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. | |
| 25 | 12. Defendant Terry Nickerson has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 26 | Directors since April 2005. He is the Chairman of the Audit Committee and a member of the | |
| Compensation Committee and the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. | ||
| 27 | 13. Defendant Edward Y.W. Yang has been a member of the Company’s Board of | |
| 28 | ||
2
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Directors since October 2007. | |
| 2 | 14. Defendant Prophet, a private equity firm, is located at 181 Grand Avenue, Southlake, | |
| Texas. | ||
| 3 | 15. Defendant TRH, a Delaware corporation, is a Prophet-controlled entity. | |
| 4 | 16. The defendants identified in ¶¶ 9 - 13 are collectively referred to herein as the | |
| 5 | “Individual Defendants.” By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the Company, | |
| 6 | the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public | |
| 7 | shareholders of Silicon Storage, and owe Plaintiff and Silicon Storage’s other shareholders the | |
| 8 | highest obligations of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, due care, and full and fair disclosure. | |
| 9 | 17. Each of the Individual Defendants at all times had the power to control and direct | |
| Silicon Storage to engage in the misconduct alleged herein. The Individual Defendants’ fiduciary | ||
| 10 | obligations required them to act in the best interest of Plaintiff and all other Silicon Storage | |
| 11 | shareholders. | |
| 12 | 18. Each of the Individual Defendants owes fiduciary duties of good faith, fair dealing, | |
| 13 | loyalty, candor, and due care to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. They are acting in | |
| 14 | concert with one another in violating their fiduciary duties as alleged herein, and, specifically, in | |
| 15 | connection with the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 16 | 19. As directors and/or officers of a publicly traded corporation, the Individual Defendants | |
| have an affirmative fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably available for the | ||
| 17 | Company’s shareholders and to avoid taking action that: | |
| 18 | (a) discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase Silicon Storage; | |
| 19 | (b) adversely affects the value provided to the Company’s shareholders; | |
| 20 | (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; | |
| 21 | (d) adversely affects their ability to secure the best value reasonably available under | |
| 22 | the circumstances for the corporation’s shareholders; and/or | |
| 23 | (e) provides Silicon Storage insiders with preferential treatment at the expense of, or | |
| separate from, its public shareholders. | ||
| 24 | 7. In accordance with his/her duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants are also | |
| 25 | obligated to refrain from: | |
| 26 | (a) participating in any transaction in which their loyalties are divided; | |
| 27 | (b) participating in any transaction in which they will receive a personal financial | |
| 28 | ||
3
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the corporation; and/or | |
| (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public | ||
| 2 | shareholders. | |
| 3 | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS | |
| 4 | 20. Silicon Storage, which was founded in 1989, designs, manufactures and markets | |
| 5 | a diversified range of memory and non-memory products for high volume applications in the | |
| 6 | digital consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet computing markets. With | |
| its proprietary, patented SuperFlash technology, the Company is a leading provider of | ||
| 7 | nonvolatile memory solutions for products with various densities of high functionality flash | |
| 8 | memory components and flash mass storage products. The Company has a broad network of | |
| 9 | world-class manufacturing partners and technology licensees, including TSMC, which offers it | |
| 10 | under its trademark Emb-FLASH. Additionally, Silicon Storage offers non-memory products | |
| 11 | include NAND controller-based products, smart card ICs and modules, flash microcontrollers | |
| 12 | and radio frequency ICs and modules. | |
| 13 | 21. The Company’s products have been very successful; On November 2, 2009, just | |
| days before the announcement of the Proposed Transaction, Silicon Storage unveiled the | ||
| 14 | industry’s first 1.8V, high-speed quad-bit serial flash memory. It features an 80 MHz operating | |
| 15 | frequency and a specialized instruction set and allows programs to be stored and executed | |
| 16 | directly from the flash memory without the need for code shadowing. Its technology is ideal for | |
| 17 | mobile handsets, Bluetooth headsets, GPS devices and other small form factor, portable | |
| 18 | electronics. This new product follows after the Company won an Innovation of the Year Award | |
| 19 | from EDN Magazine in April of 2009 for another flash product. | |
| 20 | 22. The Company’s positive prospects suggest that the Proposed Transaction | |
| undervalues its shares. Silicon Storage has seen bright prospects in recent months as a result of | ||
| 21 | stronger product and licensing revenue and cost cuts to help the bottom line. Indeed, in | |
| 22 | September 2009, the Company raised its guidance for the second quarter ending September 30, | |
| 23 | 2009. The Company said it now sees revenue of $69 million to $71 million, up from a | |
| 24 | previously expected $61 million to $68 million and now expects net income of zero to 3 cents a | |
| 25 | share, up from a previously forecast loss of 3-7 cents a share. Silicon Storage further said that | |
| 26 | the better forecast reflects “stronger than anticipated product and licensing revenues in the | |
| 27 | quarter as well as increased dividends on investments and lower operating expenses.” Despite | |
| 28 | its recent strong performance and its potential for continued growth and success, Silicon | |
4
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Storage, via its Board of Directors has willingly accepted inadequate consideration and entered | |
| 2 | into the Proposed Transaction to the detriment of its public shareholders. | |
| 3 | 23. On November 13, 2009, Silicon Storage announced publicly that it agreed to be | |
| 4 | acquired by management and equity firm Prophet’s wholly-owned subsidiary, TRH, and | |
| 5 | members of the Company’s management, pursuant to which Silicon Storage’s public | |
| 6 | shareholders will receive $2.10 in cash for each share of common stock in the Company that | |
| 7 | they own. The aggregate value of the deal is $201 million. The Proposed Transaction is | |
| 8 | expected to close during the second quarter of 2010. | |
| 9 | 24. Under the terms of the Proposed Transaction, shares of Silicon Storage will no | |
| 10 | longer trade on a stock exchange and shareholders will not receive a continuing interest in the | |
| 11 | Company. While the public shareholders’ investment in Silicon Storage will be terminated if | |
| 12 | the Proposed Transaction is consummated, defendant Yeh, the Company’s Chairman and Chief | |
| 13 | Executive Officer, and defendant Hu, the Company’s Executive Vice President and Chief | |
| 14 | Operating Officer, who together hold or control 12.7 percent of outstanding shares of Silicon | |
| 15 | Storage, will continue having an equity interest in the Company as they have agreed to | |
| 16 | exchange all of their shares of Silicon Storage for shares of capital stock of the resulting | |
| 17 | privately held company. Accordingly, Prophet and defendant Yeh and Hu stand to benefit from the | |
| 18 | Company’s promising growth and operational results. In contrast, Silicon Storage shareholders do | |
| 19 | not. Defendants Yeh and Hu have also entered into voting agreements pursuant to which they | |
| 20 | have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against any other | |
| 21 | acquisition proposals. | |
| 22 | 25. The consideration to public shareholders is only a 13 percent premium over the | |
| 23 | $1.86 closing price on November 12, 2009, the last day of trading before the Proposed | |
| 24 | Transaction was announced. Shares traded at this level as recently as two weeks ago on | |
| 25 | October 29, 2009. Aside from the fact that the Proposed Transaction appears to favor two of | |
| 26 | Silicon Storage’s insider shareholders, the trading price of the Company’s common stock in the | |
| 27 | wake of the Proposed Transaction’s announcement suggests that the market believes that the shares | |
| 28 | should fetch a higher price. Indeed, since the Proposed Transaction was announced, the stock has | |
| traded above the $2.10 offering price. Market reaction to the announcement of the Proposed | ||
| Transaction has been swift, as investors sent Silicon Graphic’s’ stock price up approximately | ||
| 20% to close at $2.24 on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. As a result, the | ||
5
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | price Prophet is offering in the Proposed Transaction, and the Company has unanimously | |
| 2 | accepted, already represents a discount to Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. | |
| 3 | 26. A Strategic Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, consisting of all | |
| 4 | four of the so-called “independent” members of the Board, was formed to evaluate the Proposed | |
| 5 | Transaction. The Strategic Committee approved the Merger Agreement and resolved to | |
| 6 | recommend that the Company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. However, | |
| 7 | Bryant R. Riley, one of the independent directors since 2008 and a major holder in the | |
| 8 | Company, voted against the approval of the Merger Agreement and subsequently resigned from | |
| 9 | the Board of Directors on the day the Proposed Transaction was announced. | |
| 10 | 27. Moreover, Lloyd I. Miller, III, Silicon Storage’s second largest shareholder, | |
| 11 | filed a Schedule 13D-A with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on | |
| 12 | November 13, 2009. In it, Mr. Miller revealed that he “strongly opposes the price terms of the | |
| 13 | recently announced merger” and that “it would be in his best interest, and those of other | |
| 14 | stockholders, to attempt to influence the governance and business strategies of the Company.” | |
| 15 | Mr. Miller expressed concern about the appearance of opposition to the Proposed Transaction | |
| 16 | on the Board of Directors and about the appearance of conflicts of interest in the Proposed | |
| 17 | Transaction. Specifically, Mr. Miller notes (1) the resignation of Bryant R. Riley and his vote | |
| 18 | against the Proposed Transaction, and (2) the special treatment of the shares of two insiders, | |
| 19 | defendants Yeh and Hu, who will receive equity in the acquiring company while public | |
| 20 | shareholders will be cashed out at $2.10, a price that Mr. Miller believes is deficient. Mr. Miller | |
| 21 | is examining all of the options that he believes will enhance stockholder value, including | |
| 22 | encouraging, participating in or leading efforts to appoint individuals to the Company’s Board | |
| 23 | of Directors who would be independent of management and would represent the Company and | |
| 24 | the holders of the shares. | |
| 25 | 28. No doubt recognizing that the deal is unfair to existing shareholders, the | |
| 26 | individual defendants, aided and abetted by Prophet, have attempted to camouflage their | |
| 27 | breaches of fiduciary duty to Silicon Storage shareholders by the inclusion of a cosmetic “go | |
| 28 | shop” provision in the Merger Agreement. This provision is insufficient to protect the interests | |
| of Silicon Storage’s public shareholders. Any potential suitor for the Company’s shares must | ||
| complete its due diligence within the short, 45 day time permitted by the “go shop” provision, | ||
| which is expected to expire on December 28, 2009. Under the circumstances, the provision is | ||
6
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | cosmetic and merely intended to camouflage the fact that the Board violated its fiduciary duties | |
| 2 | and engaged in an unfair process that lead to an inadequate and unfair price. Now, any third | |
| 3 | party that would have paid a fair price for the Company is advantaged by the knowledge that the | |
| 4 | Board has already made it clear that it would be willing to agree, and indeed has agreed, to a | |
| 5 | wholly unfair and inadequate price and is not focused upon maximizing shareholder value. | |
| 6 | 29. Moreover, if a potential acquiror were to propose a transaction more favorable to | |
| 7 | Silicon Storage’s public shareholders, pursuant to Section 8.3(b) of the Merger Agreement, the | |
| 8 | Company would be required to pay the sum of $7.05 million or approximately 3.5 percent of the | |
| 9 | deal value to Prophet as a termination fee, thus hindering the prospect of a more favorable | |
| 10 | transaction from being proposed. | |
| 11 | 30. Accordingly, the Proposed Transaction undervalues the Company’s shares when | |
| 12 | giving due consideration to the Company’s anticipated operating results and prospects. The | |
| 13 | Proposed Transaction will deny class members their right to share proportionately and equitably | |
| 14 | in the true value of the Company’s valuable and profitable business, and future growth in profits | |
| 15 | and earnings, at a time when the Company is poised to increase its profitability. Unless the | |
| 16 | Individual Defendants are enjoined from breaching their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff and the other public | |
| 17 | shareholders of Silicon Storage will continue to suffer irreparable harm. | |
| 18 | 31. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in | |
| 19 | connection with the Proposed Transaction, violated the fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the other public | |
| 20 | shareholders of Silicon Storage, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, candor, due care and | |
| 21 | independence, insofar as they stood on both sides of the transaction and engaged in self-dealing and | |
| 22 | obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal financial benefits, not shared equally by | |
| 23 | plaintiff or the Class. As a result of the Individual Defendants’ self-dealing and divided loyalties, | |
| 24 | neither plaintiff nor the Class will receive adequate or fair value for their Silicon Storage investment in the | |
| 25 | Proposed Transaction. | |
| 26 | 32. Because the Individual Defendants have breached their duties of due care, loyalty and good | |
| 27 | faith in connection with the Proposed Transaction, the burden of proving the inherent or entire fairness of | |
| 28 | the Proposed Transaction, including all aspects of its negotiation, structure, price and terms, is placed upon | |
| the Individual Defendants as a matter of law. | ||
| CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | ||
| 33. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to §382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure on its | ||
7
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all common stockholders of Silicon Storage who are being and | |
| 2 | will be harmed by defendants’ actions described below (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are | |
| 3 | defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any | |
| 4 | defendants, or their principals or affiliates. | |
| 5 | 34. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. | |
| 6 | 35. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of October 31, | |
| 7 | 2009, the Company had over 95 million shares of common stock outstanding held by scores, if | |
| 8 | not hundreds of individuals and entities scattered throughout America. | |
| 9 | 36. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and predominate over | |
| 10 | questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions include, inter alia, the | |
| 11 | following: | |
| 12 | (a) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty of | |
| 13 | undivided loyalty, independence, due care and/or candor with respect to plaintiff and the other members of | |
| 14 | the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 15 | (b) whether the Individual Defendants are engaging in self-dealing in connection | |
| 16 | with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 17 | (c) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to secure and | |
| 18 | obtain the best price reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiff and the other members | |
| 19 | of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; | |
| 20 | (d) whether defendants have breached any of their other fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and | |
| 21 | the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction, including the duties of good | |
| 22 | faith, diligence, candor and fair dealing; | |
| 23 | (e) whether the defendants have impeded or erected barriers to discourage other | |
| 24 | offers for the Company or its assets; whether the consideration payable to Plaintiff and the Class is | |
| 25 | unfair and inadequate; and | |
| 26 | (f) whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would be irreparably | |
| 27 | harmed if the transactions complained of herein are consummated. | |
| 28 | 37. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff | |
| does not have any interests adverse to the Class. | ||
| 38. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel | ||
| experienced in litigation of this nature and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the | ||
8
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Class. | |
| 2 | 39. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk | |
| 3 | of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which | |
| 4 | would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. | |
| 5 | 40. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. A | |
| 6 | class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this | |
| 7 | controversy. | |
| 8 | 41. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the | |
| 9 | matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class | |
| 10 | as a whole. | |
| 11 | CAUSES OF ACTION | |
| 12 | COUNT I | |
| 13 | (For Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the Individual Defendants) | |
| 14 | 42. Plaintiff repeats and re alleges each allegation set forth herein. | |
| 15 | 43. The defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor and independence | |
| 16 | owed to the public shareholders of Silicon Storage. | |
| 17 | 44. By the acts; transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, defendants, individually and | |
| 18 | acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class | |
| 19 | of the true value of their investment in Silicon Storage. Moreover, they have violated their fiduciary | |
| 20 | duties by entering into the Proposed Transaction without regard to its fairness. | |
| 21 | 45. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to | |
| 22 | exercise the care required and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith and candor owed to the | |
| 23 | shareholders of Silicon Storage. | |
| 24 | 46. As a result of the actions of defendants, Plaintiff and the Class have been and | |
| 25 | will be irreparably harmed in that they have not and will not be provided complete and candid | |
| 26 | information concerning the Proposed Transaction, which information is in the possession of defendants. | |
| 27 | 47. Unless enjoined by this Court, the defendants will continue to breach their fiduciary | |
| 28 | duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed Transaction that will | |
| result in irreparable harm to the Class. | ||
| 48. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the | ||
| exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the | ||
9
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | immediate and irreparable injury which defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. | |
| COUNT II | ||
| 2 | (For Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breach of Fiduciary | |
| 3 | Duty against Silicon Storage, TRH and Prophet) | |
| 4 | 49. Plaintiff repeats and re alleges each allegation set forth herein. | |
| 5 | 50. Defendants Silicon Storage, TRH and Prophet are sued herein as aiders | |
| 6 | and abettors of the breaches of fiduciary duties outlined above by the Individual | |
| 7 | Defendants, as members of the Board and/or executives of Silicon Storage. | |
| 8 | 51. The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of due care, | |
| 9 | good faith, loyalty, and candor to the Silicon Storage stockholders by the actions alleged | |
| 10 | supra. | |
| 11 | 52. Such breaches of fiduciary duties could not and would not have occurred but | |
| 12 | for the conduct of Defendant Silicon Storage, which, therefore, aided and abetted such | |
| 13 | breaches via entering into the Proposed Transaction with Prophet. | |
| 14 | 53. Defendants Silicon Storage, TRH and Prophet directly breached or aided and/or abetted the | |
| 15 | Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and the other holders of Silicon | |
| 16 | Storage stock. In connection with discussions regarding the Proposed Transaction, Silicon | |
| 17 | Storage provided, and Prophet obtained, sensitive non-public information concerning Silicon | |
| 18 | Storage’s operations and thus had unfair advantages which enabled it to acquire the Company at | |
| 19 | an unfair and inadequate price. | |
| 20 | 54. Defendants Silicon Storage, TRH and Prophet had knowledge that it was aiding | |
| 21 | and abetting the Individual Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage | |
| 22 | stockholders. | |
| 23 | 55. Defendants Silicon Storage, TRH and Prophet rendered substantial assistance to the | |
| 24 | Individual Defendants in their breach of their fiduciary duties to the Silicon Storage stockholders. | |
| 25 | 56. As a result of Silicon Storage’s, TRH’s and Prophet’s conduct of aiding and abetting | |
| 26 | the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiff and the other members of the | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
10
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from obtaining a | |
| 2 | fair price for their shares. | |
| 3 | 57. As a result of the unlawful actions of Defendants Silicon Storage, TRH and | |
| 4 | Prophet, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not | |
| 5 | receive fair value for Silicon Storage’s assets and business and will be prevented from obtaining the | |
| 6 | real value of their equity ownership in the Company. Unless the actions of Defendants Silicon Storage, | |
| 7 | TRH and Prophet are enjoined by the Court, it will continue to aid and abet the Individual Defendants’ | |
| 8 | breach of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, and will aid and abet a | |
| 9 | process that inhibits the maximization of stockholder value. | |
| 10 | 58. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |
| 11 | PRAYER FOR RELIEF | |
| 12 | WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment and preliminary and permanent relief, including | |
| 13 | injunctive relief, in his favor and in favor of the Class and against defendants as follows: | |
| 14 | A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action; | |
| 15 | B. Declaring and decreeing that the Merger Agreement was entered into in breach of the | |
| 16 | fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants and is therefore unlawful and unenforceable; | |
| 17 | C. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Proposed Transaction or any of the | |
| 18 | terms thereof, | |
| 19 | D. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining defendants, their agents, counsel, employees and all | |
| 20 | persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed Transaction, unless and until the | |
| 21 | defendants provide Silicon Storage shareholders with an offer that is fair, equitable, maximizes shareholder | |
| 22 | value; | |
| 23 | E. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a | |
| 24 | transaction which is in the best interests of Silicon Storage’s shareholders and implement a process for the | |
| 25 | sale of the Company designed to ensure that the highest possible price is obtained; | |
| 26 | /// | |
| 27 | /// | |
| 28 | ||
11
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
| 1 | /// | |||
| 2 | F. Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable | |||
| 3 | attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and | |||
| 4 | G. Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. | |||
| 5 | DATED: November 17, 2009 | Respectfully Submitted, | ||
| 6 | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE | |||
| 7 | STEPHEN R. BASSER | |||
| 8 | SAMUEL M. WARD | |||
| 9 | /s/ Stephen R. Basser | |||
| 10 | STEPHEN R. BASSER | |||
| 11 | 600 West Broadway, Suite 900 | |||
| 12 | San Diego, CA 92101 | |||
| 13 | Telephone: (619) 230-0800 | |||
| 14 | Facsimile: (619) 230-1874 | |||
| 15 | BARRACK, RODOS, & BACINE | |||
| 16 | DANIEL E. BACINE | |||
| 17 | JULIE PALLEY | |||
| 18 | 3300 Two Commerce Square | |||
| 19 | 2001 Market Street | |||
| 20 | Philadelphia, PA 19130 | |||
| 21 | (215) 963-0600 | |||
| 22 | BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS | |||
| 23 | J. GERARD STRANCH, IV | |||
| 24 | MICHAEL STEWART | |||
| 25 | 227 Second Avenue North, Fourth Floor | |||
| 26 | Nashville, TN 37201-1631 | |||
| 27 | (615) 254-8801 | |||
| 28 | Attorneys for Plaintiff Anis Shaikh | |||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT