Exhibit (a)(5)(viii)
| 1 | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP | |||
| David E. Bower, Esq. SBN 119546 | ||||
| 2 | 600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170 | |||
| Culver City, CA 90230-7600 | ||||
| 3 | Tel: 310-839-0442 | |||
| LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP | ||||
| 4 | Joseph Levi, Esq. | |||
| Juan E. Monteverde Esq. | ||||
| 5 | 30 Broad Street, 15th Floor | |||
| New York, New York 10004 | ||||
| 6 | Tel: 212-363-7500 | |||
| 7 | Fax: 212-363-7171 | |||
| 8 | Attorneys for Plaintiff | |||
| 9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |||
| 10 | SANTA CLARA COUNT | |||
| 11 | HUNG-CHUNG SHIH, individually and on behalf | Case No. 109CV157882 | ||
| of all others similarly situated, | ||||
| 12 | ||||
| Plaintiff, | ||||
| 13 | v. | CIVIL ACTION | ||
| 14 | BING YEH, YAW WEN HU, RONALD CHWANG, | CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT | ||
| 15 | TERRY NICKERSON, YAO-WU YANG, SILICON | |||
| 16 | STORAGE TECHNOLOGY, INC., TECHNOLOGY | |||
| 17 | RESOURCES HOLDINGS, INC., and | |||
| 18 | TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES MERGER SUB, | |||
| INC., | ||||
| Defendants. | ||||
| 19 | Plaintiff, by his attorneys, alleges upon information and belief, except for his own acts, | |||
| 20 | which are alleged on knowledge, as follows: | |||
| 21 | 1. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the public stockholders of Silicon Storage | |||
| 22 | Technology, Inc. (“Silicon Storage “ or the “Company”) against Defendants, Silicon Storage and its | |||
| 23 | Board of Directors (the “Board”) seeking equitable relief for their breaches of fiduciary duty and | |||
| 24 | other violations of state law arising out of their attempt to sell the Company to Defendants | |||
| 25 | Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. and Technology Resources Merger Sub, Inc., entities | |||
| 26 | controlled by Prophet Equity LP (collectively “Prophet Equity”) by means of an unfair process and | |||
| 27 | ||||
| 28 | ||||
- 1 -
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | for an unfair price of $2.10 per share in cash (the “Proposed Transaction”). The Proposed | |
| 2 | Transaction is valued at approximately $210 million. | |
| 3 | 2. While the public shareholders will be cashed out at the unfair price of $2.10 per | |
| 4 | share, certain members of Silicon Storage’s management will remain shareholders of the newly | |
| 5 | resulting company following consummation of the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 6 | 3. Defendants Bing Yeh (“Yeh”), Silicon Storage’s Chief Executive Officer, President, | |
| 7 | and Chairman of the Board, and Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”), Silicon Storage’s Executive Vice President | |
| 8 | and Chief Operating Officer and a member of the Board collectively own approximately 12.7% of | |
| 9 | the Company’s common stock. | |
| 10 | 4. Pursuant to the Proposed Transaction, Prophet Equity will acquire all of the | |
| 11 | outstanding common stock of the Company for $2.10 per share, except for shares held by Yeh and | |
| 12 | Hu, who have agreed to exchange all of their shares of Silicon Storage common stock for shares of | |
| 13 | capital stock of the newly resulting privately held company following the Proposed Transaction. As | |
| 14 | a result, Yeh and Hu will be able to realize the benefits of the burgeoning prospects that lay ahead | |
| 15 | for Silicon Storage, while the public shareholders are cashed out. | |
| 16 | PARTIES | |
| 17 | 5. Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of shares of common stock | |
| 18 | of Silicon Storage. | |
| 19 | 6. Silicon Storage is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of | |
| 20 | California. It maintains its principal corporate offices at 1020 Kifer Road, Sunnyvale, California | |
| 21 | 94086, and supplies NOR flash memory semiconductor devices for the digital consumer, | |
| 22 | networking, wireless communications, and the Internet computing markets. The company produces | |
| 23 | and sells semiconductor products, including NAND flash controllers and NAND controller-based | |
| 24 | modules, smart card integrated circuits (ICs) and modules, flash microcontrollers, and radio | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | frequency ICs and modules. The Company also produces and sells various products based on its | |
| 2 | SuperFlash design and manufacturing process technology, as well as licenses the SuperFlash | |
| 3 | technology for applications in semiconductor devices that integrate flash memory with other | |
| 4 | functions on a monolithic chip. | |
| 5 | 7. Defendant Bing Yeh (“Yeh”) has been the President and Chief Executive Officer of | |
| 6 | the Company since 1989, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company since 2004. | |
| 7 | 8. Defendant Yaw Wen Hu (“Hu”) has been the Chief Operating Officer, Executive | |
| 8 | Vice President, and a director of the Company since 2004. | |
| 9 | 9. Defendant Ronald Chwang (“Chwang”) has been a director of the Company since | |
| 10 | 1997. | |
| 11 | 10. Defendant Terry Nickerson (“Nickerson”) has been a director of the Company since | |
| 12 | 2005. | |
| 13 | 11. Defendant Yao-Wu Yang (“Yang”) has been a director of the Company since 2007. | |
| 14 | 12. Defendants referenced in ¶¶7 through 12 are collectively referred to as Individual | |
| 15 | Defendants and/or the Silicon Storage Board. The Individual Defendants as officers and/or directors | |
| 16 | of Silicon Storage, have a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and other public shareholders of | |
| 17 | Silicon Storage and owe them the highest obligations of good faith, fair dealing, loyalty and due | |
| 18 | care. | |
| 19 | 13. Defendant Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that is | |
| 20 | controlled by Prophet Equity LP, a private equity firm. | |
| 21 | 14. Defendant Technology Resources Merger Sub, Inc. is a California corporation | |
| 22 | wholly owned by Technology Resources Holdings, Inc. that was created for the purposes of | |
| 23 | effectuating the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 24 | INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | 15. By reason of Individual Defendants’ positions with the Company as officers and/or | |
| 2 | Directors, they are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public shareholders of | |
| 3 | Silicon Storage and owe them, as well as the Company, a duty of highest good faith, fair dealing, | |
| 4 | loyalty and full, candid and adequate disclosure, as well as a duty to maximize shareholder value. | |
| 5 | 16. Where the officers and/or Directors of a publicly traded corporation undertake a | |
| 6 | transaction that will result in either: (i) a change in corporate control; (ii) a break up of the | |
| 7 | corporation’s assets; or (iii) sale of the corporation, the Directors have an affirmative fiduciary | |
| 8 | obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably available for the corporation’s shareholders, and if | |
| 9 | such transaction will result in a change of corporate control, the shareholders are entitled to receive | |
| 10 | a significant premium. To diligently comply with their fiduciary duties, the directors and/or officers | |
| 11 | may not take any action that: | |
| 12 | (a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporation’s shareholders; | |
| 13 | (b) favors themselves or will discourage or inhibit alternative offers to purchase | |
| 14 | control of the corporation or its assets; | |
| 15 | (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; | |
| 16 | (d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to search and secure the best value | |
| 17 | reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporation’s shareholders; and/or | |
| 18 | (e) will provide the directors and/or officers with preferential treatment at the | |
| 19 | expense of, or separate from, the public shareholders. | |
| 20 | 17. In accordance with their duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants, | |
| 21 | as Directors and/or officers of Silicon Storage, are obligated to refrain from: | |
| 22 | (a) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers’ loyalties are | |
| 23 | divided; | |
| 24 | ||
| 25 | ||
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | (b) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers receive, or are | |
| 2 | entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the | |
| 3 | corporation; and/or | |
| 4 | (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public | |
| 5 | shareholders. | |
| 6 | 18. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in | |
| 7 | connection with the Proposed Transaction are knowingly or recklessly violating their fiduciary | |
| 8 | duties, including their duties of loyalty and good faith owed to Plaintiff and other public | |
| 9 | shareholders of Silicon Storage, or are aiding and abetting others in violating those duties. | |
| 10 | 19. Defendants also owe the Company’s stockholders a duty of candor, which includes | |
| 11 | the disclosure of all material facts concerning the Proposed Transaction and, particularly, the | |
| 12 | fairness of the price offered for the stockholders’ equity interest. Defendants are knowingly or | |
| 13 | recklessly breaching their fiduciary duties of candor by failing to disclose all material information | |
| 14 | concerning the Proposed Transaction, and/or aiding and abetting other Defendants’ breaches. | |
| 15 | CONSPIRACY, AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONCERTED ACTION | |
| 16 | 20. In committing the wrongful acts alleged herein, each of the Defendants has pursued, | |
| 17 | or joined in the pursuit of, a common course of conduct, and acted in concert with and conspired | |
| 18 | with one another, in furtherance of their common plan or design. In addition to the wrongful | |
| 19 | conduct herein alleged as giving rise to primary liability, the Defendants further aided and abetted | |
| 20 | and/or assisted each other in breach of their respective duties as herein alleged. | |
| 21 | 21. During all relevant times hereto, the Defendants, and each of them, initiated a course | |
| 22 | of conduct which was designed to and did: (i) permit Prophet Equity to attempt to eliminate the | |
| 23 | public shareholders’ equity interest in Silicon Storage pursuant to a defective sales process, and (ii) | |
| 24 | permit Prophet Equity to buy the Company for an unfair price. In furtherance of this plan, | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | conspiracy and course of conduct, Defendants, and each of them, took the actions as set forth | |
| 2 | herein. | |
| 3 | 22. Each of the Defendants herein aided and abetted and rendered substantial assistance | |
| 4 | in the wrongs complained of herein. In taking such actions, as particularized herein, to substantially | |
| 5 | assist the commission of the wrongdoing complained of, each Defendant acted with knowledge of | |
| 6 | the primary wrongdoing, substantially assisted the accomplishment of that wrongdoing, and was | |
| 7 | aware of his or her overall contribution to, and furtherance of, the wrongdoing. The Defendants’ | |
| 8 | acts of aiding and abetting included, inter alia, the acts each of them are alleged to have committed | |
| 9 | in furtherance of the conspiracy, common enterprise and common course of conduct complained of | |
| 10 | herein. | |
| 11 | ||
| 12 | CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS | |
| 13 | 23. Plaintiff brings this action on its own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all | |
| 14 | owners of Silicon Storage common stock and their successors in interest, except Defendants and | |
| 15 | their affiliates (the “Class”). | |
| 16 | ||
| 17 | 24. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the following reasons: | |
| 18 | (a) the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of | |
| 19 | November 19, 2009, Silicon Storage has approximately 95.85 million shares outstanding. | |
| 20 | (b) questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, inter alia, the | |
| 21 | following: | |
| 22 | ||
| 23 | (i) Have the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed | |
| 24 | by them to Plaintiff and the others members of the Class; | |
| 25 | (ii) Are the Individual Defendants, in connection with the Proposed | |
| 26 | Transaction of Silicon Storage by Prophet Equity, pursuing a course | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | of conduct that does not maximize Silicon Storage’s value in violation | |
| 2 | of their fiduciary duties; | |
| 3 | (iii) Have the Individual Defendants misrepresented and omitted material | |
| 4 | facts in violation of their fiduciary duties owed by them to Plaintiff | |
| 5 | and the other members of the Class; | |
| 6 | (iv) Have Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity aided and abetted the | |
| 7 | Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty; and | |
| 8 | (v) Is the Class entitled to injunctive relief or damages as a result of | |
| 9 | Defendants’ wrongful conduct. | |
| 10 | (c) Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and have retained competent | |
| 11 | counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. | |
| 12 | ||
| 13 | (d) Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the other members of the Class. | |
| 14 | (e) Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the Class. | |
| 15 | (f) The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class | |
| 16 | would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications for individual members of the Class | |
| 17 | and of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. | |
| 18 | (g) Conflicting adjudications for individual members of the Class might as a | |
| 19 | practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications | |
| 20 | or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. | |
| 21 | ||
| 22 | ||
| 23 | SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS | |
| 24 | 25. Silicon Storage is poised for substantial growth. On October 27, 2009, the Company | |
| 25 | announced its results for the third quarter of 2009. Among the financial highlights, the Company | |
| 26 | announced that revenues for the quarter were $71.3 million compared with $58.1 million in the | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | second quarter of 2009, and that net income for the quarter was $3.1 million compared with a net | |
| 2 | loss of $6.4 million for the second quarter of 2009. | |
| 3 | 26. In the press release announcing the results, Defendant Yeh commented on the | |
| 4 | Company’s bright future that lay ahead: | |
| 5 | “This was a productive quarter for SST as we executed well on our | |
| 6 | strategy and returned the company to profitability ahead of our | |
| expectations,” said Bing Yeh, chief executive officer. “Seasonally | ||
| 7 | strong demand in NOR flash memory, as well as a stabilizing | |
| pricing environment, resulted in healthy sequential growth in unit | ||
| 8 | shipments and improved product revenues across all four of our | |
| application segments. Over the past few quarters, we have signed | ||
| 9 | several new licensing agreements for our embedded SuperFlash | |
| 10 | program, which will begin to contribute upfront fee revenue in | |
| the fourth quarter as we make progress on deliverables. These | ||
| 11 | new licensing agreements will help drive royalty growth in our | |
| licensing business in future years. We continue to manage our | ||
| 12 | expenses closely and operate our business conservatively, but we | |
| 13 | are optimistic about the opportunities in our markets and we | |
| 14 | believe that we are laying a solid foundation for growth in 2010.” | |
| 15 | 27. Despite its promise and poise for growth, in a press release dated November 13, | |
| 16 | 2009, the Company announced that it had entered into a merger agreement with Prophet Equity, | |
| 17 | stating: | |
| 18 | SUNNYVALE, Calif., Nov. 13, 2009 — SST (Silicon Storage | |
| Technology, Inc.) (NASDAQ: SSTI), a memory and non-memory | ||
| products provider for high-volume applications in the digital | ||
| 19 | consumer, networking, wireless communications and Internet | |
| computing markets, today announced that it has entered into a | ||
| 20 | definitive merger agreement to be acquired by Technology | |
| Resource Holdings, Inc., a Prophet Equity LP-controlled entity, as | ||
| 21 | well as by members of SST’s management team. Prophet Equity | |
| LP will acquire all of the outstanding common stock of the | ||
| 22 | company for $2.10 per share, except for shares held by Bing Yeh, | |
| SST’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Yaw Wen Hu, | ||
| 23 | SST’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer and | |
| member of the Board of Directors, who have agreed to exchange | ||
| 24 | all of their shares of SST common stock for shares of capital stock | |
| of the resulting privately held company. This price per share | ||
| 25 | represents approximately a 13 percent premium to the closing price | |
| per share of SST’s stock on November 12, 2009. | ||
| 26 | SST’s Board of Directors, acting upon the recommendation of a | |
| 27 | Strategic Committee composed of all of SST’s independent | |
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| directors, approved the agreement and resolved to recommend that | ||
| 1 | the company’s shareholders adopt and approve the agreement. | |
| 2 | * * * | |
| 3 | The transaction, which is expected to close in the second quarter of | |
| 2010, is subject to regulatory approvals and approval of the | ||
| 4 | agreement by (i) the holders of a majority of the company’s | |
| outstanding common stock represented and voting at a special | ||
| 5 | meeting to be held to approve the transaction, excluding Bing Yeh | |
| and Yaw Wen Hu, and (ii) the holders of a majority of the | ||
| 6 | company’s outstanding common stock, and other customary | |
| 7 | closing conditions. | |
| 8 | 28. As part of the Proposed Transaction, Defendants Yeh and Hu, who collectively own | |
| 9 | 12.7% of the Company’s common stock, agreed to exchange all of their Silicon Storage common | |
| 10 | stock for common stock and preferred stock of Prophet Equity immediately prior to the | |
| 11 | consummation of the Proposed Transaction. The Proposed Transaction was a fantastic opportunity | |
| 12 | for Defendants Yeh and Hu, along with Prophet Equity, to cash out the public shareholders at an | |
| 13 | unfair price. | |
| 14 | ||
| 15 | 29. First, the Proposed Transaction represents a mere 13% premium to shareholders | |
| 16 | based upon the closing price of Silicon Storage’s shares the day prior to the announcement of the | |
| 17 | Proposed Transaction. This is a paltry amount to offer for the entire equity stake of any company, | |
| 18 | but is doubly offensive because it fails to account for Silicon Storage’s future growth prospects. | |
| 19 | 30. Indeed, in the few months prior to the Proposed Transaction, Silicon Storage stock | |
| 20 | had been trading well in excess of the Proposed Transaction offer price of $2.10. In fact, as recently | |
| 21 | as September 29, 2009, Silicon Storage’s stock traded at $2.75 per share. Moreover, the Company | |
| 22 | has a book value of greater than $2.62 per share with $1.20 per share in cash and no debt. In | |
| 23 | addition, at least one analyst set a $2.50 price target for Silicon Storage shares prior to the | |
| 24 | announcement of the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | 31. Given the Company’s recent performance and future prospects, the consideration | |
| 27 | shareholders are to receive is inadequate. Rather, Defendants Yeh and Hu found the perfect | |
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | opportunity to cash out the public shareholders at an unfair price and, along with Prophet Equity, | |
| 2 | pick up Silicon Storage at a time when Silicon Storage is poised for growth and its stock price is | |
| 3 | trading at a huge discount to its intrinsic value. | |
| 4 | 32. The fact that the Proposed Transaction is unfair to shareholders is supported by the | |
| 5 | fact that Bryant R. Riley, one of the Company’s independent directors, voted against the approval of | |
| 6 | the Proposed Transaction. He subsequently resigned from the Board the day prior to the | |
| 7 | announcement of the Proposed Transaction. | |
| 8 | ||
| 9 | 33. Furthermore, on November 13, 2009, the Company filed a Form 8-K with the United | |
| 10 | States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) wherein it disclosed the operating Agreement | |
| 11 | and Plan of Merger for the Proposed Transaction (the “Merger Agreement”). As part of the Merger | |
| 12 | Agreement, Defendants agreed to certain onerous and preclusive deal protection devices that | |
| 13 | operate conjunctively to make the Proposed Transaction a fait d’accompli and ensure that no | |
| 14 | competing offers will emerge for the Company. | |
| 15 | ||
| 16 | 34. First, pursuant §6.4(a) of the Merger Agreement, the Company has only 45 days | |
| 17 | from November 13, 2009, the date the Merger Agreement was signed, to solicit other offers. After | |
| 18 | the 45 day period, the “go-shop” period ends, and a strict “no solicitation” provision kicks in and | |
| 19 | demands that the Company terminate any attempts to solicit other potential suitors. | |
| 20 | ||
| 21 | 35. In addition, pursuant to §6.4(c) of the Merger Agreement, should a bidder arrive on | |
| 22 | the scene during either the “go-shop” period or after, the Company must notify Prophet Equity of | |
| 23 | the bidder’s identity and offer. Thereafter, should the Board determine that the alternative offer is | |
| 24 | superior, Prophet Equity is granted three business days as a “last look” to amend the terms of the | |
| 25 | Merger Agreement to make a counter-offer that only needs to be at least as favorable to the | |
| 26 | Company’s shareholders as the alternative offer. Prophet Equity is able to match the offer because | |
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | it is granted unfettered access to the offer, in its entirety, eliminating any leverage that the Company | |
| 2 | has in receiving other offers. | |
| 3 | 36. In other words, the Merger Agreement gives Prophet Equity access to any rival | |
| 4 | bidder’s information and allows Prophet Equity a free right to top any superior offer. Accordingly, | |
| 5 | no rival bidder is likely to emerge and act as a stalking horse for Prophet Equity, because the | |
| 6 | Merger Agreement unfairly assures that any “auction” will favor Prophet Equity and piggy-back | |
| 7 | upon the due diligence of the foreclosed second bidder. | |
| 8 | 37. In addition, should the other bidder overcome the “last look,” the Merger Agreement | |
| 9 | provides that a termination fee of $4,025,875 (in the event the offer resulted during the “go-shop” | |
| 10 | period) or $7,045,281 (in the event the offer resulted from an unsolicited offer after the “go-shop” | |
| 11 | period) must be paid to Prophet Equity by Silicon Storage if the Company decides to pursue said | |
| 12 | other offer, thereby essentially requiring that the alternate bidder agree to pay a naked premium for | |
| 13 | the right to provide the shareholders with a superior offer. | |
| 14 | 38. Lastly, Defendants Yeh and Hu, who hold approximately 12.7% of the Company’s | |
| 15 | outstanding common stock, have entered into voting agreements with Prophet Equity pursuant to | |
| 16 | which they have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction and against any | |
| 17 | other acquisition proposal. | |
| 18 | 39. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent the | |
| 19 | irreparable injury that Company shareholders will continue to suffer absent judicial intervention. | |
| 20 | CLAIM FOR RELIEF | |
| 21 | COUNT I | |
| 22 | Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Failure to Maximize Shareholder Value | |
| 23 | (Against All Individual Defendants) | |
| 24 | 40. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. | |
| 25 | ||
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | 41. As Directors of Silicon Storage, the Individual Defendants stand in a fiduciary | |
| 2 | relationship to Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company and owe them the highest | |
| 3 | fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care. The Individual Defendants’ recommendation of the | |
| 4 | Proposed Transaction will result in change of control of the Company which imposes heightened | |
| 5 | fiduciary responsibilities to maximize Silicon Storage’s value for the benefit of the stockholders and | |
| 6 | requires enhanced scrutiny by the Court. | |
| 7 | 42. As discussed herein, the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties | |
| 8 | to Silicon Storage shareholders by failing to engage in an honest and fair sale process. | |
| 9 | 43. As a result of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff | |
| 10 | and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair | |
| 11 | portion of the value of Silicon Storage’s assets and will be prevented from benefiting from a value- | |
| 12 | maximizing transaction. | |
| 13 | 44. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach | |
| 14 | their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed | |
| 15 | Transaction, to the irreparable harm of the Class. | |
| 16 | 45. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |
| 17 | COUNT II | |
| 18 | Aiding and Abetting | |
| 19 | (Against Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity) | |
| 20 | 46. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. | |
| 21 | 47. As alleged in more detail above, Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity are well aware | |
| 22 | that the Individual Defendants have not sought to obtain the best available transaction for the | |
| 23 | Company’s public shareholders. Defendants Silicon Storage and Prophet Equity aided and abetted | |
| 24 | the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties. | |
| 25 | 48. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members are being harmed. | |
| 26 | ||
| 27 | ||
| 28 | ||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
| 1 | 49. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. | |||
| 2 | WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants jointly and severally, as | |||
| 3 | follows: | |||
| 4 | (A) declaring this action to be a class action and certifying Plaintiff as the Class | |||
| 5 | representatives and their counsel as Class counsel; | |||
| 6 | (B) enjoining, preliminarily and permanently, the Proposed Transaction; | |||
| 7 | (C) in the event that the transaction is consummated prior to the entry of this | |||
| 8 | Court’s final judgment, rescinding it or awarding Plaintiff and the Class rescissory damages; | |||
| 9 | (D) directing that Defendants account to Plaintiff and the other members of the | |||
| 10 | Class for all damages caused by them and account for all profits and any special benefits obtained | |||
| 11 | as a result of their breaches of their fiduciary duties; | |||
| 12 | (E) awarding Plaintiff the costs of this action, including a reasonable allowance | |||
| 13 | for the fees and expenses of Plaintiff’s attorneys and experts; and | |||
| 14 | (F) granting Plaintiff and the other members of the Class such further relief as the | |||
| 15 | Court deems just and proper. | |||
| 16 | DATED: November 19, 2009 | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP | ||
| 17 | /s/ David E. Bower | |||
| 18 | DAVID E. BOWER | |||
| 19 | 600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170 | |||
| 20 | Culver City, CA 90230-7600 | |||
| 21 | LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP | |||
| 22 | Joseph Levi, Esq. | |||
| 23 | Juan E. Monteverde, Esq. | |||
| 24 | 30 Broad Street, 15th Floor | |||
| 25 | New York, New York 10004 | |||
| 26 | Tel: 212-363-7500 | |||
| 27 | Fax: 212-363-7171 | |||
| 28 | ||||
| Attorneys for Plaintiff | ||||
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY