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Attention:
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Daniel F. Duchovny
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Special Counsel
Office of Mergers and Acquisitions
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Re:
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Verint Systems Inc.
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Preliminary Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A
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Filed April 24, 2019
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File No. 001-34807
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your assertion that NICE is Verint’s “closest peer” (page 5)
Response: We have revised the disclosure at page 5 of the Proxy Statement and have added a footnote with respect to the basis for
the peer comparison. We note supplementally that three independent sell-side analysts, Samad Samana of Jeffries, Paul Coster of JP Morgan and Shaul Eyal of Oppenheimer, all of whom issue research on Verint and Nice, Ltd., share this view.
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your disclosure that for fiscal years 2016, 2017 and 2018 company management “has failed to meet a
variety of financial targets’ set by the board under the company’s executive bonus program (page 7)
Response: The source for this information is Verint’s 2018 proxy statement, and we have revised the Proxy Statement at page 7 to
reflect this information in a footnote.
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your belief that Verint’s stock has underperformed as a result of operating two business units (page
8)
Response:
We note the Staff’s comment and respectfully advise that we believe this assertion is sufficiently supported by
information regarding Verint’s performance in the Proxy Statement. In addition, we advise the Staff supplementally that Verint’s shares declined by more than half their value in the eight-month period ending February 12, 2016 due mainly
to a decline in its CIS business, which drove a decline in the valuation of the entire company, which in our view is evidence that stockholders’ valuation for each of Verint’s businesses is impacted by either business’s underperformance.
Moreover, we respectfully note that conglomerate discount is a well-documented phenomenon observed by economists and corporate finance experts. See for example Khorna, A., Shivdasani, A., Stendevad, C., and Sanzar, S.V. “Spin-offs:
Tackling the Conglomerate Discount” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp. 90-101, 2011.
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your disclosure that Dr. Greene and Ms. Herscher “are both highly regarded software executives and public-company board members”
(page 9)
Response: We have revised the disclosure at page 9 of the Proxy Statement in response to the Staff’s comment.
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your disclosure that “Mr. Egan told Neuberger Berman that the Board was amenable to adding Ms.
Herscher because Verint needed a woman on the Board” (page 10)
Response:
We note the Staff’s comment. This statement was made by Mr. Egan directly to representatives of Neuberger Berman and
accurately reflects their recollection of Mr. Egan’s comments.
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your stated opinion that “Verint’s Lead Independent Director lacks clearly disclosed key authorities
to be effective in that vital oversight role” (page 10)
Response:
We have revised the disclosure at page 10 of the Proxy Statement in response to the Staff’s comment.
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your disclosure that on an earnings call in March 2018 Mr. Bodner indicated that “Verint did not
intend to separate CIS and CES…” (page 10)
Response: We respectfully note that on Verint’s Q4 2018 earnings call, when asked by JP Morgan analyst Paul Coster if Verint intends
to separate CES and CIS, Mr. Bodner responded: “…So where we are right now is we completed this operational agility and we are focused on creating shareholder value through growing both businesses [and] at the same time expanding
margins.”
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your disclosure that at a meeting on December 7, 2018 Mr. Bodner stated that “…Verint’s customers do
not want to transition to the cloud, and that Verint had no intention to pursue a cloud-centric strategy for CES” (page 11)
Response:
We note the Staff’s comment. This statement was made by Mr. Bodner directly to representatives of Neuberger Berman and
accurately reflects their recollection of Mr. Bodner’s comments.
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