1. | In July 2016, the US EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice announced a $425 million settlement with TRMC, including the TRMC Anacortes Refinery, in relation to violations of the Clean Air Act. The settlement (the Consent Decree) with the U.S. Department of Justice requires that the storage tanks be added to the Refinery’s LDAR program and be monitored regularly for leaks. Some valve locations are difficult to monitor and may require relocation nearer to grade. These locations have been identified and will be addressed when |
2. | The recent Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice has required that the Refinery perform a BWON (Benzene Waste Operations National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) Audit to recalculate the Total Annual Benzene amount and the total benzene emitted under the 2 Mg per year exemption. During this process, the Refinery determined that it exceeded the 2 Mg exemption and reported the exceedance to NWCAA in the 2016 Annual Compliance Certification air operating permit. |
1. | With respect to the Mandan Rail Rack and Trackage and the Salt Lake Rail Rack and Trackage (each as defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement), an August 2013 Fuels Consent Decree contains provisions that apply to tanks storing Conventional Gasoline. Capital Improvements and Audits have been performed under the Consent Decree, but the tanks are still subject to a mandated System-Wide Compliance Plan for sampling tank contents. |
2. | With respect to the LARW Refinery Unit, the LARC Refinery Unit, and the LA Refinery Interconnecting Pipeline (each as defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement), litigation by environmental advocacy group(s), CBE v. SCAQMD, challenging the LARIC Environmental Impact Review for combining the LARW Refinery Unit and the LARC Refinery Unit. Contests anything within scope of that EIR, including LA Refinery Interconnecting Pipeline connections. |
3. | For LARC Refinery Unit operations and assets only, the 2001 EPA Consent Decree entitled U.S. and the State of Indiana, State of Ohio, and the Northwest Air Pollution Authority, Washington v. BP Exploration & Oil Co. |
4. | LARC Tankage (as defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement) was issued Cleanup and Abatement Order (CAO) No. 90-121, dated 22 August 1990. |
5. | Certain of the Assets (as defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement) are subject to a 2016 Environmental Consent Decree with the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Justice. |
• | The pump station for the Tesoro Alaska Pipeline is adjacent to the Kenai Refinery Lower Tank Farm. Multiple historic tank and buried pipeline releases have impacted soil and groundwater in the area; however there are no documented releases from the pipeline pump station. The soil and groundwater surrounding the pump station is considered characterized and undergoing groundwater monitoring and treatment. |
• | A pipeline release in 2001 resulted in soil, groundwater and surface water impacts in an undeveloped area of the Kenai Peninsula. The quantity of the release is not known. Soil surrounding the release was excavated and stockpiled at the Kenai Refinery while groundwater and surface water were remediated on-site. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation issued a No Further Action letter for this cleanup effort in 2008. There are no other known release sites on the pipeline between the Kenai Refinery and Anchorage. |
• | Historic spills and releases have impacted the Anchorage #1 terminal, including past releases from the Tesoro Alaska Pipeline receiving station. Groundwater remediation monitoring is ongoing across the Anchorage #1 terminal. In addition, a soil vapor venting system is being installed to address a flame suppressant compound detected in soils near the receiving station control room. |
1. | Deviations reported under Anchorage Air Permit No. AQ0235TVP03, Issue Date: April 2, 2014, Effective Date: May 2, 2014 |
• | Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC did not submit a report as required under Condition 68 based upon defects listed in Condition 6.3 discovered during the out of service inspection conducted on T-4216 during July 2014. The deviation report covering this incident is set out in the Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC deviation report dated January 29, 2015. |
• | Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC did not report all emissions or operations that exceed or deviate from the requirements of its permit within 30 days of the end of the month in which the excess emission or deviation occurred. The deviation report covering this incident is set out in the Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC deviation report dated January 29, 2015. |
• | Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC did not perform preventative maintenance in accordance with 40 CFR Subpart ZZZZ within 365 days of effective date on EU IDs 7, 8, and 9. The maintenance was performed 2 days after that date. The deviation report covering this incident is set out in the Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC deviation report dated July 30, 2014. |
• | Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC did not report all emissions or operations that exceed or deviate from the requirements of this permit within 30 days of the end of the month in which the excess emissions or deviation occurred. The deviation report covering this incident is set out in the Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC deviation report dated January 29, 2015. |
• | On April 10, 2014. ADEC issued Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC a letter of Acceptance of the Anchorage Facility Compliance Certificate, and identified 4 deviations from the air permit. |
2. | In a letter dated July 22, 2015, the ADEC indicated that the Anchorage Terminal Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan needed the additional information specified in the July 22, 2015 letter to be submitted in order for the plan renewal to be approved. On September 2, 2015, the facility submitted the requested information and is awaiting ADEC approval. |
3. | On May 15, 2015 Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC received a notice of failure to pay Air Quality fees relating to Air Permit No. AQ0235TVP03. Those fees were paid on June 2, 2015. |
4. | In a letter dated October 1, 2015, ADEC approved the facility’s request for a waiver of secondary containment, subject to the terms of the letter, until March 31, 2016. |
5. | On July 24, 2014 ADEC issued a letter to Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC advising that Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC is a responsible party under Alaska law for the July 22, 2014 Anchorage Facility Jet Fuel release. |
6. | On April 21, 2014, ADEC issued a letter to Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC advising it that Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC is a responsible party under Alaska law for the April 20, 2014 gasoline release. |
(i) | In a letter dated May 29, 2015, ADEC detailed items that needed correction related to ADEC’s May 19, 2015 inspection of the terminal and its Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan. The facility has submitted a response to ADEC and is working with the agency to correct the identified items. |
(ii) | On April 24, 2014 ADEC advised Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC that the Primary Response Action Contractor is no longer an ADEC approved and registered contractor. Therefore, Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC’s Fairbanks Facility Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan was out of compliance and needed amendment. |
(iii) | Two underground storage tanks are located at the Fairbank Terminal, both of which are used to store heating oil. One underground storage tank was removed from the Purchased Site prior to Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC’s leasehold. |
(iv) | Asbestos materials has been identified and are known to be located at the Anchorage Facility in the following locations: |
Material Type | Location(s) | EPA Category |
Gray Caulk (10% Chrysotile) | Fire Pump Room, Warehouse | Category II |
Sheetrock (4% Chrysotile) | Boiler Room, Warehouse | Category II |
Brown Insulation (5% Chrysotile) | Heat Exchanger Building | Category I |
Window Caulk (3% Chrysotile) | Warehouse | Category II |
Gray Mastic (10% Chrysotile) | Concrete Pad Near Tank 4136 | Category II |
Black Mastic (6% Chrysotile) | Concrete Pad Near Tank 4136 | Category II |
Black Mastic (17% Chrysotile) | Exchanger on West Side of Asphalt Tank Farm | Category II |
Black Mastic (6% Chrysotile) | Piping located near railroad tracks on Ocean Dock Road. | Category II |
Black Mastic (20% Chrysotile) | Piping on side of Tank 4263, East Tank Farm | Category II |
White Insulation (60% Chrysotile) | Piping on side of Tank 4263, East Tank Farm | Category I |
Mastic/Insulation (20% Chrysotile) | Top skirt of Tank 4263, East Tank Farm | Category I |
Mastic (15% Chrysotile) | Sections of buried pipelines | Category II |
1. | On July 24, 2014 ADEC issued a letter to Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC advising that Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC is a responsible party under Alaska law for the July 22, 2014 Anchorage Facility Jet Fuel release. |
2. | On April 21, 2014, ADEC issued a letter to Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC advising it that Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC is a responsible party under Alaska law for the April 20, 2014 gasoline release. |
3. | In a letter dated July 22, 2015, ADEC indicated that the Anchorage Terminal Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan needed the additional information specified in the July 22 letter to be submitted in order for the plan renewal to be approved. On September 2, 2015, the facility submitted the requested information and is awaiting ADEC approval. |
1. | Notice issued April 16, 2013 by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (“BAAQMD”) related to liquid discovered on internal floating roof of Tank 870; |
2. | Notice issued February 11, 2014 by BAAQMD related to a leaking PV valve on Tract 3 VRS Tank 613; and |
3. | Notice issued August 12, 2014 by BAAQMD related to a ½ inch gap at well sliding cover on Tank 692. |

1. | The transfer piping on the wharf has not been reviewed for risk of surge. In the event of misalignment during cargo operations or accidental valve closure on vessel or shore there is a potential to overpressure the transfer piping. A surge study will be conducted and any required modifications will be undertaken. |
2. | There is a seep of oil through the north secondary containment dike for Tanks 6 and 7 and into the adjacent storm water swale. Absorbent booms are placed at intervals in the swale to contain the oil. Any oil that makes its way to the wastewater treatment facility can be |
3. | The tank containment dikes are coated with asphalt and roofing tar and the asphalt coating is deteriorating on many of the dikes, vegetation is encroaching, and some minor sloughing was noted. If not maintained, further erosion may occur to containment dikes and there are potential compliance risk related to 40 CFR 121, SPCC, and WAC 173-180-320. A tank containment dike erosion control program is in place but needs to be accelerated to mitigate erosion issues over next three years. |
4. | Certain floating roof deck fittings do not meet the requirements of Refinery MACT Subpart CC for storage tanks. According to TRMC representatives, seals/gaskets need to be replaced on 27 tanks in the Assets covered by the 2017 Anacortes Contribution Agreement. |
5. | Per the Consent Decree mentioned in Schedule 1, the Refinery must install closed-purge, closed-loop, or closed-vent samplers at all storage tanks by 2021. According to facility representatives, there are 42 tanks left to retrofit in the Assets covered by the 2017 Anacortes Contribution Agreement. |
6. | Several out-of-service assets are included in the drop, including 17 tanks, the asphalt loading rack, pipelines, the red dye shed, and lead shed areas. TRMC has indicated a total of 17 out-of-service tanks (Tanks 34, 46, 47, 48, 55, 62, 88, 89, 90, 95, 98, 99, 110, 147, 159, 232, and 249). |
7. | Propane and butane vessels were observed to potentially not have drain-away protection that is sized and configured for one-half the largest vessel. A release should be able to drain away from the vessels to prevent further releases, explosions, and fires. |
1. | On August 22, 1990, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB) issued Cleanup and Abatement Order (CAO) No. 90-121 to Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC (TRMC) for the LARC Refinery Unit. The CAO requires investigation and remediation of light non-aqueous phase liquid (LNAPL) on the water table and groundwater containing dissolved-phase petroleum hydrocarbons and methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE). TRMC operates a LNAPL and groundwater recovery system predominantly along the western boundary of LARC Refinery Unit. LNAPL also is removed from selected wells within the process and tank farm areas via vacuum truck. Other remediation efforts at the LARC Refinery Unit include vapor-phase hydrocarbon extraction from soils and enhancing natural biologic degradation in groundwater. Groundwater and soil remediation and LNAPL removal will be ongoing. |
2. | Subsurface environmental investigation at the LARW Refinery Unit began in the early 1980s. These investigations revealed soil and groundwater impacts from dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons, MTBE, tert-butyl alcohol (TBA) and LNAPL. Shell Oil Products US (SOPUS) is responsible for soil and groundwater remediation originating prior to May 2007. SOPUS has recovered LNAPL using a total fluids extraction system and tracked LNAPL recovery rates since 2010. A Remediation Feasibility Study was submitted by SOPUS to the RWQCB in August of 2017. SOPUS presented four "remedy packages" to meet remedy objectives; however, additional data are needed prior to designing a total fluids extraction or dual pump liquid extraction. Releases from TRMC operations have not commingled with impacts attributable to SOPUS. |
3. | Groundwater impacts at the LARC Refinery Unit and the LARW Refinery Unit have migrated downward and offsite. SOPUS, TRMC and Kinder Morgan have modeled groundwater flow and continue to document natural biodegradation in the lower aquifers. |
4. | On January 4, 2010, TRMC notified the California Emergency Management Agency of a naphtha release from LARW Refinery Unit Tank 80214. The release was initially estimated at 15,200 barrels. The RWQCB issued CAO R4-2011-0037 to TRMC on April 11, 2011. The CAO required the assessment and delineation of soil and groundwater impacts associated with this release. In response, TRMC investigated the Tank 80214 area and constructed a LNAPL and groundwater extraction system, which is under continuous operation. Remedial efforts are on-going, however active pumping is expected to be complete within 10 years. |
5. | Underground piping is to be removed/decommissioned under Cleanup Abatement Order (CAO), Los Angeles Plant (File No. 85-20) issued by the California Water Quality Board, Los Angeles Region Order 88-70 was adopted June 27, 1988. Between 2003 and 2017, approximately 89,895 feet of aboveground pipeline was installed and approximately 69,182 |
1. | On October 16, 2018 the North Dakota Department of Health (NDOH) issued a RCRA Hazardous Waste Storage and Treatment and Corrective Action Permit (HW-002) for operations at the Mandan Refinery. The Permit requires the investigation and mitigation of hazardous wastes and hazardous waste constituents released from facility waste management units, including the wastewater collection system below areas of refinery operations and petroleum storage. Mitigation measures include collecting groundwater from down-gradient recovery trenches and monitoring groundwater twice per year. Continued groundwater monitoring, operation of the groundwater trench collection system, and annual reporting to the NDOH is expected to be on-going. |
1. | TRMC operates a remediation system to contain and recover LNAPL and groundwater at the Salt Lake Refinery. This recovery and monitoring system is operated under a Stipulated Consent Order (SCO), dated January 9, 1992, between the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board and Amoco Oil Company, the former refinery owner. Under the SCO, Amoco completed a RCRA Facility Investigation and developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) that included a groundwater remediation/containment system, tracking of soil impacts and establishing deed restrictions to limits property and groundwater use. The LNAPL extraction system operates primarily along the western boundary of the refinery, including the west side of the storage tank area. Dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons are no longer detected in site groundwater. As a result, TRMC is currently in discussions with the State of Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Remediation Control, to update the SCO and CAP into a Site Management Plan and Environmental Covenant. It is unknown whether the State will agree with TRMC’s proposed and revised technical approach. |
2. | Asphalt seeps within the bermed area at Tank 204 can impact operations within the containment area. The Salt Lake Refinery is currently removing residual pockets of asphalt through routine maintenance. The asphalt has not migrated through the containment area. Asphalt seeps are not expected to infiltrate through soils to the water table. Groundwater from monitoring wells located near Tank 204 do not contain dissolved petroleum hydrocarbons or LNAPL. |
3. | LNAPL and water have been observed within the secondary containment at Tank 247. The wastewater treatment facility capacity at the Salt Lake Refinery can be overwhelmed following heavy precipitation events. The backup of hydrocarbon containing wastewater |
4. | Laboratory instruments containing free-phase mercury were once used within the Bulk Loading Rack (BLR) Control Building. Impacts from this practice were discovered on December 1, 2014. The free phase mercury in soil was remediated in the immediate area of the BLR, and interior floors were cleaned and sealed. Mercury remains in the shallow soil surrounding the north side of the BLR Control Building; however institutional controls – including an asphalt cap - are in place to prevent earthwork or disturbing the area without approval and permitting. Post-remediation indoor air sampling demonstrated that the BLR Control Building is suitable for worker occupancy. |
1. | The facility records at the JAL NGL Storage Facility include the following information regarding releases, impacts or potential impacts: |
a) | A former compressor unit leaked an unknown quantity of oil containing poly-chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). |
b) | The southwest corner of the property is used for construction debris, out of service equipment, transformers and storage of other discarded materials. Contaminated soil also is placed in this area. |
c) | Groundwater is impacted by former operation of brine ponds. Kinder Morgan is responsible for these groundwater impacts. |
d) | Wastes, including water, solids, and lubricating oils, were previously disposed in an on-site injection well. |
1. | In 2015, the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division issued Abatement Plan AP-121 to Western Refining. Site groundwater impacts will be addressed after the facility is closed or if contamination migrates off-site. Until closure of the facility’s active operations, the AP-121 requires monitoring eight wells and submitting a report each year. Groundwater monitoring and annual reporting is expected to be on-going. |
2. | Asbestos is present at the Wingate Terminal, including buildings that are cladded in transite and pipes insulated with asbestos wrap. Currently, asbestos is kept sealed and managed in place. |
3. | Two burn pits were used before the existing flare system was constructed. Flare pits may be a source of surface and subsurface soil impacts. |
1. | A sump was reportedly overfilled on March 8, 2018 due to a power outage. This caused a release of 24.4 bbl of crude oil, which flowed across the terminal property and to adjacent undeveloped ranch land. Remedial actions are in process. |
1. | Great Northern Gathering & Marketing LLC vs. Mountain Peak Builders, LLC, Case No. 27-2015-CV-00222, District Court, McKenzie County, North Dakota; Mountain Peak Builders, LLC vs. Great Northern Gathering & Marketing LLC, Case No. 4:15-cv-034, the United States District Court of North Dakota; Cross-Country Pipeline Supply Co., Inc. v. Great Northern Gathering & Marketing LLC and Great Northern Midstream LLC, Civil Case No. 27-2017-CV-00305, in the District Court, McKenzie County, North Dakota. Three related suits regarding construction liens on certain Tesoro Great Plains Midstream LLC assets in North Dakota relating to work for the prior owner (all fully indemnified and being defended by third party/seller - secured by escrow). |
2. | Efrain Onsurez v Rangeland Energy - Litigation in which plaintiff claims that Rio Pipeline (fka Rangeland) drivers are trespassing on his land and related grievances. Affects Rio Pipeline assets in Texas and New Mexico. |
3. | Other litigation scheduled on Schedule I (Environmental Litigation). |
4. | The following HR lawsuits and pending administrative claims: |
(1) | Executive management services of Andeavor employees who devote less than 50% of their business time to the business and affairs of the Partnership, including stock based compensation expense |
(2) | Financial and administrative services (including, but not limited to, treasury and accounting) |
(3) | Information technology services |
(4) | Legal services |
(5) | Health, safety and environmental services |
(6) | Human resources services |
Asset | Owner | |
Nikiski Dock and Storage Facility (Nikiski, Alaska) A single-berth dock and storage facility located at the Kenai Refinery that includes five crude oil storage tanks with a combined capacity of approximately 930,000 barrels, ballast water treatment capability and associated pipelines, pumps and metering stations. The dock and storage facility receives crude oil from marine tankers and from local production fields via pipeline and truck, and also delivers refined products from the refinery to marine vessels. | Tesoro Alaska | |
a) | TRMC and the Operating Company shall mutually agree on the inspection schedule and the duration of such inspections so as to minimize disruption within the Wilmington and Carson refinery systems, with TRMC having the right to approve the final inspection schedule. |
b) | If TRMC fails to renew the Carson II Storage Services Agreement, prior to November 12, 2022, in accordance with the terms thereof, the Partnership Group may elect to accelerate API 653 or API 510 inspections prior to the expiration of the Carson II Storage Agreement. |
Tank Number | Year of Last Inspection |
53 | 2013 |
87 | 2013 |
41 | 2013 |
4 | 2013 |
88 | 2013 |
5 | 2013 |
24 | 2013 |
325 | 2013 |
326 | 2013 |
45 | 2014 |
65 | 2014 |
89 | 2014 |
276 | 2014 |
289 | 2014 |
303 | 2014 |
340 | 2014 |
50 | 2014 |
302 | 2014 |
138 | 2014 |
139 | 2014 |
289 | 2015 |
65 | 2015 |
969 | 2015 |
40 | 2015 |
955 | 2015 |
194 | 2015 |
1. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TAC and the Partnership, TAC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following instrumentation and control projects: AFE# 2012217023 (TCM Idea# 137100002), TCM Idea# 2014216018, TCM Idea# 2007002425. For any such projects listed above in this section 1 that are required to maintain safe operation of the Assets, the Partnership shall determine the final project scope in its sole discretion. |
2. | All capital costs related to the assessment and upgrade or replacement of tank level measurement and transmitter instruments, upon mutual consent of TAC and the Partnership of the scope for the multi-year project. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Partnership in its sole discretion shall determine the final scope of any element of the tank level instrument upgrade project required to maintain safe operation of the Assets. |
3. | All capital costs related to installation of tank liners during first API 653 inspection cycle to bring each tank into conformance with Alaska Department of Environmental Conversation standards. |
4. | All capital costs related to the assessment and necessary upgrades of cathodic protection system including: |
• | Additional anode ground beds |
• | Additional surface distributed anodes |
• | Additional amperes of cathodic protection for on-grade storage tanks |
• | Under tank monitoring systems |
5. | All capital costs related to internal inspection, assessment and repair of Tank 11 internal floating roof. |
1. | The parties agree that Tank 37 included in the Alaska Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 24 months prior to the date hereof, and are excluded from the reimbursement requirements listed above unless such actions fail to meet such compliance standards due to the negligence of TAC. |
2. | Any costs or expenses related to: |
• | Completion of pressure relief documentation, expected to be complete by year-end 2016. |
• | Completion of area classification plans per NEC 500.4, expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
1. | All capital costs related to: |
a) | Anchorage Terminal |
• | Installation of permanent fire water pipeline supports with proper coating; expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
• | Assessment, evaluation and potential replacement of two deep anode ground beds (No. 2 and No. 5); expected to be completed within cathodic protection program by year-end 2018. |
• | Installation of third tank floor on Tank 4236 with either new cathodic protection system or an El Segundo system; expected to be complete by year-end 2020. |
• | Assessment and upgrades to add access platforms and roof protection to east side filter vessels; expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
b) | Fairbanks Terminal |
• | Assessment, evaluation and potential replacement of two deep anode ground beds and installation of two new rectifiers to allow ground beds to be operated independently; expected to be completed within cathodic protection program by year-end 2018. |
1. | Any costs or expenses related to: |
a. | Anchorage Terminal |
• | Inspection and assessment of buried product pipeline; expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
• | Assessment of manual operation of rail car sump tankage; expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
b. | Fairbanks Terminal – Any costs or expenses related to: |
• | Arc flash assessment; expected to be complete by year-end 2017. |
Tank Number |
26 |
258 |
517 |
601 |
612 |
641 |
690 |
701 |
702 |
709 |
710 |
711 |
1. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following gasoline blending unit projects identified: TCM Idea# 2017211656, TCM Idea# 2016215025, TCM Idea# 2014215018, and TCM Idea# 2012215056. For any such projects listed above in this section 1 that are required to maintain safe operation and compliance of the Assets, the Partnership shall determine the final project scope in its sole discretion. |
2. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following tank repairs, improvements and new build projects: TCM Idea# 2015215024, TCM Idea# 2015215023, TCM Idea# 2015215020, TCM Idea# 2015215022, TCM Idea# 2015215006, TCM Idea# 2016215005, TCM Idea# 2015215008, AFE# DTKRS.0600.2017.03 (TCM Idea# 2015215017), AFE# DTKRS.0600.2017.02 (TCM Idea# 2015215018), AFE# DTKRS.0600.2017.01 (TCM Idea# 2015215010), TCM Idea# 2015215019, TCM Idea# 2015215015, TCM Idea# 2015215012, TCM Idea# 2015215026, TCM Idea# 2009005038, AFE# DTKRS.0600.2016.03 (TCM Idea# 2011215042), AFE# DTKRS.0600.2016.05 (TCM Idea# 2009005041). For any such projects listed above in this section 2 that are required to maintain safe operation and compliance of the Assets, the Partnership shall determine the final project scope in its sole discretion. |
3. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the tank improvement program listed under AFE# 164100007 (TCM Idea# 2015215004). The Partnership, in its sole discretion, shall determine the final scope of the project listed above in this section 3, if required to maintain safe operation and compliance of the Assets. |
4. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following manifest rail unloading project identified: TCM Idea# 2016215023. The Partnership, in its sole discretion, shall determine the final scope of the project listed above in this section 4, if required to maintain safe operation and compliance of the Assets. |
5. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following miscellaneous projects identified: AFE# 172100068 (TCM Idea# 2017211658), AFE# 162100077 (TCM Idea# 2016215022), TCM Idea# 2013215028, AFE#172100086 (TCM Idea# 2014215009). For any such projects listed above in this section 5 that are required to maintain safe operation and compliance of the Assets, the Partnership shall determine the final project scope in its sole discretion. |
6. | All capital costs related to the installation of closed-purge, closed-loop, or closed-vent samplers at all storage tanks by 2021 (per the Consent Decree mentioned in Schedule 1). According to TRMC representatives, as recorded in section 2.2.4 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017), there are 42 tanks left to retrofit in the Assets covered by the 2017 Anacortes Contribution Agreement. |
1. | The parties agree that the following tanks included in the 2017 Anacortes Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 36 months prior to the date hereof and are excluded from the reimbursement requirements listed above unless such actions fail to meet such compliance standards due to the negligence of TRMC. |
Tank Number |
TK001 |
TK019 |
TK024 |
TK025 |
TK026 |
TK028 |
TK060 |
TK091 |
TK092 |
TK134 |
TK248 |
TK156 |
TK158 |
TK180 |
TK241 A |
TK241 B |
2. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between TRMC and the Partnership, TRMC shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all expense and capital costs incurred for the execution of the following miscellaneous projects identified in the tables below. |
IEA) - Replace aging power poles in Tank Farm |
IEA) - Upgrade Switch Racks |
IEA) - Tank Farm Conduit |
IEA) - Replace MOV's in the tank farm |
IEA) - Replace Coggins Conduit and wire |
IEA) - Tank Farm Grounding |
IEA) - Install electric heat tracing |
PIPE) - Upgrade steam piping in tank farm |
REF) - Sample station compliance |
IEA) - Skim oil sump level controller to P-709 |
INSP) - Required inspection work on V-801 |
INSP) - Required inspection work on TK-38 |
REF) - Purchase tank 8 heater |
TKWK) - Roof Drains, Seal Failures |
IEA) - Back pressure regulator for C4 to storage |
INSP) - Offsite/Rack Piping RBMI Implementation – Field |
REF) - Contingency boom replacement |
IEA) - Causeway Conduit |
PPXX) - Abrasive Blast and recoat wharf lines and remove asbestos conduit |
REF) - Rebuild bumpers to be prioritized by operations |
WINP) - Install stairway to access spill boats |
RAIL) - Rail Maintenance & Inspection |
Rail) - Rail Track Repair |
3. | All additional operating expenses associated with accelerating the tank containment dike erosion control program, for the mitigation of erosion issues, over the next five years. This issue is recorded in section 2.2.2 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017) as well as section 3.2.1 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
4. | All costs related to the installation of independent high-high level switches, consistent with the established tank inspection and repair program. This issue is recorded in section 3.2.1 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
5. | All costs for any future modifications required to comply with Andeavor “Tank & Loading Rack” fire protection standard CPER-004 currently under review. This issue is recorded in section 3.4.11 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
6. | All costs for implementing a surge study for the wharf transfer piping and for any required modifications discovered as a result of this study. This issue is recorded in sections 2.2.1 and 6.2.1 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017). |
7. | All costs for implementing a study of the dike arrangement to the north and east sides of Tank 38, which may not adequately direct contents to the remote containment area in the event of a vessel failure, and for any required modifications discovered as a result of this study. This issue is recorded in section 3.2.2 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
8. | All costs for potential future expenses of investigation and mitigation work related to seep of oil through the north secondary containment dike for tanks 6 and 7. This issue is recorded in sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.3 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017). |
9. | All costs related to the installation of storage tank seals and gaskets, required by Refinery Sector Rule MACT Subpart CC, to be identified in the established compliance schedule for tank inspection and repair. This issue is recorded in section 2.2.3 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017). |
10. | All costs to empty, blind-flange or air-gap any of the out-of-service tanks listed below. |
Tank Number |
TK034 |
TK046 |
TK047 |
TK048 |
TK055 |
TK062 |
TK088 |
TK089 |
TK090 |
TK095 |
TK098 |
TK099 |
TK110 |
TK147 |
TK159 |
TK232 |
TK249 |
11. | All costs for removal of out-of-service assets identified in section 6.2.8 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017). These assets include 17 tanks (shown in Section 10 above), asphalt loading rack, pipelines, red dye shed and lead shed. |
12. | All costs related to the performing of an assessment of propane and butane vessel containment areas, and any resulting project expenses required, to ensure compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) fire codes. This issue is recorded in section 6.3.3 of ERM’s Due Diligence Summary Report (October 2017). |
13. | All costs related to performing an initial direct assessment, and any resulting required repairs, of the Andeavor-owned segment of the underground “Kinder Morgan” crude pipeline. This issue is recorded in section 3.3.1 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
14. | All costs related to performing an initial inspection, and any resulting required repairs, of the wharf sumps. This issue is recorded in section 3.3.5 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
15. | All costs related to performing an initial inspection, and any resulting required repairs, of the cathodic protection (CP) systems for the aboveground storage tank bottoms, buried facility piping and marine structures. During this inspection the rectifiers will be surveyed and any rectifiers which are not Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) listed per OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) and NFPA requirements will be replaced and costs will be subject for reimbursement. These issues are recorded in section 3.4.17 of Coffman’s Mechanical Integrity Due Diligence Study (September 2017). |
16. | All cost of in-service inspections and evaluations of the condition of tank walls and tank floors for each of the following tanks, using accepted engineering methods for non-invasive external inspections that do not require that a tank be emptied or structurally altered, which are conducted before the earlier of (i) an API 653 inspection of such tank and (ii) November 7, 2022, up to an aggregate reimbursable cost not to exceed two million dollars for all such tanks. |
Tank Number |
TK003 |
TK005 |
TK006 |
TK008 |
TK011 |
TK013 |
TK015 |
TK017 |
TK018 |
TK021 |
TK022 |
TK027 |
TK030 |
TK032 |
TK033 |
TK035 |
TK036 |
TK037 |
TK038 |
TK113 |
TK114 |
TK142 |
TK148 |
TK230 |
TK247 |
TK054 |
TK056 |
TK138 |
TK160 |
TK157 |
TK221 |
TK222 |
TK223 |
TK224 |
TK225 |
TK226 |
TK227 |
TK228 |
TK229 |
1. | Los Angeles Refinery Wilmington - Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of Partnership Group, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified: |
IDEA # | AFE | DESCRIPTION |
NA | LA-130014 | RAIL CAR FALL PROTECTION |
100000000000000007122018 | NA | TANK GAUGING PH V |
100000000000000013322018 | NA | LAR CATHODIC PROTECTION PROGRAM |
100000000000000014342018 | NA | RP&S CONTROL SYSTEM MODERNIZATION |
100000000000000020072018 | NA | REPLACE EAST RAILCAR LOADING PLATFORM |
100000000000000042922018 | NA | Tank Gauging VII |
100000000000000042822018 | NA | UPR – LARW |
NA | NA | Tank 11001 Double-Bottom Upgrade Project |
NA | LA-120052 | TANK GAUGING – PHASE III |
NA | LA-160120 | LARW FIREWATER UPGRADE NW TANK FARM – 5B |
NA | LA-170005 | 2017 WIL TANK 80065 REBUILD |
NA | LA-170010 | TK-80081 REBUILD – CRUDE |
NA | LA-170018 | TK-080038 REBUILD |
NA | LA-170038 | 2023 WIL TANK 80060 REBUILD – CRUDE |
NA | TA-170031 | 2017 WIL TANK 80218 SHELL REPAIRS |
NA | SC-189066 / TA-180016 | TANK 80210 Unplanned Repairs (Revision No. WP 18044B) |
2. | Los Angeles Refinery Carson - Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified: |
IDEA # | AFE | DESCRIPTION |
NA | LA-160102 | 70 SERIES BUTANE SPHERE LEVEL MEASUREMENT |
NA | LA-180057 | PROPANE LOADING ODORANT TRIP |
NA | TA-170032 | 2018 CAR TANK 61 FLOOR/BOTTOM SHELL |
3. | Mandan Refinery - Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified: |
IDEA # | AFE | DESCRIPTION |
NA | MN-170096 | TANK FIELD MODERNIZATION - PHASE 4 |
100000000000000013852018 | NA | FB-754 NEW CR & INTERNAL FLOATING ROOF CONVERSION |
100000000000000013862018 | NA | FB-706 NEW CR & INTERNAL FLOATING ROOF CONVERSION |
NA | MN-180087 | INSTALL SPARE GA-778 PROPANE LOADING PUMP |
NA | MN-180084 | TANK FIELD MODERNIZATION - PHASE 5 |
100000000000000020132018 | NA | REPLACE OM PLC OR MOVE TO THE DCS |
100000000000000020182018 | NA | FB-724 - NEW INTERNAL FLOATING ROOF |
NA | MN-180094 | Firewater Line to Rail Switch Yard |
NA | MN-180085 | Oil Movements HPM Migration |
100000000000000041422018 | NA | FB-738 Foam Pipe and New Basin |
NA | MN-170121 | BUTANE TRUCK OFFLOADING |
NA | TA-160011 | FB-751 DOUBLE FLOOR REPLACEMENT |
NA | TA-160013 | FB-741 INTERNAL SHELL REPAIR |
NA | TA-160014 | FB-755 INSPECT AND REPAIR |
100000000000000006842018 | NA | FB-738 - BOTTOM REPAIRS AND BASIN ENHANCEMENT |
100000000000000006852018 | NA | FB-752 - BOTTOM REPAIRS AND BASIN ENHANCEMENT |
100000000000000006862018 | NA | FB-742 - BOTTOM REPLACEMENT |
100000000000000006922018 | NA | FB-710 Inspect and Repair |
100000000000000006932018 | NA | FB-726 Inspect and Repair |
NA | TA-180109 | FB-717 Repairs |
100000000000000042412018 | NA | Tank Field Modernization - Phase 6 |
NA | MN-180109 / NG-180069 | Butane Sphere Valve Access Platforms |
NA | MN-180100 | Install Water Draw Systems on LPG Tanks |
4. | Salt Lake Refinery - Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the Andeavor |
ITEM # (IDEA #) | ID (AFE) | DESCRIPTION |
NA | SL-160012 | SALT LAKE TIER III GASOLINE COMPLIANCE (Tank 248 + Rail + Dan Upgrades + Blend Upgrades) |
NA | SL-170063 | TANK 144 REPLACEMENT (new 245) |
NA | SL-170004 | TANK 245 REPLACEMENT (new 244) |
NA | SL-170034 | TANK 213 |
NA | SA-179045 | Automation Modernization Program (AMP) (to replace OMD CSM and BLR SIS projects) |
100000000000000017312018 | NA | DIESEL / JET MANIFOLD SEGREGATION |
100000000000000027732018 | NA | TANK 243 REPLACEMENT |
100000000000000006602018 | NA | TANK 206 TURNAROUND |
100000000000000006612018 | NA | TANK 247 TURNAROUND |
100000000000000006652018 | NA | TANK 246 TURNAROUND |
100000000000000006772018 | NA | Tank 206(A) New Tank |
Unknown | Unknown | Replace Bottom 1/3 of Sphere 306 |
NA | SL-180012 | FCU Feed Strategy Project |
5. | Delek Asphalt Terminals – Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified: |
IDEA # | AFE | Location | DESCRIPTION |
TBD | TBD | Fernley (50%) | Fall Protection – Truck |
TBD | TBD | Fernley (50%) | Fall Protection – Rail |
TBD | TBD | Fernley (50%) | Remove surface impoundment |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Fall Protection – Truck |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Fall Protection – Rail |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Replace CS RTO lines with SS |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Remove surface impoundment |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Piping debottleneck |
TBD | TBD | Elk Grove | Refurbish PMA unit |
TBD | TBD | Mojave | Fall Protection – Truck |
TBD | TBD | Mojave | Fall Protection – Rail |
TBD | TBD | Mojave | Hot oil booster pump |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | Fall Protection – Truck |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | Fall Protection – Rail |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | Remove surface impoundment |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | New Boiler/Steam Generator |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | Hot Water tank |
TBD | TBD | Bakersfield | New emission control unit |
TBD | TBD | Phoenix | Fall Protection – Truck |
TBD | TBD | Phoenix | Fall Protection – Rail |
TBD | TBD | System | Spare emulsion mill/housing |
TBD | TBD | System | Spare PMA mill tooling |
6. | BakkenLink / Fryburg – Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified: |
IDEA # | AFE | DESCRIPTION |
NA | NG-170034 | FRYBURG RAIL TERMINAL T103 & T104 VALVE |
NA | NG-180026 | FRYBURG RAIL TERMINAL SECURITY IMPROVEMENT |
NA | NG-180019 | TGP METER SKID BUILDING UPGRADES |
NA | NG-180020 | ARC FLASH MITIGATION TGPM |
NA | NG-180021 | TANK LIGHTNING PROTECTION TGPM |
NA | NG-180022 | FLOWCAL IMPLEMENTATION BAKKENLINK |
NA | NG-180017 | TANK MIXERS T201 AND T301 AT WATFORD CIT |
7. | Jal NGL Storage Facility – Upon mutual consent on project scope between the applicable Andeavor Entities and the applicable members of the Partnership Group, the applicable Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all capital costs incurred for the execution of the following projects identified |
IDEA # | AFE | DESCRIPTION |
TBD | TBD | Dead leg removal project: Remove several dead legs SW of the pump house and reroute a brine water line to mitigate an existing ramp concern |
99991944 | NA | 2019.SMT.Jal NGL Storage Facility. Brine Pond liner replacement and salt/sand disposal |
TBD | TBD | 2019.SMT.Jal. Inline filters for line coming in from MAPCO |
TBD | TBD | 2019.SMT.Jal NGL Storage Facility. Install a gas separator in the brine line |
TBD | TBD | 2019.SMT.Jal NGL Storage Facility. SDV upstream of product pumps & relocate discharge/suction valves outside of pump room |
1. | The Parties agree that the following tanks relating to the LARW Refinery Unit included in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 36 months prior to the date hereof, or are deemed in compliance with API 653 through current risk-based management inspection (RBMI) standards and whose next API 653 |
Tank Number |
776 |
777 |
778 |
779 |
780 |
1503 |
13502 |
50000 |
80035 |
80057 |
80092 |
80210 |
80219 |
125001 |
125002 |
2. | The Parties agree that the following tanks relating to the LARC Refinery Unit included in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 36 months prior to the date hereof, or are deemed in compliance with API 653 through current risk-based management inspection (RBMI) standards and whose next API 653 inspection is scheduled greater than 20 years after the Effective Date, and are excluded from the reimbursement requirements listed above unless such actions fail to meet such compliance standards due to the negligence of Andeavor. |
Tank Number |
74 |
350 |
351 |
352 |
353 |
354 |
355 |
681 |
3. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between the Andeavor Entities and the Partnership, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all expense and capital costs incurred for the execution of the following miscellaneous projects at the LARW Refinery Unit or LARC Refinery Unit, identified in the table below. |
NRE ID# | Description |
6473 | RP&S Replace 200 ft of 8” Slops Line |
6456 | RP&S Replace 800 ft of 12” Vapor Recovery Piping – V2331 to VXXXX |
6474 | Tank 80219, hot tap a new nozzle at ~15’ |
6477 | REPLACE LIGHTING AT CONTROL ROOM MANIFOLD |
6273 | Brinewater to slop Bypass line |
6280 | PLATFORM BETWEEN TANK 80219 AND 80087 |
6197 | RP&S Install minimum flow kickback for P-1206 |
6202 | RP&S Steam pressure control valve at tank 118066 |
5802 | Replace 73-CP-1 (RP&S Central Tank Farm) PLC |
TBD | Clean and air gap tanks 11000, 11001, 11003 and 11004 |
WP18044B | Tank 80210 expense minor repairs |
4. | The Parties agree that the following tanks relating to the Mandan Refinery included in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 36 months prior to the date hereof, or are deemed in compliance with API 653 through current risk-based management inspection (RBMI) standards and whose next API 653 inspection is scheduled greater than 20 years after the Effective Date, and are excluded from the reimbursement requirements listed above unless such actions fail to meet such compliance standards due to the negligence of Andeavor. |
Tank Number |
FB-702 |
FB-708 |
FB-714 |
FB-715 |
FB-717 |
FB-721 |
FB-722 |
FB-725 |
FB-726 |
FB-728 |
FB-729 |
FB-731 |
FB-744 |
FB-747 |
FB-753 |
FB-758 |
FB-771 |
FB-774 |
5. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between Andeavor and the Partnership, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all expense and capital costs incurred for the execution of the following miscellaneous projects at the Mandan Refinery, identified in the table below. |
Expense Order # | Description |
9074513 | OTE – GA759 & GA759S Pump Foundation Replacement |
9026500 | OTE – Remove OM RV Pot & Modify Drain Piping |
unknown | OTE – Resolve Wet Propane Issue |
6. | The Parties agree that the following tanks relating to the Salt Lake Refinery included in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement listed on Schedule VII have been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to ensure compliance with API 653 or API 510 standards within the 36 months prior to the date hereof, or are deemed in compliance with API 653 through current risk-based management inspection (RBMI) standards and whose next API 653 inspection is scheduled greater than 20 years after the Effective Date, and are excluded |
Tank Number |
142 |
190 |
204 |
212 |
213 |
244 |
245 |
306 |
321 |
326 |
330 |
427C |
7. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between Andeavor and the Partnership, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all expense and capital costs incurred for the execution of the following project at the Salt Lake Refinery, identified in the table below. |
IDEA # | Description |
Unknown | Tank 297 – Lift and Level |
Unknown | J-928D ATB Loading |
8. | Upon mutual consent on project scope between Andeavor and the Partnership, the Andeavor Entities shall reimburse the Partnership Group for all expense and capital costs incurred for the execution of the following miscellaneous projects identified in the table below. |
Description | Location |
Berm repair | Elk Grove |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
LAR | The recently revised CA OSHA Rule 5189.1, Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries, incorporates a number of significant changes related to hazard reviews that will potentially result in modifications to RP&S assets. New review methodologies to be incorporated include: • Safeguard Protection Analysis • Hierarchy of Hazard Controls Analysis (HHC) • Damage Mechanism Reviews (DMR) Discussions with PSM staff indicated that while many of the practices have been adopted within the refinery, some of the additional hazard reviews are likely to result in project costs related to safeguard improvements | All costs related to implementing additional safeguard improvements to conform with changes in PSM requirements |
LAR | Underground piping is removed/decommissioned as part of the UPR effort ongoing at the refinery (required by Cleanup Abatement Order (CAO)). There is a risk that additional underground piping not previously identified will need to be included in the program. Between 2003 and December 2017, approximately 89,895 feet of aboveground pipeline were installed and approximately 69,182 feet of underground pipeline were decommissioned. | All costs for projects to comply with Cleanup Abatement Order, decommissioning underground piping not previously included in the removal program |
LAR | Additional investment related to Air Toxics health risk reduction requirements may be required due to: • Increased calculated health risk due to changes in California Air Toxics risk calculation methodologies, resulting in additional risk reduction activities • Increased focus on risk from refineries due to California AB617 community monitoring that could lead to additional emission control requirements on tanks (adding domes or vapor recovery to additional tanks), alternative measures for providing power during turnarounds (eliminating portable engine use), and additional cost related to controlling vacuum truck emissions. • Increased cost related to SCAQMD Rule 1180 Refinery Fenceline and Community Air Monitoring (additional instrumentation will be installed in the next year and may need to be updated in 5 years) | All costs related to identified projects required to comply with California Air Toxics regulations |
LAR Carson | Shared containment dikes without intermediate subdivisions (773, 774, 775). Potential risk of fire spread between tanks. | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
LAR Carson | Tanks 677, 678, 679, 680 (15k bbl. each) are out of service. Tanks would require extensive repairs to reinstate, including adding anchors for seismic stability due to height to diameter ratio. | All costs to perform study to determine if tanks should be demolished and for any resulting costs to demolish tanks, if required. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
LAR Carson | Vessels grouped into shared containment areas without subdivision or remote impoundments (pentane spheres 681, 682, 683, 684) and (propane bullets 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355) | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
LAR Carson | There is an ongoing, but incomplete project to upgrade the tank L&J Technologies gauging system to radar type. | All costs to upgrade the tank L&J Technologies gauging system to radar type. |
LAR Carson | Motorola Intrac tank overfill protection system is no longer supported. A project has been identified to upgrade it. | All costs to upgrade tank gauging and control systems |
LAR Carson | Arc flash labels are not provided on any equipment. There is a program in place to correct this within the next two years. Part of the energized work permitting process is have the facility engineer use the existing ETAP model to calculate the incident energy at the work location. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
LAR Carson | Two single bottom tanks do not have adequate levels of cathodic protection. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
LAR Carson | Cathodic protection levels on the buried facility piping could not be verified due to suspect data. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
LAR Wilmington | LPG vessels 6000 and 6001 as well as the 700 series LPG vessels (7 total) do not have a back-flow check valve or thermal activated automatic shutdown valve in place as required per NFPA 58. | All costs for upgrades required to comply with NFPA 58 automatic shutdown requirements on tanks 6000 and 6001 and 700 series tanks |
LAR Wilmington | Pressure relief devices on V-1700 series pressure vessels (gasoline) vent to atmosphere directly above vessel. | All costs to evaluate requirements and for any related projects required to reroute V-1700 series pressure vessels relief vents |
LAR Wilmington | No cable type ground connection between the rack and rail car was observed. | All costs to evaluate grounding requirements at the LPG train car rack and for any related projects required to meet Andeavor standards |
LAR Wilmington | The loading safety platforms need upgraded. | All costs to upgrade rail car loading racks to Andeavor Logistics standards |
LAR Wilmington | The truck rack lacks a grounding assurance system. | All costs to install interlocks and grounding systems on Truck & Rail racks |
LAR Wilmington | Arc flash labeling is incomplete. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
LAR Wilmington | The Honeywell DCS system for both the inline blending area and tank farm is no longer supported. A project has been identified to upgrade to the E300 system. | All costs related to any control system upgrades needed for the Honeywell inline blender |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
LAR Wilmington | The first phases of the project to upgrade tank gauging to radar type used a wireless system to report data to the control system. Current Andeavor practice is hard wire level transmitters. An evaluation of the security of the wireless system is being conducted. | All costs related to modifying wireless systems to hardwire to meet Andeavor standards. |
LAR Wilmington | There is an ongoing, but incomplete project to upgrade the tank gauging system to radar type. Approximately 30 tanks still need to be completed. | All costs to upgrade tank gauging to radar types |
LAR Wilmington | No operational cathodic protection exists to protect aboveground storage tanks with single bottom floors or buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
LAR Wilmington | No fixed fire protection on tanks 13506, 13507, 13508, 7200. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
LAR Wilmington | The following observations were made related to secondary containment at LARW that will require additional investment: • Erosion of roads and berms was observed (not only asphaltic covering, but the underlying soil starting to show shear, erosion, signs of scouring). • Integrity of sidewalls, cracks observed in concrete around west side tanks (north wall). • Weak and uncoated points in berms. • Tank dike floor has been excavated to below the berm wall substrate in South tank farm, which may compromise the berm integrity. • Piping interconnections between berms should be reviewed as part of the SPCC Plan renewal efforts. | All costs to complete SPCC plan review and to make any necessary repairs to improve tank farm berms and roadways at LAR-Wilmington |
LAR Wilmington | LPG Rail and Truck loading racks lack the following safe guards: • No driver card system, • Loading operation is manual, • No predetermined load volume capacity, • No automated gauge/level monitoring, • functional fire detection UV/IR with automatic water deluge (system is installed, but has not been commissioned). | All costs for initial review of safe guards and for any resulting improvements required to bring the LPG rail and truck rack up to Andeavor standards |
LAR Wilmington | Four clusters of four 80,000 bbl. tanks containing crude, slop, transmix or VGO have comingled secondary containment dikes. An event of loss of primary containment (LOPC) in one tank would spread to the entire surface of the common dike floor, creating a large spill area. If the event is ignited (pool fire) the consequence would be more severe and lead to potential escalation to neighboring tanks. Construction of additional segregation berms would be required for tank segregation containment. | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
LAR Wilmington | Butane spheres and propane bullets near to the road tanker loading/unloading area are not equipped with flammable or fire detection. | All costs to evaluate fire protection systems to ensure compliance with NFPA, local city regulations and Andeavor fire protection standards; and for any resulting modifications required to comply with above regulations and standards |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Mandan | Multiple tanks grouped into a single secondary containment dike lack subdivision berms resulting in potential spread of spills to inundate all tanks in the group. This increases the risk of loss in the event of a fire. Reference tank groups (743, 745); (737, 738); (741, 756, 707, 709); (715, 714, 710, 708, 712, 711); (742, 744, 720, 718); (719, 722, 721, 732, 756); (757, 716); (717, 740) | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
Mandan | Three significant dents are present at the top course of the north face of Tank 734. | All costs to evaluate integrity of tank 734 dents and to make any required repairs |
Mandan | U-1A forms are not available for all pressure vessels (bullets and spheres). Modifications, if required, may become complicated without the original manufacture forms. | All costs to perform a refinery engineering review and to document original U-1A forms are on file for all pressure vessels, and all costs to replace any vessels, if required |
Mandan | Original drawings indicate shells of the LPG bullets are made of ASTM A212 steel, which historically has had failures associated with brittle fracture. The material is no longer made. Mandan has a DMT of about -20F, so brittle fracture should be considered in vessel materials. | All costs to perform a study, if needed, to evaluate brittle fracture areas on LPG bullet tanks, and to cover any resulting repairs required |
Mandan | A majority of the concrete pipe support foundations have experienced heaving/settling, in some cases failing completely, resulting in loss of support of the pipe. Many foundations are cracked, eroded, or completely broken away exposing the reinforcing steel and are no longer providing support to the piping. | All costs to perform a study to evaluate tank farm pipe foundations and supports in question and any costs to address deficiencies discovered |
Mandan | Several supports for the 14” jet fuel pipe routed along the west side of Tank 734 have failed completely. The pipe is spanning approximately 80'-0" unsupported which could result in overstress. | All costs to repair supports on the 14" jet piping along the west side of TK-734 |
Mandan | The LPG transfer pump 759 and 759S foundation and support slabs are compromised and do not provide sound support or drip containment for the pumps. Refinery stated the pump foundations are slated for replacement. | All costs for projects to repair or replace LPG pump 759 and 759S foundations |
Mandan | Pump 778 has issues with its dry well collecting liquids which can freeze and cause misalignment of the pump. Other pumps in the area (e.g. 759) do not have the same capacity as 778, so when pump 778 goes down flow to the process is limited. Refinery personnel indicated a project to relocate pump 778 is in initial stages to determine funding. | All costs to conduct a complete mechanical reliability evaluation of pump 778 and to upgrade and or relocate, as needed |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Mandan | No document control for P&ID updates or revisions. Work history on pumps is only available for the past year due to the new system for tracking pump maintenance. | All costs to evaluate document controls and determine if appropriate P&ID's, plot plans, isometric and electrical one-line drawings and maintenance records are in place, as well as to prepare any required documents. |
Mandan | The rail car loading stations on track 8 have catch basins for spill collection. The catch basins are piped to a sump with integrity of buried pipe unknown. | All costs of recommended underground piping replacements, as a result of initial catch basin inspections. Inspections are being implemented into refinery inspection programs for rail car loading stations. |
Mandan | Cable tray and conduit has failed at many locations due to being exposed to snow loads, or due to settling/heaving or failure of pipe supports. Failed conduit may be located in classified areas, with internal wiring exposed. | All costs to perform a survey of the tank farm and identify any failed trays and conduits and implement projects to repair. |
Mandan | Fire and Gas detection is typical of this type of facility and consists of direct observation by field personnel. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Mandan | 35 storage tanks do not have fixed fire protection systems for delivery of foam to the tank interior. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Mandan | Fire foam piping within the tank farm is poorly supported due to support failure. Supports have jacked or settled and, in several locations, are no longer supporting the piping. | All costs to conduct a survey of the tank farm, to determine if there are failed fire foam piping supports, and for any resulting projects required to make repairs |
Mandan | Storage tank level monitoring varies throughout tank farm. Some tanks do not have independent high-level switches. Some tanks do not have levels that report to the control room - level is monitored at the tank using the gauge board. Lack of high level switches increases potential for overfill. | All costs to conduct a survey of the Andeavor requirement for high level switches, and for any resulting projects to address deficiencies |
Mandan | No lightning protection system was observed on storage tanks with EFRs. | All costs to evaluate requirements for lightning protection on storage tanks and to address any deficiencies to Andeavor standards |
Mandan | Cathodic protection of the buried product facility piping could not be verified as CP monitoring is not being performed on an annual basis. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
Mandan | Cathodic protection of the tank bottoms could not be verified as perimeter readings are being obtained and the data is suspect. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
Mandan | Tracks have significant settlement at decanted oil, diesel and jet, and LPG transfer areas. | All costs for one-time 3rd party rail integrity assessment and any repair recommendations identified |
Mandan | Rail electrical isolation between mainline and spurs to decanted oil, diesel and jet, and LPG transfer areas appears to be compromised. | All costs for one-time 3rd party rail integrity assessment and any repair recommendations identified |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Mandan | Foundations have settled or heaved creating unleveled walking surfaces and tall bottom steps to grade creating fall hazards. | All costs to conduct a survey of stairways not in compliance with OSHA requirements and those with uneven walking surfaces and for any resulting projects required to address safety concerns |
Mandan | Access ladders at the aboveground storage tanks exceed OSHA height limits without intermediate landings and do not include safety cages or fall protection devices. | All costs to conduct a survey of tank access ladders for compliance with OSHA and for any resulting repairs required to address deficiencies |
Mandan | The SPCC Plan does not document the volumes of the secondary containment calculations. The numbers presented in the plans are the design basis for the containments. | All costs to perform SPCC Plan update and for any resulting secondary containment improvements required |
Mandan | RSR compliance modifications are excluded from tank inspection plan. Three tanks have been identified that will require equipment upgrades for compliance with the Refinery Sector Rules (RSR) provisions for tank seal and gaskets. The Refinery cost estimates have been identified for the three tanks. Future inspections are expected to identify similar missing seals on smaller openings and equipment modifications related to RSR compliance have not yet been determined for 7 other tanks. | All costs to complete inspections for tanks subject to refinery sector rules and for any resulting modifications or repairs required to address deficiencies related to RSR compliance |
Mandan | Ethanol tank (Tank 758) will need IFR or vapor control. Tank just moved into Group 1 and is now in Refinery Sector Rule (RSR). | All costs to install IFR or similar vapor controls on Ethanol tank 758, required to ensure compliance with Refinery Sector Rule |
Mandan | The rack drip pans and rail loading area drain to a sump. Based on discussions with Operations and Environmental, it was unclear who inspects/monitors the sump and if the sump is currently operational because it was disconnected from the truck rack. The sump is not equipped with an automated pump or alarm. The concrete sump appears to be in poor condition with spalling and cracks present, an indication of integrity concerns. A hydrocarbon sheen was observed on the water in the sump and the ground adjacent to the sump. | All costs to perform a study, evaluating integrity of the sump and its function in the context of SPCC plan |
Mandan | Horse trough sump collects steam condensate and reciprocating pump compressor oil from LPG truck rack and LPG and butane storage tanks. A hydrocarbon sheen was observed on the water in the sump and on the ground adjacent to sump, indicative of an overfill of the sump. Sump is not equipped with automatic alarms or shutoffs to prevent overflow. Sump is maintained by operator of the LPG truck rack who calls a vacuum truck to empty sump. | All costs to perform a study, evaluating integrity of the sump and its function in the context of SPCC plan |
Mandan | Tanks in the tank farm did not have automated level indication. The facility is currently in the execute stage of the tank field modernization project that will see each tank receive automated level indication (MOC M20181397-001). | All costs related to installation of independent High level switches on tanks, as part of tank modernization project |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Salt Lake | Tanks sharing a dike cell lack intermediate berms and do not provide 100% separation with the other tanks in such that they could inundate the adjacent tank if a spill occurred. A spill fire would be contained within the main diked area. | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
Salt Lake | Many dike walls contain open culverts for communication between containment cells, or unsealed casings between cells. As a result, containment dike walls do not provide 100% separation with the other tanks in such that they could inundate the adjacent tank if a spill occurred. A spill fire would be contained within the main diked area. | All costs to conduct fire risk study, to determine risks associated with shared containment dikes, and for any related projects required to address NFPA deficiencies |
Salt Lake | Tank 325 was modified with 6 vertical channel stiffeners at the north side of the tank to maintain the shape of the tank due to a reported fire in 1989. Refinery staff indicated issues with the floating roof snagging on the shell. | All costs to conduct an inspection of tank 325 and to address repairs through refinery tank repair program |
Salt Lake | The shell at the bottom two courses of Tank 322 appears to be bulging, and the inspections group has been notified. | All costs to conduct an inspection of tank 322 and to address repairs through refinery tank repair program |
Salt Lake | Dents or shell wall distortion is present at the 3rd and 4th course at the east side of tank 297, and at the base course of tank 308. | All costs to conduct inspections of tanks 297 and 308 and to address repairs through refinery tank repair program |
Salt Lake | Riveted tanks are notes as weeping, resulting in staining on the ground. | All costs to conduct inspections of applicable riveted tanks and to address repairs and or replacement through refinery tank repair program |
Salt Lake | Tank 204 containment area has hydrocarbon product seeping from underground around the perimeter of the tank with oil staining at the gravel directly beneath the tank chime and throughout the containment dike areas. | All costs for managing Tank 204 asphalt contamination remediation and clean up, including any required tank inspections or related repairs or modifications |
Salt Lake | Floating oil at surface water present at tank 247 due to storm water backup to oily waste system during rain event. | All costs to clean up tank 247 containment due to stormwater backups |
Salt Lake | Out of service and dead leg piping in the tank farm is not actively managed. | All costs to conduct a study to identify out of service and dead leg piping in the tank farm and for any projects required to address recommendations per Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | Some grounding operations at loading/unloading racks do not have ground proving (Scully) systems in place. | All costs to conduct an evaluation of the potential need for ground proving interlocks on truck racks and for any resulting upgrades required per Andeavor Standards |
Salt Lake | The butane loading rack building's concrete column and roof girders are heavily spalled with exposed reinforcing steel throughout. | All costs to conduct an evaluation of the butane loading rack building concrete columns and roof girders, and for any projects required to address resulting recommendations |
Salt Lake | No automated fire or gas detection systems were observed; however this is typical for this type of facility. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Salt Lake | 27 storage tanks do not have fixed fire protection systems for delivery of foam to the tank interior. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | The fire foam piping at 5 of the tanks with fire foam chambers extend down the shell with a flanged connection near grade. The fire foam piping does not extend to the edge of the containment dike. In the event of a fire, fire department would not have access to the foam piping connection without entering the dike and bolting up a flange. Connection to the existing flanged connection at the tank shell is unlikely to occur in the event of a fire event. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | The software controlling the gasoline blender pumps is outdated and no longer supported. | All costs related to upgrading the automation controls at the blender per Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | Storage tank level high-high level switches are not independently hardwired back to the DCS. | All costs related to installing High-High level switches to comply with NFPA 30 Chapter 21.7.1.1 and Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | Tank level alarms set higher than currently recommended by API 2350 resulting in recent overfill of one of the vessels. | All costs to conduct an alarm rationalization study on tank level alarm settings and to make required revisions in control systems per Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | Cathodic protection levels could not be verified for select aboveground storage tank bottoms and the buried facility piping. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
Salt Lake | Asphalt seeps were observed within the bermed area at Tank 204. The seeps cover areas around Tank 204 and can impact operations within the containment area. | All costs for managing Tank 204 asphalt contamination remediation and clean up, including any required tank inspections or related repairs or modifications |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Salt Lake | The following issues with secondary containment and stormwater/wastewater management were identified at the Site: 1) a survey of secondary containment volumes was completed during 2018 to confirm adequacy with respect to SPCC requirements; the report identified that Tanks 244 and 245 have inadequate secondary containment capacity and redesign is anticipated by the environmental representative. 2) The manual drain valve for the secondary containment berm around Tank 157 was reported by site personnel to be maintained open to allow general stormwater drainage from the depressed (low-area), exterior roadway to drain water from the road into the bermed area for storage/evaporation in an effort to reduce flooding; however, this is contrary to SPCC requirements. 3) Free phase oil mixed with water was observed within the secondary containment berm for Tank 247. The site representative reported that the wastewater treatment facility capacity can be overwhelmed following heavy precipitation events, as occurred the day before the site visit. The backup of hydrocarbon containing wastewater into the tank berms reduces the secondary containment capacity and could result (temporarily) in noncompliance with the SPCC requirements as well as additional H&S and remediation activities. | All costs related to addressing improvements to SPCC plan containment and stormwater related deficiencies, as well as all costs related to wastewater cleanup |
Salt Lake | Site is in the process of completing a Baker Risk facility siting evaluation. Based on visual evidence and interviews with site personnel, major equipment relocation costs are anticipated. | All costs for repairs or projects to address risk reduction recommendations from Baker Risk Siting evaluation |
Salt Lake | Eleven tanks have been identified that will require equipment upgrades in 2025 for compliance with the Refinery Sector Rules (RSR) provisions for tank seal and fitting vapor controls. The Refinery cost estimates are presented in the plant Ten Year Tank and Boiler Plan 2017. | All costs for tank seal and fitting vapor controls projects required for compliance with Refinery Sector Rules |
Salt Lake | The RSR rule requires venting to be controlled during equipment maintenance. The Site has not yet identified the extent of equipment and maintenance shutdown venting that may be subject to the emission control measures required by the rule. | All costs for venting and emission controls projects required for compliance with Refinery Sector Rules |
Salt Lake | The OMD (Oil Movements Division) PHA included the tank farm and remote tank farm. This PHA is currently in draft and under Site review. The PSM coordinator specifically indicated two recommendations will need to be corrected and are likely to be material: (1) A corrosion study needs to be completed and recommendations implemented. (2) More than 20 deadlegs were identified that potentially would need to be removed from service throughout the tank farm. | All costs to finalize PHA study and obtain related recommendations and then to address findings |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Salt Lake | Three railcar derailments have occurred at the Site in the last 8 months, with one major derailment that required third party intervention to upright the cars. Facility representatives stated that one derailment was caused by ice and the other two derailments were caused by a rail integrity issue. The portion of the rail that was causing the issue was not identified during routine rail inspections. Representatives reported that the root cause of the rail integrity issue has not been identified. This rail section has since been replaced. Without understanding the integrity issue failure, the Site is not able to proactive address other sections of rail that may have similar integrity issues. | All costs for one-time 3rd party rail integrity assessment and any repair recommendations identified |
Salt Lake | No hydrocarbon detection and alarm systems exist in the LPG truck loading area that could notify operations of a continuous release. An LPG release in close proximity to loading trucks accessing the rack could result in a high consequence event. | All costs to evaluate the potential need to install hydrocarbon detection and alarms at the LPG truck loading rack and to ensure compliance with NFPA and Andeavor Fire Standards, and then to address any deficiencies discovered |
Salt Lake | There are >20 tanks that will require foam injection capabilities to be added to meet Andeavor standards requirements. | All costs to conduct a study of fire protection systems and identify tanks needing modification to comply with NFPA or Andeavor fire protection standards, and then to address any deficiencies discovered |
Salt Lake | A 2011 Hydraulic Model Study identified the blending facility lacks potential firefighting infrastructure. | All costs for upgrading the firefighting infrastructure at the blending facility per Andeavor standards |
Salt Lake | Five pressure relief devices (PRD) within the tank farm are anticipated to be subject to the RSR PRD standards. The Site has not yet completed the regulatory evaluation and the final applicability determination. PRD monitoring systems are required for systems to be in compliance with the rule. | All costs to conduct a regulatory evaluation to determine if PRD monitoring systems are required to comply with Refinery Sector Rules, and then to address any deficiencies identified |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
BakkenLink | The Arc Flash labels do not meet the requirements of the 2014 NEC (130D). The existing labels display the fault current but not the PPE requirements or the safe work zone. A 2018 project is in progress to complete an Arc Flash Study. | All costs related project to install Arc Flash labels |
BakkenLink | Some CP test point locations do not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys. |
BakkenLink | The Arc Flash labels do not meet the requirements of the 2014 NEC. The existing labels display the fault current but not the PPE requirements or the safe work zone. A 2018 project is in progress to complete an Arc Flash Study. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
BakkenLink | The Arc Flash labels do not meet the requirements of the 2014 NEC. The existing labels display the fault current but not the PPE requirements or the safe work zone. A 2018 project is in progress to complete an Arc Flash Study. | All costs related project to install Arc Flash labels |
BakkenLink | The aboveground storage tank shells were not grounded for lightning protection per NFPA requirements with the exception of the tanks at the Fryburg Rail Terminal. | All costs related to evaluate requirements for grounding tank shells for lightning protection per NFPA requirements and for any resulting repairs or projects required for NFPA compliance |
BakkenLink | Several test points on the buried facility piping and tank bottoms do not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Dry Creek | An engineered drainage swale is present on the south side of the facility. Facility receives runoff from the eastern adjacent property that bypasses the engineered drainage swale and has eroded a swale along the northern boundary of the facility. | All costs related to conducting a study for diversion of offsite runoff away from the facility to eliminate erosion on the property and any resulting projects required |
Fryburg | Sedimentation into and erosion of the tank berms has diminished the design containment capacity and sufficient freeboard. Due to the presence of excessive sediment and standing water within the tank farm secondary containment, there is a reduction in containment volume. | All costs related to conducting a study of existing containment capacity to ensure that sufficient containment exists (ensuring that the study includes accumulated precipitation and sedimentation in the containment calculations) and costs to correct resulting noted deficiencies |
Fryburg | There is inadequate secondary containment for 110% of the largest vessel (a rail car) spill at the diesel car rail loading area. | All costs related to conducting and documenting a secondary containment impracticability study |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Clearbrook | Clearbrook - The transfer pipe between the primary and auxiliary roof drain sumps on Tank-14 cracked during the winter of 2017 / 2018 resulting in contents of the tank accumulating on the floating roof. The issue has been temporarily addressed by facility operators and the tank construction contractor has been notified to perform warranty repairs. A member of the Partnership Group should verify repairs are made. | All costs to make any required repairs related to the transfer pipe between the primary and auxiliary roof drain sumps on Tank-14. |
Clearbrook | Clearbrook - The fire foam piping at Tanks 14 and 15 extend down the shell with a flanged connection near grade. The fire foam piping does not extend to the edge of the containment dike. In the event of a fire, the local volunteer fire department does not have access to the flanged connection from the access road. Connection to the existing flanged connection at the tank shell is unlikely to occur in the event of a fire event. | All costs to evaluate fire safety risk with 3rd party Operator and for resulting required project to route foam connections outside of the containment berm to a safe location. |
Clearbrook | Clearbrook - Life of the semi-deep anode groundbeds could be reduced due to the absence of a venting system and use of non-chemically resistance anode lead cables. | All costs related to conducting a cathodic protection inspection and for any resulting repairs required. |
Clearbrook | Tank 14 and 15 are designed to have foam for firefighting. The foam pipes end at the base of the tank so if there is a fire, firefighting crews will not be able to get close enough to the tanks to connect to the foam dispersal pipes. | All costs to evaluate fire safety risk with 3rd party Operator and for resulting required project to route foam connections outside of the containment berm to a safe location. |
Clearbrook | Tanks 14 and 15 are equipped with IFRs. The drain line between the secondary sump and the primary sump in Tank 14 leaked in the winter of 2017/2018. The leak discharged oil to the top of the IFR. The line between the secondary sump and the primary sump has been blinded in Tank 14 to eliminate a future recurrence of a release. Maintenance/repair of line will occur at next internal inspection. Repair costs will be material if undertaken outside of scheduled tank inspection. | All costs related to ensuring repairs are addressed in a timely manner and for any repairs required, which are not covered under tank warranty. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Conan | Pipe traps may not have proper dimension to support ILI tools. Oversize pipe segment (barrel) appears to be too short. Also, no flanges are provided to allow for extending the barrel length. # Receivers: 85 (assuming only receivers at CTB’s, TUL’s and Conan Terminal in scope) # Launchers: 79 (assuming only launchers at CTB’s and TUL’s in scope). It appears the launchers/receivers could be prepared for ILI using a replacement barrel and additional pipe spools (sharing of the replacement barrel and piping is dependent on diameter; system contains piping with diameter 6”, 8”, 10, 12” and 16”). Estimated cost for 10 extended barrels (launcher and receiver) and associated piping: $500k. | All costs related to correcting design issues with receivers and launchers. |
Conan | Currently the leak detection system is mass balance system and is scheduled to be upgraded to ATMOS (quote was provided to project manager). Andeavor typically uses CPM through ATMOS. Total 91 Coriolis meters installed. Price to upgrade to ATMOS CPM is approx. $500k. | All costs to evaluate if ATMOS system is needed and for any resulting upgrade of the leak detection systems. |
Conan | Fire Suppression - A modification to the tank fire protection system at Conan Terminal was ordered by EOG and is scheduled (Protect-O-Burn Self Expanding Foam System for rim seal protection on (3) tanks). Allocation of additional $1.2MM quoted cost for entire system is unknown. | All required costs to upgrade the fire system for rim seal protection on 3 tanks as ordered by EOG after determination of Andeavor Entity/Partnership Group allocation |
Conan | Although the facilities are exempt from industrial stormwater permitting requirements by rule, it is not clear whether the design of the facilities is adequate to prevent discharges of contaminants that could otherwise trigger individual permit requirements. • Division berms and grading design may be insufficient to control drainage across the facilities (Hercules TUL in particular) and prevent stormwater from coming in contact with pollutants associated with process and truck unloading areas prior to off-site discharge • Stormwater tanks associated with the truck unloading areas should be assessed for adequate capacity for the amount of received drainage Improved stormwater management/diversion practices are likely to be material. | All costs related to conduct an engineering design study for addressing containment of storm water within the property and for any resulting required projects to address deficiencies in storm water containment. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Rio Pipeline & Midland Short Haul Pipelines - CIS has not been performed to evaluate stray current interference from foreign operators. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys. |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Rio Pipeline – Rectifier #2 and #3 do not have AC power installed. | All costs related to projects required to install power to rectifiers #2 and #3 |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Geneva - The intermediate tank containments did not provide 100% separation with the other tanks in such that they could inundate the adjacent tank if a spill occurred. A spill fire would be contained within the main diked area. | All costs related to conducting a fire risk study and to address any resulting deficiencies in compliance with NFPA codes, if required. |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Geneva & Zurich - Pipe supports do not allow for pipe flexibility and piping is likely overstressed on the longer pipe runs at the facilities. | All costs to conduct a study of the piping and for any resulting repairs required to address facility piping stresses |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Geneva & Zurich - Arc flash labeling is incomplete. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Geneva & Zurich - The aboveground storage tank bottoms and facility piping do not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection at some test point locations. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys. |
Midland Terminals: Geneva/Zurich/Rio Pipeline | Geneva & Zurich - The stair cross overs for piping and cable tray was not OSHA compliant. The tread depth was smaller than 10" and the height of the treads was over 7.5". | All costs related to fix deficiencies on identified stairways not meeting OSHA compliance |
Stateline Terminal | Pipe supports do not allow for pipe flexibility and piping is likely overstressed on the longer pipe runs at the facility. | All costs to conduct a study of the piping and for any resulting repairs required to address facility piping stresses |
Stateline Terminal | The 10 truck lanes that are not metered and use the truck pumps to unload crude to tanks SL-1 & SL-2. The unloading trucks have no protection or warning if a downstream valve was closed. The truck pump will deadhead against the closed valve. | All costs related to installing overpressure or other protection controls on truck loading racks for tanks SL-2 & SL-2 |
Stateline Terminal | MCC Module panelboards and building disconnects lack Arc flash labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Stateline Terminal | Alarms and controls for truck offloading need to be reviewed. Power fluctuations are causing a flow control valve to close and divert product to the sump. | All costs related to upgrading electrical infrastructure at truck rack to prevent flow control valve closing and diverting product to sump |
Stateline Terminal | There are no control interlocks on ten of the truck loading lanes. Hoses and fittings can overpressure when flow control valves are closed as a result of site power fluctuations. | All costs related to installing truck rack overpressure control interlocks on truck loading lanes. |
Stateline Terminal | Ten of the truck loading spots are not equipped with truck grounding indication or any interlocks with the offloading operation. | All costs related to installing ground proving interlocks and or grounding systems at loading racks |
Stateline Terminal | The stair cross overs for piping and cable tray is not OSHA compliant. The tread depth was smaller than 10" and the height of the treads was over 7.5". | All costs related to fix deficiencies on identified stairways not meeting OSHA compliance |
Zurich, Geneva | The following issues with secondary containment were identified: - The off-loading is not equipped with secondary containment. - No design basis for secondary containment berm around Tanks (e.g., survey and geotechnical data on construction materials). | All costs related to conducting a containment survey and validating SPCC Plan and for any resulting projects required to address deficiencies found |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Geneva | The following issues related to secondary containment were noted: - Facility off-loading lacks secondary containment. - No design basis for secondary containment berm around tanks (e.g., survey and geotechnical data on construction materials); - Blowing sand has filled part of secondary containment and berm erosion has occurred. - Additional concerns with containment capacity based on tank manifolding (three tanks are manifolded such that failure from one tank results in release from all three). | All costs related to conducting a containment survey and for any resulting projects required to address deficiencies found |
Geneva | The following issues related to secondary containment were identified: -Inadequate secondary containment capacity for H2S scavenger stored in unloading area. | All costs related to conducting a containment survey and validating SPCC plan and for any resulting projects required to address deficiencies found |
Stateline | Crude release (24.4 Bbls) occurred on March 8, 2018 due to power outage, which flowed across property and off-site onto a neighboring. Remedial actions are in process. Additional information is required to ensure that the cleanup meets Texas cleanup requirements. | All costs related to indemnify for long term subsurface liability, if warranted, and to ensure remedial efforts meet the TCEQ Standards |
Stateline | Lack of documentation indicating if retention pond has adequate capacity to prevent uncontrolled discharge from facility. | All costs related to conducting a study to determine capacity of stormwater retention pond and for making any resulting upgrades to ensure compliance with permits |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Bobcat & Wink Short Haul Pipelines - The pipelines do not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection at multiple test point locations. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys. |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Bobcat & Wink Short Haul Pipelines - CIS has not been performed to evaluate stray current interference from foreign operators. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys. |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Consider appropriate measures for leak detection including CPM systems such as ATMOS or Telvent. | All costs to conduct a study to determine if additional leak detection measures are needed and for any resulting projects required to address leak detection deficiencies |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | MCC Module panel boards, vendor modules and skids, and cathodic protection equipment lack Arc flash labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Kinder Morgan and Plains sites lack arc flash labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Tank 3513 - One test point location does not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Wink Station, Bobcat Pipeline, and Jack Rabbit Short Haul Pipelines | Jackrabbit Station - Cathodic protection levels of the buried facility piping could not be verified as CP monitoring is not being performed on an annual basis. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Mason Station East | A study was conducted by Rooney Engineering after a flooding event occurred. Some upgrades were made based on the study, but similar rain events have not reoccurred yet to determine if the corrective measures were adequate. Further evaluation and additional upgrades could be required | All costs related to addressing any remaining Rooney Engineering recommendations deemed necessary for mitigation of facility flooding |
Mason Station East | MCC Module, fire pump building, and warehouse building panel boards lack arc flash labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Mason Station East | The aboveground storage tanks do not exhibit adequate levels of cathodic protection at some test point locations. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Mason Station East | Cathodic protection levels of the buried facility piping could not be verified as CP monitoring is not being performed on an annual basis. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
TexNewMexX: Yucca & Mesquite | Mesquite & Yucca – Some MCC Module panel boards and cathodic protection equipment lack arc flash labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
TexNewMexX: Yucca & Mesquite | Mesquite & Yucca – Cathodic protection levels of the buried facility piping could not be verified as CP monitoring is not being performed on an annual basis. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Jal | Out-of-service fractionator equipment has been abandoned in place with heat exchanger heads open, vessel manways open, open-ended piping. There is no HazCom signage (i.e. regarding confined spaces, ACM, lead-based paint) and the volume/quantity of lead based paint and ACM has not been quantified. | All costs related to conduct study to determine if tanks should be demolished and associated costs to demolish tanks, if needed |
Jal | The facility siting study required under PSM is not based on the current site layout. | All costs related to evaluation of facility siting based on current site layout and for any resulting modifications required |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | A number of concrete piping supports are cracked or completely broken away exposing the rebar. | All costs related to repairing identified broken concrete pipe supports |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | The rail access platform was constructed in the late 1950’s with the construction of the fractionation plant and currently would be unable to support the weight of a new safe rack gate system if future safety upgrades are required. | All costs to conduct a study of the rail access platform and for any resulting projects required to make safety improvements to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | The LGP rail access platforms have no overhead tie-in safety system for the operators to use when accessing the top of the rail cars. | All costs related to projects to upgrade rail car racks loading platforms to ensure safe access to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Well-degasser needed for facility. A casing leak could lead to butane in water which settles into storage ponds for a large flashing to atmosphere scenario. If ignition source is found near pond this could lead to a vapor cloud explosion. | All costs related to evaluation of potential casing leak scenario and costs to implement recommended safe practices |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | T-825 does not have a U-Stamp affixed to the vessel and will require replacement of the vessel. | All costs related to installation of a new vessel or to provide certification and U-stamp for T-825. |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Arc flash labeling is not provided on any of the electrical equipment. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels, discovered through initial evaluation |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Area classification drawings are not available. | All costs to create and stamp facility electrical area classification drawings |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | No on-site water or foam supply for fire protection. Fire protection is provided by volunteer fire department with limited resources for water supply. | All costs related to making required water or foam supply modifications to comply with Andeavor fire protection standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | No fire or gas detection is provided. Operations is particularly concerned with the lack of fire and gas detection in the pumphouse. | All costs related to performing an evaluation to determine if additional fire or gas detection is needed and for installing fixed gas detection monitors and or ESD at the pumphouse as per Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | A SCADA control system is not installed. All controls and interlocks are directly hardwired, and remote monitoring is not provided for operators. | All costs for installation of remote monitoring or SCADA control systems to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Consideration should be given to performing a PHA and evaluating the need for additional ESD valves for the wells. | All costs related to conducting a PHA study and for any required projects to address deficiencies |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Tank 825 is not equipped with any pressure instrumentation, temperature instrumentation, or automated valves. Recommend evaluating the need for additional monitoring and protection for the tank. | All costs to perform automation study and for any resulting projects to install automation instrumentation for tank 825 to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | The booster pump and Tank 825 are not equipped with bonding jumpers. | All costs to survey facility and identify any conduit fittings missing bonding jumpers and to address deficiencies |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Some liquid-tight fittings are not installed with bonding jumpers. | All costs to survey facility and identify any conduit fittings missing bonding jumpers and to address deficiencies |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Tank ground indication is not provided at the rail rack. | All costs related to installation of pump interlocks and ground proving (Scully) systems on rail rack to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Pump interlocks with the truck rack and rail rack grounding systems are not provided. | All costs to install pump interlocks and ground proving (Scully) systems on truck rack to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | Two truck loading spots are not provided with ground indication. | All costs to install ground proving (Scully) systems on truck racks to meet Andeavor standards |
Jal NGL Storage Facility | No active CP systems or monitoring program is in place for the buried facility piping. A foreign CP system is adjacent to the facility which could be cause stray current interference. | All costs related to addressing cathodic protection deficiencies after verification of cathodic protection surveys |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursement |
Wingate | Secondary containment around four legacy sphere tanks has torn liner that is in need of repairs or replacement. Two spheres have containment without liners. | Once a study sphere use is complete, all costs related to conducting a study on secondary containment and for any resulting requirements to address deficiencies. |
Wingate | Two artesian water wells (No. 3 and 4) have leaking casings at the tops of the well heads. The leaking water created a >1-acre wetland area that is permanently saturated. The costs to re-drill the wells would be material. A recent NMED inspection identified the need to repair the wells. | All costs for any mechanical integrity repairs to water wells No. 3 and 4 associated with recent inspection reports identifying need to redrill the water wells |
Wingate Terminal | The rail access platform was constructed in the late 1950’s with the construction of the fractionation plant and currently would be unable to support the weight of a new safe rack gate system if future safety upgrades are required. | All costs to conduct a study of the rail access platform and for any resulting projects required to make safety improvements to meet Andeavor standards |
Wingate Terminal | The concrete foundation under propane tank 518 has a significant crack that exposes the rebar inside the foundation and is a structural concern | All costs related to either repairing the foundation or removing the vessel |
Wingate Terminal | No back-flow check valve or thermal activated automatic shutdown valve in place as required per NFPA 58. | All costs related to making upgrades to vessels to meet requirements of NFPA 58 |
Wingate Terminal | Seven vessels are overdue for inspection (V-400 through V-406) and one vessel (V-407) is out of service. | All costs to inspect vessels prior to their returning to product service |
Wingate Terminal | The concrete foundations for the horizontal iso butane tanks 209-214 & propane tanks 508-517 are showing signs of cracking. | All costs to evaluate foundation cracking on LNG tanks 209-214 and 508-517, to determine if repairs are required, and for any resulting required LNG tank foundation repairs |
Wingate Terminal | Gas detection is not provided at the spheres. Consider evaluating the need for additional gas detection. | All costs to perform a study to determine if facility is in compliance with NFPA codes and for any related projects to comply with fire codes or Andeavor standards |
Wingate Terminal | One sphere does not appear to have ground bonding jumpers. | All costs to correct ground bonding jumper deficiency on sphere |
Wingate Terminal | The rail rack is not equipped with ground indication or process interlocks with a grounding system. | All costs to install ground proving (Scully) systems on truck racks |
Wingate Terminal | Cathodic protection levels for the buried facility piping, pressure vessels bases, and water storage tanks could not be verified as CP monitoring is not being performed on an annual basis. | All costs related to conduct an initial cathodic protection survey and for addressing any cathodic protection deficiencies discovered |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Elk Grove Terminal | An unsupported vent pipe span at the polymer modified asphalt blending area is experiencing excessive movement and deflection. | All costs to conduct an engineering review of unsupported piping spans at the polymer modified asphalt blending area and to address any deficiencies identified |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Elk Grove Terminal | Rail rack piping has no expansion loops for piping flexibility. Offload pumps are located at both ends of the rail rack which act as anchors and pump nozzles could be overstressed. | All costs to conduct an engineering review of unsupported piping spans at the rail rack and address any deficiencies identified |
Elk Grove Terminal | The condensate return tank (adjacent to the hot oil heaters) is vibrating excessively. | All costs to conduct an engineering review of the condensate return tank, to determine root cause of excessive vibration, and to address any deficiencies identified |
Elk Grove Terminal | The retractable landings do not provide fall protection on all sides. | All costs to Implement interim mitigations to reduce risk of falls to personnel and undertake projects to address tank fall protection concerns at the truck offloading stations. |
Elk Grove Terminal | No fall protection is present for personnel accessing the tops of rail cars. | All costs to Implement interim mitigations to reduce risk of falls to personnel and undertake projects to address tank fall protection concerns at the rail car. |
Elk Grove Terminal | Existing vapor collection piping is reportedly plugging regularly, and the system is not adequately functioning. | All costs to investigate root cause of plugging in the vapor collection piping and for any projects required to repair |
Elk Grove Terminal | The vapor collection system piping is not finished. | All costs to evaluate and complete prior project for Phase 2 installation of vapor collection systems, if required |
Elk Grove Terminal | Although the site is equipped with seven cameras, the image quality is poor, and they are frequently non-functional. | All costs to conduct a security assessment to ensure compliance with Andeavor security standards and to address any gaps through a security upgrade project and to update security cameras. |
Elk Grove Terminal | No arc-flash studies have been conducted and the electrical distribution equipment is not equipped with arc-flash warning labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
Elk Grove Terminal | Electrical drawings (One-Lines, Area Plans) and documentation are not available for the terminal. Limited project specific documents may be available. | All costs to determine if appropriate P&ID's, plot plans, isometric and electrical one-line drawings and maintenance records are in place, as well as to prepare any required documents. |
Elk Grove Terminal | No automated fire or gas detection systems were observed; however, this is typical for this type of facility. Manual alarm pushbuttons are installed, but are not functional. | All costs related to performing an evaluation to determine if additional fire or gas detection is needed and for addressing any identified deficiencies in compliance with NFPA codes and Andeavor fire safety standards |
Elk Grove Terminal | A control panel is available for the PMA and tank wetting systems, but no other SCADA controls are available at the terminal for remote monitoring or automated shutdowns. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Elk Grove Terminal | A control panel is available for the SAAB tank gauging, but it was only operational for a short period. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Elk Grove Terminal | The emulsion tanks are not equipped with either radar or site gauges. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls for the emulsion tanks and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Elk Grove Terminal | Asphalt tanks are equipped with Rosemount SAAB level radar gauges, but do not have Varec local site gauges for back-up. Reportedly, there is a project to install Varec gauges. The SAAB level radar gauges are not currently able to be remotely monitored. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls on the asphalt tanks and for installation of remote monitoring or SCADA control systems, Sabb Radar gauges, Varec local gauges and remote monitoring systems per Andeavor standards |
Elk Grove Terminal | Cathodic protection systems do not exist to protect select aboveground storage tank bottoms and buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Elk Grove Terminal | The Stairs/landings/walkways at the south end of the tank farm do not include a kick plate or center guardrail, and the guardrail members are not adequately sized to resist code applied live loads. The grating and support structure appears to be undersized since the grating surface is bouncy. In addition, piping running along the landings present a tripping hazard. | All costs to for projects required to address deficiencies with stairs, landings and walkways in the emulsion tank farm including kick plates and undersized gratings. |
Elk Grove Terminal | The Stairs/landings/walkways at the Emulsion tank farm do not include a kick plate or center guardrail, and the guardrail members are not adequately sized to resist code applied live loads. The grating and support structure appears to be undersized since the grating surface is bouncy. In addition, piping running along the landings present a tripping hazard. | All costs to for projects required to address deficiencies with stairs, landings and walkways in the emulsion tank farm. |
Elk Grove | The site has experienced numerous spills of asphalt. The spilled material was observed throughout the emulsion plant and the site. The non-recoverable asphalt storage area is full, and the site has begun a practice of placing non-recoverable asphalt materials onto the soil near the non-recoverable asphalt storage area. | All costs to perform initial clean up and disposal of non-recoverable asphalt as a result of historical spills across the site |
Elk Grove | The on-site pre-fabricated fire pump is not compliant with NFPA 20 and the 2016 California Fire Code. The following issues were identified: • The expose cables and battery constitute an electrical hazard; • The condition of the pump is not adequate - leaking oil is potentially providing an additional fire hazard; • The pump is feed by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) which provides additional fire hazard, conditions of the electrical cables could lead to ignition. Are drive by diesel or electricity, LPG is not an acceptable medium to run a fire pump; and • Exhaust is release inside the room allowing for the accumulation of accumulating carbon monoxide. | All costs to conduct an inspection of the fire water pump, to determine if any potential areas of non- compliance with NFPA 20 and California Fire Code exist, and for any projects required to address deficiencies |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Elk Grove | The following issues related to SPCC were identified. A 26-inch wall surrounds the emulsion plant on three sides. The fourth side is the emulsion plant building; piping penetrations through the wall do not appear sealed, which reduces the actual containment volume. Additionally, ERM noted the following issues with containment at the asphalt plant: • Squirrels and burrowing owls are nesting in the containment walls, affecting berm integrity (the burrowing owl is a protected species). • Rainwater is pumped into the containment areas during times of heavy rainfall, limiting containment capacity. | All costs to evaluate SPCC issues identified and to address any deficiencies |
Elk Grove | The site has experienced numerous asphalt spills. Most notable, in 2017, 125 tons of product from tank 100-M2 was released due to a tank bottom failure. The majority of the spilled materials were removed Clean Harbors. The removal of spilled material was ceased to allow for the tank to be repaired. During warm weather, asphalt seeps are observed in the former spill area. In general, spilled asphalt materials were observed on the ground throughout the emulsion plant and the site. The non-recoverable asphalt jersey barriers is overfilled and the site has begun a practice of placing non-recoverable asphalt materials onto the soil near the barriers. | All costs to perform initial clean up asphalt seeping from the area around Tank 100-M2 |
Elk Grove | The site has installed a RTO, with some of the piping replaced with stainless steel. The remainder of the piping needs to be replaced to allow the RTO to properly operate. Estimated costs for this upgrade is $400K. | All costs to complete stainless steel piping replacement on RTO |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Mojave Terminal | The listed API 650 name plate on tanks TK-1, TK-2, TK-3, and TK-4 state the maximum operating temperature at 180 Deg. F. The current operating temperatures of all four tanks are 350 Deg F. Documentation does not exist to support the current operating temperature which is beyond the stamped tank design. | All costs to conduct engineering reviews and management of change (MOC) reviews for TK-1, TK-2, TK-3, and TK-4, to verify the maximum allowable temperature of the asphalt tanks, and to make any required updates to tank nameplates and provide documentation of change |
Mojave Terminal | High level alarms for storage tanks do not exist. Tank gauging equipment and infrastructure are in place. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Mojave Terminal | Active below ground lines are present in facility (rail offload rack). No existing cathodic protection systems in place or inspection programs. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Mojave Terminal | The retractable landings do not provide fall protection on all sides. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at the truck offloading stations. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Mojave Terminal | No fall protection is present for personnel accessing the tops of rail cars. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns from the tops of rail cars. |
Mojave Terminal | Existing thermal oxidizer system does not function correctly. May be undersized. Operations indicated it does not pull enough vacuum. Currently not being used. | All costs to conduct a review of the Thermal Oxidizer operational issues and for any upgrades required to improve operation if required to be in service. |
Mojave Terminal | The terminal is not equipped with cameras or automated gates. | All costs to conduct a security assessment to ensure compliance with Andeavor security standards and to address any gaps through a security upgrade project |
Mojave Terminal | No arc-flash studies have been conducted and the electrical distribution equipment is not equipped with arc-flash warning labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
Mojave Terminal | Electrical drawings (One-Lines, Area Plans) and documentation are not available for the terminal. Project specific documents may be available. | All costs to determine if appropriate P&ID's, plot plans, isometric and electrical one-line drawings and maintenance records are in place, as well as to prepare any required documents. |
Mojave Terminal | A SCADA control system does not exist for the terminal. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Mojave Terminal | Cathodic protection monitoring is not being performed to evaluate the levels of cathodic protection on the aboveground storage tank bottoms and buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Mojave Terminal | An Andeavor Entity owned and DOT regulated out of service or abandoned underground pipeline segment is located on the terminal. Documents were not available for review to determine if the pipeline was properly abandoned or taken out of service. Reportedly the pipeline was pigged clean and purged with Nitrogen. | All costs to conduct a review of pipeline abandonment records and to conduct any corresponding additional inspections required to verify if pipeline was properly abandoned |
Mojave Terminal | The tank containment dikes are not outfitted with stair styles for access over the berms or over some piping at the rail rack. Lack of stairs presents a slip/fall hazard. | All costs to Implement interim mitigations to reduce risk of falls to personnel and undertake projects to address tank fall protection concerns including installation of stairways at tank farm berms and rail car stations. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Phoenix Terminal | Tank 4, 102 and 202 contain patch plates which do not appear to meet API 653 repair standards. No radius present at patch corners, and vertical welds are within 6" of each other. | All costs to inspect tanks for compliance with API 653 repair standards and to address any deficiencies with patch plates on tanks 4, 102 & 202 |
Phoenix Terminal | Some tanks share a common stair to access the tank roofs. Walkways, guardrails, or tie-off points for fall protection to access vent hoods, gage hatches, etc. are not present. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at stair access and tank roofs. |
Phoenix Terminal | The retractable landings do not provide fall protection on all sides. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at truck loading racks. |
Phoenix Terminal | No fall protection is present for personnel accessing the tops of rail cars. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns on tops of rail cars. |
Phoenix Terminal | No arc-flash studies have been conducted and the electrical distribution equipment is not equipped with arc-flash warning labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
Phoenix Terminal | Electrical drawings (One-Lines, Area Classification) and documentation are not available for the terminal. The area classification around the diesel and jet tanks and process piping should be reviewed and the suitability of the installed electrical equipment verified. | All costs to conduct a study to verify the suitability of installed electrical equipment around the diesel and jet tanks relative to area electrical classification standards and to create electrical one-line drawings and Area Classification drawings, if required |
Phoenix Terminal | A SCADA control system does not exist for the terminal. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Phoenix Terminal | Tanks are not equipped with any remote monitoring, alarms, or interlocks to prevent tank overfill. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Phoenix Terminal | Additional software is required to monitor the wireless Rosemount tank level transmitters from the main office. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Phoenix Terminal | Cathodic protection systems do not exist to protect select aboveground storage tank bottoms and buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Phoenix Terminal | Stair rise/run at the stair style over the tank containment dike wall north of Tank 50001 varies, presenting a trip/fall hazard to personnel. | All costs to conduct a safety assessment of the stairs and to address any safety concerns identified at the stairway north of tk-550001 |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Phoenix | Underground vaults and drains are located at the site. Reportedly, the vaults discharge to the stormwater pond. However, piping was not observed at this discharge location. A piping drawing for underground lines does not exist according to site personnel. Facility personnel are unaware where the stormwater is discharging. | All costs to conduct a study to determine whether underground vaults are connected to the stormwater retention basin, to understand stormwater permitting requirements, and to address any deficiencies identified |
Phoenix | According to the information provided, the on-site sewer may require cleaning due to blockage from calcium carbonate buildup and potentially need to be repaired or replaced. Previous estimates to replace the sewer line were approximately $250,000. | All costs to evaluate condition of underground sewer and to repair or replace, if required at the boiler area. |
Phoenix | The site has installed a covered storage area for hazardous materials. The storage area is still in the process of being fully permitted and a sprinkler system is required by the local fire marshal. The site is actively using the storage area for hazardous materials storage. | All costs to install sprinkler system in the new storage building if required by building permit, local fire standards, or Andeavor hazardous materials storage management practices |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Bakersfield Terminal | Some tanks share a common stair to access the roofs with no walkways, guardrails, or tie-off points for fall protection to access vent hoods, gage hatches, etc. In particular, operators must access tanks 17-20 gauge hatches on a daily basis. Access to the gauge hatches requires operators to leave the rooftop walkway system and work near tank edges with no guardrails or fall protection present. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns from stair access and tops of tanks. |
Bakersfield Terminal | High level alarms for storage tanks do not exist. Tank gauging equipment and infrastructure are in place. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | Heat exchanger for asphalt product is not functioning properly and needs to be evaluated. | All costs to conduct an engineering study to determine if heat exchanger is operating per design and to address recommended upgrades if any are required |
Bakersfield Terminal | Steam piping at rail rack shows signs of movement from thermal expansion. Additional shoes have been added to avoid pipe from dropping off support. Expansion loops should be considered in steam piping. | All costs to review piping at the rail rack to ensure there are adequate supports to prevent the piping from falling off the rack and to address deficiencies identified |
Bakersfield Terminal | Active below ground lines are present in facility (rail offload rack). No existing cathodic protection systems in place or inspection programs. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | The retractable landing at emulsion rack 1 is heavily damaged with broken/bent rails. The landing is currently being used for accessing tops of trucks. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at emulsion tank 1. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Bakersfield Terminal | The retractable landings at lanes 1, 4 & 5 include a scaffold system for personnel fall protection tie-off. The scaffold system does not appear to be adequately sized to support minimum OSHA load requirements, and is not inspected on a frequent basis by certified scaffold inspectors. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at truck rack lanes |
Bakersfield Terminal | No fall protection is present for personnel accessing the tops of rail cars. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns from tops of rail cars. |
Bakersfield Terminal | The vapor recovery and control system is inadequate to recover emissions from the asphalt tanks to prevent nuisance odor complaints from the community. Some tanks are not piped to the vapor recovery system. | All costs to conduct an engineering review of the vapor recovery piping and thermal oxidizer to ensure adequacy to capture all emissions from the tanks and to make any repairs needed |
Bakersfield Terminal | No arc-flash studies have been conducted and the electrical distribution equipment is not equipped with arc-flash warning labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
Bakersfield Terminal | Electrical drawings (One-Lines, Area Plans) and documentation are not available for the terminal. Limited project specific documents may be available. | All costs to determine if appropriate P&ID's, plot plans, isometric and electrical one-line drawings and maintenance records are in place, as well as to prepare any required documents. |
Bakersfield Terminal | No automated fire or gas detection systems were observed, however this is typical for this type of facility. | All costs related to performing an evaluation to determine if additional fire or gas detection is needed and for addressing any identified deficiencies in compliance with NFPA codes and Andeavor fire safety standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | A SCADA control system does not exist for the terminal. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | Tanks are not equipped with any remote monitoring, alarms, or interlocks to prevent tank overfill. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | Only one emulsion tank is equipped with a visual gauge. The asphalt tanks are only equipped with SAAB radar and no site gauges are available for comparison. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | Cathodic protection systems do not exist to protect select aboveground storage tank bottoms and buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Bakersfield Terminal | The guardrail of the stairs accessing the south side of truck loading lanes 4 & 5 is broken, presenting a fall hazard. In addition, no midrail is present at the stair and kick plate are missing. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns on lanes 4 & 5 guardrails, midrails and stairways. |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Bakersfield Terminal | The corrugated metal pipe vaults at the below ground piping transitions inside the tank farm and at the rail rack are not covered and present a fall hazard to personnel. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall hazards associated with corrugated metal pipe vaults at the below ground piping transitions inside the tank farm and at the rail rack |
Bakersfield Terminal | Access ladders at tank T-10 exceed OSHA height limits without intermediate landings and do not include safety cages or fall protection devices. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address OSHA height limits of Access ladders at tank T-10 including safety cages and fall protection devices. |
Bakersfield | An asbestos and lead survey was completed for the old lab and operations buildings. The survey indicated presence of asbestos as well as external green and white paints containing high lead contents. The external paint was observed in very poor and peeling conditions. | All costs to demolish existing buildings and replace with new, if required per Andeavor standards as result of reviewing findings from asbestos and lead survey |
Bakersfield | A large quantity of super sacks is stored outside exposed to the sun. This material has been known to spontaneously ignite under high temp conditions. These materials need to be stored properly in sheds or covered storage areas. | All costs to identify safe storage requirements for all chemicals at the site and to address any safe storage deficiencies |
Bakersfield | Site relies on a groundwater well for potable and process water. Reportedly, there is a well approximately 700 ft. deep (water level at about 500 ft.), with a submersible pump, installed around September 2013. There is a second well not in use and locked shut with the casing damaged (slots corroded, and sand has infiltrated the well). The site was unaware of any well abandonment, potable water testing or drinking water requirements. | All costs to test water on active well to verify it is potable, to connect facility to City water service if required, and to abandon water well per California Department of Water Resource regulations Health & Safety Code Section 115700, if required |
Bakersfield | The following issues related to Air Permit compliance were observed: - The permit requires continuous use of a vapor control system (either carbon drums or thermal oxidizer) whenever tank contains or is being loaded with asphalt products. However, based on site observations the thermal oxidizer system is not in use and facility personnel reported the system was non-operational. - Facility has tendency to manually modify the design of the boilers in the event that it fails. This practice is not encouraged because it could lead to non-compliance with permit conditions. - Rental loader was found on site. They need to be registered in the CARB system (DOORS) if used for longer than 1 year. | All costs to evaluate noted air permit compliance issues and to make necessary upgrades to the facility vapor recovery equipment based on permitting requirements |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
All Sites | Inadequate fall protection at the truck loading racks as well as other areas within the sites. It should be noted that the Fernley truck rack is equipped with cages. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns per Andeavor standards |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
All Sites | The sites lack a comprehensive fire safety program. Fire safety issues identified included: • No fire detection systems are in place and facility personnel rely on fire extinguishers for fire protection. • No active or adequate fire suppression systems are in place. • No response agreements are in place with local fire departments, nor do the facilities actively engage, or exercise, with emergency responders. • With the exception of Phoenix, fire hydrants fed by municipal water are not inspected on a regular basis. The facility representative indicated that inspections are conducted, but that documentation is not maintained regarding the inspections. • Hazardous area classification assessments have not been conducted at the sites and numerous ignition sources are present. • Manual call points installed on-sites are disabled and not functioning. Therefore the call points will not activate any general alarm in the event of an emergency. No provisions have been implemented to fix the system. | All costs related to performing an evaluation to determine if additional fire or gas detection is needed and for addressing any identified deficiencies in compliance with NFPA codes and Andeavor fire safety standards |
All Sites | With limited exceptions, operations are performed manually, with no automation (e.g. MOVs, high level alarms, automated shut down devices, etc.). Overfill prevention is based on correct calculation of loading time based on the level before loading. The operator is required to perform level monitoring with manual gauges on top while loading is performed. Numerous tanks showed evidence of previous overfill events. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
All Sites | No arc flash studies have been performed at the sites. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
All Sites | According to information provided, over 90 tanks are past tank inspection due dates. With few exceptions, all tanks are single bottomed without means of detecting a tank bottom failure. | All costs to address overdue tank inspections as per API 653 and to address any deficiencies identified |
All Sites | With the exception of Mojave, the following issues have been identified with respect to secondary containment with the exception of Mojave: -capacity of secondary containment areas appears inadequate at many locations -tanks were observed without secondary containment -secondary berms are eroding and do not have preventative maintenance programs -spill pans are not used during rail car unloading | All costs to conduct a review of SPCC plans and to address any deficiencies identified which are required to comply with SPCC requirements |
All Sites | Boiler blow down at the sites is discharged to the ground or an impoundment. The sites are unaware of permitting requirements for this activity. Additionally, boiler blow down discharge on bare ground could lead to subsurface contamination. | All costs to review boiler blowdown permitting requirements, to obtain permits required to discharge boiler blowdown water to the stormwater pond if required, or to make other modifications needed for safe, compliant blowdown practices |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Fernley Terminal | Some tanks share a common stair to access the tank roofs. Walkways, guardrails, or tie-off points for fall protection to access vent hoods, gage hatches, etc. are not present. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce risk of falls and for any projects to address tank fall protection concerns from tank roofs and stair access points |
Fernley Terminal | No fall protection is present for personnel accessing the tops of rail cars. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce risk of falls and for any projects to address tank fall protection concerns from rail cars. |
Fernley Terminal | Security cameras are not provided. | All costs to conduct a study/evaluation to determine security camera needs and for any projects to address identified deficiencies in Andeavor Security Standards |
Fernley Terminal | The terminal entrance gate is not equipped with badge readers. | All costs to conduct security assessment and to address deficiencies relative to access gate badge readers as they relate to Andeavor security standards. |
Fernley Terminal | No arc-flash studies have been conducted and the electrical distribution equipment is not equipped with arc-flash warning labels. | All costs for installation of required Arc Flash labels and other recommendations per Andeavor standards, discovered through initial evaluation |
Fernley Terminal | Electrical drawings (One-Lines, Area Plans) and documentation are not available for the terminal. | All costs to determine if appropriate P&ID's, plot plans, isometric and electrical one-line drawings and maintenance records are in place, as well as to prepare any required documents. |
Fernley Terminal | An underground electrical vault recently caught on fire and needed replacement. The root cause should be investigated and mitigated for all underground cabling. | All costs to conduct an investigation to determine cause of electrical vault fire and to implement projects to address findings to prevent future incidents |
Fernley Terminal | No automated fire or gas detection systems were observed; however this is typical for this type of facility. | All costs related to performing an evaluation to determine if additional fire or gas detection is needed and for addressing any identified deficiencies in compliance with NFPA codes and Andeavor fire safety standards |
Site | 3rd Party Contractor Identified Risk | Andeavor Reimbursements |
Fernley Terminal | A SCADA system is available for the storage tanks, but it is only visible from the local HMI located on the PLC at the terminal and not in the main office. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls on storage tanks and to implement findings as per Andeavor standards |
Fernley Terminal | Tanks are not equipped with any remote monitoring, alarms, or interlocks to prevent tank overfill. Tank levels are displayed locally on a PLC HMI, but only text appears when a tank level is high. No shutdowns or audible alarms are in place. | All costs to conduct a study to evaluate need for SCADA or similar controls and for installation of remote monitoring or SCADA control systems, as needed. |
Fernley Terminal | Cathodic protection systems do not exist to protect select aboveground storage tank bottoms and buried facility piping in direct soil contact. | All costs to conduct a Cathodic Protection survey and to make recommended repairs to address deficiencies as per Andeavor standards |
Fernley Terminal | The stair styles and landings at the rail loading rack do not have guardrail on all sides. Landings are greater than 30" above adjacent grade and require rails for personnel fall protection. | All costs to implement interim mitigations to reduce the risk to personnel and undertake projects to address fall protection concerns at the rail loading rack. |
Fernley | The facility does not have a general alarm system to warn personnel on an incident. The emergency response plan indicates that the facility has a general alarm, but this is not accurate based on a review of the site. | All costs for review of Emergency Response Plan and for any modifications needed to comply with Andeavor standards and requirements of Emergency Response Plan including installation of emergency alarm systems |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement, dated as April 26, 2011, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Andeavor, Tesoro Alaska, TRMC and Tesoro High Plains Pipeline Company LLC | April 26, 2011 | April 26, 2013 | April 26, 2016 | TRMC and Tesoro Alaska | TRMC | April 26, 2021 | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement dated as of April 1, 2012, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Tesoro and TRMC | April 1, 2012 | April 1, 2014 | April 1, 2017 | TRMC | TRMC | April 1, 2022 | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement executed as of September 14, 2012, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Andeavor and TRMC | Execution Date is September 14, 2012, and various Effective Times are upon receipt of the Long Beach Approval, the CDFG Approval and the Other Approvals as set forth in the agreement, as applicable | September 14, 2014 | September 14, 2017 | TRMC | TRMC | September 14, 2022 | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement executed as of November 15, 2012, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Andeavor and TRMC | November 15, 2012 | November 15, 2014 | November 15, 2017 | TRMC | TRMC | November 15, 2022 | No |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement executed as of May 17, 2013, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Andeavor and TRMC | June 1, 2013 | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement executed as of November 18, 2013, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Andeavor, TRMC and Carson Cogeneration Company | December 6, 2013 | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement executed as of June 23, 2014, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Tesoro Logistics Pipelines LLC, Andeavor, TRMC and Tesoro Alaska | First Closing Date: July 1, 2014 Second Closing Date has the meaning set forth in the Contribution Agreement | The second (2nd) anniversary of the First Closing Date or the Second Closing Date, as applicable | With respect to Section 3.1(a): Not applicable With respect to Section 3.2: The fifth (5th) anniversary of the First Closing Date or the Second Closing Date, as applicable | Andeavor, TRMC, Tesoro Alaska | Andeavor, TRMC, Tesoro Alaska | The tenth (10th) anniversary of the First Closing Date or the Second Closing Date, as applicable. | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of November 12, 2015, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Tesoro SoCal Pipeline Company LLC, Andeavor, TRMC and Carson Cogeneration Company | November 12, 2015 | November 12, 2017 | November 12, 2020 | Andeavor, TRMC, Carson Cogen | Andeavor, TRMC, Carson Cogen | November 12, 2025 | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of July 1, 2016, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Tesoro Alaska Company LLC, and Andeavor KENAI TANKAGE | July 1, 2016 | July 1, 2018 | July 1, 2021 | Tesoro Alaska Company LLC | Not applicable | July 1, 2026 | Yes |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of July 1, 2016, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, Tesoro Alaska Company LLC, and Andeavor ANCHORAGE AND FAIRBANKS TERMINALS | September 16, 2016 | September 16, 2018 | September 16, 2023 | Tesoro Alaska Company LLC | Not applicable | September 16, 2026 | Yes |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of November 21, 2016, among the Partnership, the General Partner, the Operating Company, TRMC and Andeavor | November 21, 2016 | November 21, 2018 | November 21, 2021 | TRMC | Not applicable | November 21, 2026 | Yes |
Pre-Merger Agreement WNRL Assets | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
For Assets owned by WNRL on the Closing Date of the Merger Agreement and acquired by the Partnership pursuant to the Merger Agreement by virtue of its acquisition of WNRL thereunder | October 30, 2017 | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | No |
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of November 8, 2017, among the Partnership, the Operating Company, TRMC and Andeavor | November 8, 2017 | November 8, 2019 | November 8, 2022 | TRMC | Not applicable | November 8, 2027 | Yes |
Refinery storage, rail, truck, Legacy Western Permian/4-Corners, Clearbrook tankage, Great Plains/BakkenLink | |||||||
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of August 6, 2018 (the “2018 Assets Contribution Agreement”), among the Partnership, the Operating Company, TRMC, Western Refining Southwest, Inc. (“WRSW”), Andeavor and the other parties thereto, insofar as it covers the Group B Assets [Bobcat Pipeline, Benny Pipeline, Mesquite Truck Station, Yucca Truck Station, Mason East Station, Wink Station], Group C [Wingate Terminal], Group D Assets [Clearbrook Tankage], Group E [assets associated with Mandan Refinery, Salt Lake Refinery, LARC Refinery Unit and LARW Refinery Unit], and TGPM Units (as such terms are defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement) | August 6, 2018 | August 6, 2020 | August 6, 2023 | TRMC WRSW Western Refining Company, L.P. (“WRCLP”) | Not applicable | August 6, 2028 | Yes |
Aranco Pipeline, Jal NGL Storage Facility | |||||||
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of August 6, 2018, among the Partnership, the Operating Company, TRMC, WRSW, Andeavor and the other parties thereto, insofar as it covers the Group A Assets [Jal NGL Storage Facility] and the Group G Assets [Aranco Pipeline] | August 6, 2018 | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | August 6, 2028 | No |
LA Refinery Interconnecting Pipeline, Conan, Rio Pipeline, Asphalt Terminals, MPL | ||||||||
Contribution Agreement | Closing Date | First Deadline Date | Second Deadline Date | Andeavor Indemnifying Parties | Andeavor Indemnified Parties | Third Deadline Date | Omnibus Section 5.1(b) Applies | |
Contribution, Conveyance and Assumption Agreement effective as of August 6, 2018, among the Partnership, the Operating Company, TRMC, WRSW, Andeavor and the other parties thereto, insofar as it covers the Group F Assets [LA Refinery Interconnecting Pipeline], the MPL Units, WRCG Units, WRDBS Units, ATL Units, and Andeavor Rio Units (as such terms are defined in the 2018 Assets Contribution Agreement) | August 6, 2018 | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable | August 6, 2028 | No* | |
* Special indemnities per Schedule IX | ||||||||