UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C.  20549

FORM N-CSR

CERTIFIED SHAREHOLDER REPORT OF REGISTERED

MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES

811-23016

(Investment Company Act file number)

Alternative Credit Income Fund

(Exact name of Registrant as specified in charter)

650 Madison Avenue, 3^rd Floor

New York, NY 10022

(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip code)

The Corporation Trust Company

Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

(Name and address of agent for service)

Registrant’s telephone number, including area code: (212) 891-2880

Date of fiscal year end: September 30

Date of reporting period: October 1, 2024– September 30, 2025

Item 1. Reports to Stockholders.

Table of Contents

September 30, 2025

Dear Shareholders,

We are excited to share with our partners the annual shareholder letter for the Alternative Credit Income Fund (ticker: RCIXX) for the period ended September 30, 2025.

The Fund gained 3.3% in the periodⁱ, inclusive of a special distribution to our shareholders at the end of calendar 2024.

Macro Backdrop

We tortured our Thesaurus writing this shareholder letter trying to find sufficient synonyms for “uncertainty,” which was a prevailing force shaping markets over the past 12 months.

The Concerning

Job market dead stop:

The weakening U.S. job market that we’ve highlighted in recent quarters jumped from the subtext to the front page with the July jobs report.

The headline unemployment rate remained low at 4.2%, but this figure was likely boosted by a shrinking labor force. Deportations have had a twin impact on the U.S. labor supply by literally removing workers and prompting others not to seek employment.

What grabbed attention in the July data, echoed in the chart below, was evidence that the U.S. job creation engine has stalled.

Change in Rate of Payroll Growth:

Source: Haver, Morgan Stanley Research (07/30/2025)

The August report, showing the addition of just 22,000 jobs, underscored the dearth of job creation and ongoing weakness in NFIB hiring intentions portend continued subdued activity.

Identifying causality remains the central challenge for all market watchers, but the pall of uncertainty has been central to job market deterioration, in our view. Businesses will only expand within their immediate planning horizon. Until companies have greater clarity on trade and tariffs, we expect anemic employment trends to persist. 

September 30, 2025

Fortunately, as previously noted, we believe the shadow of COVID may delay layoffs. After businesses battled to rebuild workforce’s post-pandemic, many will be slow to fire this cycle. This has been evident in initial claims and WARN data, which reflects fraying, not dramatic decay. Post-pandemic labor hoarding may forestall job losses, but it will not eliminate them should the economy downshift.

“Risk-on” rate cuts? 

By signaling a rate cut in September, the Fed substantiated fading job trends.

We observed the perverse logic of the market rally after the Fed’s dovish tilt and believe a rate cut with inflation well above target, combined with lofty asset values, should presage caution, not “risk-on.” The Fed will only cut if trends dramatically slow, which is not a reason to celebrate.

Underscoring another market inconsistency, CME FedWatch forecasts 100 basis points (“bps”) of cuts through September 2026, a level of reduction that might be associated with recessionary concerns, of which credit spreads and equity values reveal no signs.¹ Only an uber bullish scenario of inflation easing with no economic damage—despite incremental monetary accommodation—would justify this market signal.

Perhaps most importantly, rate cuts may fail to heal what ails our economy. Lowering front-end rates will steepen the yield curve if it stokes inflation and/ or if the market perceives the Fed as having capitulated to political pressure (a risk amplified by recent incursions to Fed independence).

Given that mortgages are benchmarked to the long end of the curve, rate cuts could, paradoxically, hurt the U.S.’s moribund housing market.

Additionally, rates remain a global phenomenon and Japanese, German, French and U.K. 30-year sovereign yields are hovering near multi-decade highs. U.S. front-end cuts will do little to counter the global interplay of long-term rates.

Lastly and most importantly, the malaise of uncertainty cannot be solved through monetary policy. It is not cost of capital, but a general lack of certainty that has restrained recent economic activity.

Final Sales — Reflect a downshift 

Tariff-related import/export activity has skewed recent GDP figures, making them a less reliable near-term gage. Final domestic sales (which exclude inventory changes) garnered greater attention in recent quarters and have begun to show signs of deceleration, slowing to +1.2% in 2Q 2025 vs. +1.9% in 1Q 2025 and +2.9% in 2Q 2024.²

Separately, 2Q GDP revealed that businesses may have depleted pre-tariff inventories.

Change in private inventories ($bn):

Source: Bloomberg, Bureau of Economic Analysis (08/12/2025); Note: Chained 2018 dollars

Businesses pushing through higher costs as the economy begins to slow would represent textbook definition stagflation—a brutal backdrop for an economy to escape.

September 30, 2025

Kozmo.com 2.0? 

“AI” is the only word used more frequently than “uncertain” in 2025.

We want to revisit our AI bubble concerns with an analog from a bygone era: Kozmo.com

Launched during the peak dot-com boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s in 1998, Kozmo promised one-hour delivery of groceries and other items, without cumbersome (yet revenue-generating) fees. We distinctly remember Kozmo delivering a pint of Ben & Jerry’s to my desk during a marathon conference call.

Did Kozmo.com increase productivity? Unquestionably. Did it make money? Absolutely not. The company shuttered in 2001 after slaughtering $200mn of venture capital. The lesson: productivity tools are only sustainable if they can generate economic returns.

Does AI increase productivity? Speaking anecdotally, yes. However, does AI make money? While precise figures are elusive, evidence seems to suggest not.

Companies, predominantly Big Tech, will spend roughly $400bn on AI-related infrastructure this year.³ By comparison, market leader OpenAI said in August that its annualized revenue exceeds $13bn which marks impressive growth relative to 2024 sales of $5.5bn, but is dwarfish relative to capital spend.

Sam Altman has predicted “trillions” of AI capital expenditure (“capex”) spend and McKinsey recently estimated the need for $6.7tn of infrastructure investment by 2030 to keep pace with compute power.⁴

Hence, not unlike the VC dollars that subsidized the delivery of Chunky Monkey, each AI query is currently largely being financed by Big Tech and venture firms. The staggering magnitude of capital required calls into question the viability of AI, writ large.

AI kills the golden goose/geese? 

Crucially, the current AI boom risks toppling the most sacrosanct names in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (“S&P 500”) ⁱⁱⁱ, which creates significant systematic risk for U.S. investors. Given Big Tech’s monstrous index weighting, any waning of the mania risks collapsing the S&P’s lofty valuation.⁵

The rents earned by U.S. megacaps have provided the riches to fund AI investment, but for how long will the market countenance these outlays?

The S&P 500 has been boosted by a handful of companies with near mythical business models that have enabled growth with de minimis marginal costs and therefore powered mammoth cash generation. These businesses have enjoyed a virtuous cycle whereby sky-high valuations have lowered their cost of capital, reinforcing growth, margin and cash flows. Amazon arguably enjoyed an effective zero WACC before achieving scale and stumbling upon the AWS cash engine.

As depicted in the chart below, AI has already dimmed the magic of the S&P’s hegemons by consuming their vaunted cash flows.

Capex, FCF Margin and Revenue Growth: MSFT, AMZN, GOOG and META

Source: BOND Capital (06/02/2025)

September 30, 2025

Plus, massive capex today will create depreciation expenses (albeit non-cash) that will weigh on earnings per share (“EPS”) for years to come.

Thus far, the market has rewarded Big Tech’s spending, but at some point, chasing the chimera of AI riches with impunity may stop. Not unlike the market’s refusal to reward growth in oil & gas post-shale (thereby strangling access to capital), sentiment towards spending can shift rapidly.

Ominously, in their “The GenAI Divide: State of AI in Business 2025” dispatch, MIT NANDA (Networked Agents and Decentralized AI) reported that 95% of businesses are reporting zero return on their AI investments.⁶ The shot clock on AI may be ticking…

Fed war a core threat 

The recent infringement on Federal Reserve independence, in our view, represents the biggest threat to U.S. monetary policy since Andrew Jackson killed the Second Bank of the United States (a Fed predecessor), which left the country without a centralized authority for more than seventy years.

More recently, the most notable political interference in monetary policy occurred when Richard Nixon cajoled Fed chair Arthur Burns to lower rates ahead of the 1972 election. While many factors contributed to amplify its impact (e.g. oil shocks, hangover from LBJ’s Guns and Butter programs), the Fed’s imprudent cuts nevertheless catalyzed the debilitating inflation that manacled the economy throughout the decade. It required the courage of Paul Volker to wrangle inflation through punishing rate hikes, which smoothed aggregate demand.

The U.S. economy paid a heavy price for the politicization of monetary policy. Nixon’s meddling appears picayune relative to the current administration’s attempt to fire a Fed governor to install a more dovish loyalist.

Turkey highlights the consequences of executive intrusion into monetary matters. President Erdogan has actively interfered with monetary policy, beginning with the appointment of his son-in-law as Turkey’s finance minister shortly after his election. During Erdogan’s tenure, which is ongoing, inflation averaged 26.7% (cumulative price change 967.8%) from 2014 through 2024.⁷

Paraphrasing renowned economist and former advisor to the New York Federal Reserve Kenneth Rogoff in his recent book Our Dollar, Your Problem, the global trust that the U.S. Federal Reserve will deliver stable prices “is the single most important bulwark that stands between global economic stability and the return of the macroeconomic stone ages—that is to say, the 1970s.” Politicizing monetary policy undermines this fundamental trust.

The market has largely ignored the administration’s efforts, reflecting the low likelihood of success on legal grounds. Further, we believe a galvanic negative bond market response could ultimately stomp out these incursions.

The Good

Market watchers always sound smarter emphasizing the negative; careers have been built on permabear narratives. Hence, we consciously attempt to provide balance to my commentary.

Hard to kill 

The resilience of the U.S. economy amid a cavalcade of disorder has been astounding.

Global trade and security relationships have been reshuffled amid a protracted land war in Europe and the dramatic amplification of Middle East conflict, while U.S. rule of law, governance and monetary policy norms have been challenged by a rollback of both free-market orthodoxy and democratic institutions amid heightened cost of capital reflected by U.S. 10-year Treasury yields averaging 4.11% over the last three years compared to 1.54% in the previous three at the same time that American universities (the envy of the world) are under assault. (Editor’s note: intentional run-on sentence for dramatic effect)

Powering through this tumult is a testament to the U.S. economy’s underlying soundness, we believe a derivative of COVID. Rock-bottom interest rates and fiscal spending enabled household and corporate balance sheet repair and the ensuing market rally facilitated astounding wealth creation.

With confidence at the cornerstone of GDP growth, recent economic strength could become self-fulling if a perception of economic invulnerability takes hold. If this backdrop hasn’t toppled U.S. GDP, what will?

Relatedly, stimulus from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act—including provisions like the acceleration of depreciation expense—may provide fiscal fuel to reinvigorate the economy.

September 30, 2025

The leverage to leverage 

The most traumatic economic episodes of the post-war era have given rise to today’s historically healthy household balance sheets, as demonstrated below.

U.S. Household Leverage (%)

Source: Federal Reserve Board (07/10/2025)

The emotional wounds of the Great Financial Crisis (the market and economic downturn beginning in the 2007-2008 timeframe) and the subsequent decreased availability of subprime credit has driven significant consumer deleveraging, while elevated asset values from COVID have amplified net worth.

A boost in confidence could prompt releveraging, driving further growth. The healthy aggregate consumer profile may also mute the next downturn by providing spending power for displaced workers. Recall, the pain of GFC was in part derived from households being forced to deleverage amid job loss, obliterating discretionary spending.

Dry powder 

As well documented, roughly $7tn of assets have flooded into money market funds (MMFs) since the Fed’s first hike in March 2022.

MMFs have historically moved in lock step with the federal funds rate (“fed funds rate”), meaning their yields should fall in lockstep with potential cuts. As rates decrease, these dollars in time migrate into other assets, providing firepower for markets.

However, a lower rate environment isn’t friction-free. A 100 bp decline in yields would wipe out $70bn of (near risk-free) interest income from investors’ portfolios. This could prompt investors to move out on the risk spectrum amid already lofty valuations, thus heightening asset bubble risk.

High-end consumer remains stalwart 

Spending by high-end U.S. consumers shows little sign of slowing, as reflected in the graph below.

September 30, 2025

U.S. Consumption by Income Cohort

Source: Moody’s Analytics (08/12/2025)

Lower income consumers show clear signs of stress as evidenced by higher delinquencies across lending categories; credit card delinquencies are near GFC highs.⁸ These consumers will face further stress from provisions in the OBBB, including reductions of SNAP benefits and lost healthcare coverage.

Despite their economic strain, the lowest income cohort represents around 9% of U.S. consumption compared to 39% and 23% for the highest income quintile and fourth income quintile, respectively.⁹ Hence, strength at the high end has so far subsumed low end stress.

September 30, 2025

The Opportunity

Evidence of lofty public market valuations are both unambiguous and well documented.

Anecdotally, BC Partners in recent weeks has walked away from deals priced at levels we generously characterize as “aggressive.” In our specialty finance vertical, a company that filed for bankruptcy last year recently obtained financing at S+275 bps and a 92% advance rate (or providing capital up to 92% of total value). For perspective, that’s roughly the same yield as 10-year Indian sovereign debt. Deals like this could herald the top of the market in public credit.

Before delving into areas of opportunity for BC Partners’ investors, I want to highlight a key driver behind the growth of private credit: the marked rise of passive investing.

As illustrated below, passive vehicles captured significant share from active over the last decade.

U.S. Flow of Funds

Source: Morningstar (year-end 2024)

Notably, in 2024, passive funds attracted $886bn of new capital while active vehicles lost $166bn of assets.¹⁰ Last year, passive surpassed active, comprising 53% market share compared to 47%.¹¹

Asset selection has become a dying art as an increasing percentage of “buy” and “sell” decisions have become dictated solely by fund flows. Earnings and other signals have been muffled by cash inflows and outflows, stifling the market’s normal response mechanism.

As passive has crowded out fundamentals, daring hedge funds taking directional bets (short and long) have been replaced by factor-driven pod shops with nanosecond holding periods, amplifying the breakdown of market efficiency.

The silent coup d'état of passive has created market distortion like the once unthinkable prices of Big Tech. As shown below, NVIDIA’s valuation has steadily outpaced its revenue growth due in part to passive investing.

September 30, 2025

NVIDIA Normalized Revenue vs. Normalized Market Cap (2025 represents year 1)

Source: Bloomberg, company financials and ChatGPT.

If a passive vehicle receives inflows, those dollars will buy a proportionate share of a stock in the reference index; from 1x sales or 1000x sales, valuation is irrelevant in that equation. This dynamic skews our economy by potentially rewarding large index constituents with a lower cost of capital that can stifle competitors.

Private credit has no equivalent. An investor cannot, for instance, passively buy, overhaul, and sell a jet engine. Structured equity entails hammering out a capital solution specific to each individual company; there is no formulaic approach. Asset based lending involves a double underwrite—both an assessment of the actual assets as well as the financial health of the borrower.

We believe a passive approach to such lending would be a manifest disaster for investors. Formulaic flows would perhaps sustain some struggling private borrowers, but more often would incinerate capital by providing more debt to businesses unable to service their borrowings.

In short, we believe private credit is among the last remaining corners of active management. As allocators—both institutional and individuals—push an increasing share of their equities into passive, private credit provides a compelling offset.

Of course, there are gradations of active management within private credit. Larger vehicles often serve as price-takers given the need to deploy hoards of capital, thereby forcing investors to sacrifice returns in exchange for the theoretical safety of big shops.

In contrast, as among the most prominent players in the middle market, BC Partners believes in engaging in fundamental analysis and capital structure assessment and/or formation for every name in our portfolio.

How we are making money 

BC Partners benefits from our ability to write “small checks” by virtue of our size and leveraging our institutional platform to capture larger transactions as well.

The firm recently purchased a $1.2bn aviation portfolio. In isolation, this deal would comprise a sizable percentage of our AUM and potentially represent an imprudent check size, regardless of its return potential.

September 30, 2025

However, BC Partners populated the deal among internal vehicles and syndicated the remainder to our limited partners (“LPs”) as a co-invest. The flexibility to scale a deal, when appropriate, unlocks opportunities and rewards our largest partners with a direct investment. We followed a similar path with a recent first-lien deal in the healthcare technology space.

To be sure, BC Partners does not need to write big tickets, but we can when the opportunity presents itself, which is an ideal setup, in our view.

As previously noted, the dearth of private equity exits has boosted demand for BC Partners’ NAV lending and structured equity solutions. The difficult private equity (“PE”) backdrop has also uncovered bridge equity opportunities. BC Partners has been lending sponsors short-term capital on a first lien basis, which gets repaid at transaction closing.

Wrap-up 

We are not macroeconomists, and our investment process is ultimately driven by fundamental credit selection, but a consideration of the backdrop underpins all of our investment decisions. We contrast our approach with that of passive peers.

Uncertainty looms, with stagflation potentially emerging, which could be worsened by a pullback in AI spending that could puncture the S&P 500. While rate cuts may reinvigorate GDP and jolt animal spirits, it may lead to further inflation and elevate asset bubble risk.

Regardless of the route, stretched public market asset prices provide a narrow path for investors, in our view. Deploying capital at higher valuations has historically resulted in underwhelming returns. Plus, should the market roll over, the downside descent could be steep.

As noted earlier, BC Partners has concerns that we may be at the top of the market which may pose a risk to investors who over allocate to passive funds. In our view, actively managed private credit funds provide a safe haven.

Fund Performance

The Fund gained 3.3% in the 12 months ending 9/30/2025, inclusive of a special distribution to our shareholders at the end of calendar 2024. Cumulative returns remains our focus, however, because they reflect the Fund’s longer-term investing perspective:

Cumulative Returns, Since Inception

Source: Bloomberg. Total return from 10/27/2015 through September 30, 2025

I would argue a Fund cannot beat its benchmark by more than 1.2x by focusing on quarterly performance.

What didn’t work (yet)

The largest detractor in the period was equity of Jo-Ann Stores (JoAnn Inc.), which sought bankruptcy protection after struggling to source inventory from China for the 2024 holiday season—a precursor to the trade war. The Fund received a disproportionate share of reorg equity by participating in the new money Term Loan during the company’s first restructuring. The rise and subsequent crash of this equity proved a headwind.

Shares of Aperture Dodge (Aperture Dodge 18 LLC)—a specialty finance business focused on overseas remittances (particularly to Mexico)— dropped during the period as the business adjusts to U.S. immigration uncertainty. The company has been outperforming the market, but remittance volumes have dropped materially in 2025.

What worked

The Credit Income Fund benefited from several strong gainers in the period.

September 30, 2025

Online auto marketplace Autorola (Marvel APS, (Autorola Group Holding A/S), Delayed Draw Term Loan) was one of largest contributors, helped by strong underlying performance.

Preferred debt of education and training provider Pennfoster (Pennfoster) was a positive contributor to our shareholders in the period, helped by strong enrollment rates; in 2Q25, revenue and EBITDA gained 4.0% and 17.0% respectively. The company has launched a refinancing process for its 1L debt and the resulting lower cost of debt will benefit our Preferreds.

In addition to these names, the Fund enjoyed returns from other positions, demonstrating a breadth of positive credit selection. Further, the Fund has several existing loans poised for strong recovery in the coming months and quarters.

What we are excited about going forward

EagleView Technologies (Phoenix Finance, Inc., First Lien Term Loan & Phoenix Finance, Inc., Second Lien Term Loan), whose loans are marked at 90, should continue to climb as the company continues to post notable growth thanks to its new ARR contract model.

Physical therapy platform Upstream Rehab (Upstream Rehabilitation, Inc., Second Lien Term Loan) battled wage inflation, labor availability and poor operating performance last year. The company, whose second lien loans are marked in the 60s, will benefit from a contemplated Amend & Extend transaction as well as a management change which has refocused the business on operational execution; results have already started to recover after a disappointing 2024.

Food manufacturer Florida Food (Florida Food Products LLC, Second Lien Term Loan), whose loans are also marked in the 60s, recently received capital to support a new $100mn contract award in the coffee segment and the company has a new growth initiative in the energy drink segment. The combination of these new businesses as well as continued recovery in core products will drive ongoing recovery.

Spanish Broadcasters (Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc.) is the nation’s leading Hispanic radio systems. Bonds that we purchased in the 70s have traded into the 60s after a mildly disappointing 2024. Management has signaled intentions to sell their cash burning TV assets and non-core real estate to fund a sizable debt paydown. This will, we believe, result in improved trading of remaining bonds.

As for new deals, we funded an additional program for Pocket.Watch (PocketWatch, Inc., First Lien Term Loan), and our investors are being paid directly by Disney. We expect follow-on opportunities with Netflix before year end, enabling us to continue scaling.

We have been around this situation for a while, but we expect to close before year end an IP acquisition in the entertainment industry, which we believe has potential for returns measured in multiples, not percents.

Positioning

From a positioning standpoint, we highlight that the Fund liquidated its BDC portfolio to less than 1% of AUM. With significant market uncertainty and tight credit spreads, we believe it prudent to reduce our exposure to levered credit.

We, of course, did not anticipate the blow-ups of First Brand or Tricolor Holding, but our proactive selling proved prescient for our shareholders as the Van Eck BDC Index has declined 6.7% this year through 9/30/2025.¹² We have further sidestepped the downside volatility after quarter end as well.

Our most important positioning remains in relation to leverage. Unlike most of our peers, the Credit Income Fund does not employ running leverage (except as a currency hedge). We look forward to using our facility to feast during the market’s inevitable next downturn. Our levered competitors—who have sacrificed long-term performance in exchange for near-term gains—will be sidelined when the market is most attractive.

September 30, 2025

Conclusion

I sometimes joke that the Credit Income Fund has been my “non-DNA child.” I have raised every single dollar, having forged incredible relationships with our partners along the way. Additionally, my children (my literal DNA children) also have their college dollars in the Fund as well.

Hence, I personally feel every disappointment of the Fund in a visceral way.

There is no ambiguity, our returns over the last year—although positive—remain well below our standards. As highlighted in the “What we are excited about” section, the Fund is extremely well positioned to rebound going forward and should benefit from its available leverage capacity.

As always, we look forward to our continued partnership.

Regards, 

Michael Terwilliger, CFA 

Portfolio Manager* 

Alternative Credit Income Fund

September 30, 2025

Important information: 

An investor should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges, and expenses of the Fund carefully before investing. To obtain a copy of the prospectus containing this and other information, please call (833) 404-4103 or download the file from www.opportunisticcreditintervalfund.com. Read the prospectus carefully before you invest. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The Fund is distributed by ALPS Distributors, Inc. (ALPS Distributors, Inc. 1290 Broadway, Suite 1000, Denver, CO 80203). Sierra Crest (the Fund's investment adviser), its affiliates, and ALPS Distributors, Inc. are not affiliated. Investing involves risk. Investment return and the principal value of an investment will fluctuate, and an Investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost.

The Fund is subject to the general risks associated with investing in debt and loan instruments, including market, credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk. The Fund is subject to management and other expenses, which will be paid by the Fund. Because of the risks associated with the Fund’s ability to use leverage, an investment in the Fund should be considered speculative and involving a high degree of risk, including the risk of a substantial loss of investment. There currently is no secondary market for the Fund's shares and the Fund expects that no secondary market will develop. Shares of the Fund will not be listed on any securities exchange, which makes them inherently illiquid. An investment in the Fund's shares is not suitable for investors who cannot tolerate risk of loss or who require liquidity, other than the liquidity provided through the Fund's repurchase policy. Limited liquidity is provided to shareholders only through the Fund's quarterly repurchase offers, regardless of how the Fund performs.

The Fund's distributions policy may, under certain circumstances, have certain adverse consequences to the Fund and its shareholders because it may result in a return of capital, resulting in less of a shareholder's assets being invested in the Fund, and, over time, increase the Fund's expense ratio. Any invested capital that is returned to the shareholder will be reduced by the Fund's fees and expenses, as well as the applicable sales load. Investments in lesser-known, small and medium capitalization companies may be more vulnerable than larger, more established organizations. The sales of securities to fund repurchases could reduce the market price of those securities, which in turn would reduce the Fund's NAV.

The Fund’s performance figures for the periods ended September 30, 2025, compared to its benchmark:

The Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan TR USD Index is a market value-weighted index designed to measure the performance of the U.S. leveraged loan market based upon market weightings, spreads and interest payments. Investors cannot invest directly in an index.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate. An investor’s shares when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. Total return is calculated assuming reinvestment of all dividends and distributions. Performance figures for periods less than one year are not annualized. As of the Fund’s most recent prospectus dated January 28, 2025, the Fund’s total annual operating expenses, including acquired fund fees and expenses, before fee waivers is 5.21% for Class A, 5.99% for Class C, 5.26% for Class W, 5.07% for Class I and 5.56% for Class L shares. After fee waivers, the Fund’s total annual operating expense is 4.84% for Class A, 5.60% for Class C, 4.84% for Class W, 4.59% for Class I and 5.09% for Class L shares. Class A shares are subject to maximum sales loads of 5.75% imposed on purchases. Class L shares are subject to a maximum sales load of 4.25% imposed on purchases. Share repurchases within 365 days may be subject to an early withdrawal charge of 0.50% for Class A and 1.00% for Class C shares. For performance information current to the most recent month-end, please call toll-free 1-833-404-4103.

Comparison of the Change in Value of a $10,000 Investment

Consolidated Portfolio Composition as of September 30, 2025  

Please see the Consolidated Schedule of Investments for a detailed listing of the Fund’s holdings.

        September 30, 2025

See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. 

See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements.

See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements.

See Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements.

September 30, 2025